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Abstract 
 
Joint practical deliberation is the activity of deciding together what to do. In this dissertation, I 
argue that several speech acts that we can use to alter our moral obligations – promises, offers, 
requests, demands, commands, and agreements – are moves within joint practical deliberation. 
 
The dissertation begins by investigating joint practical deliberation. The resulting account implies 
that joint deliberation is more flexible than we usually recognize, in two ways. First, we can make 
joint decisions not only about what we will do together, but also about what you or I will do alone. 
Second, we can deliberate by means of two distinct methods: propose-and-ratify, in which a 
proposed joint decision must be explicitly accepted to come into effect, and propose-and-challenge, in 
which a proposed joint decision comes into force unless it is explicitly challenged. 
 
Varying these parameters generates a botany of different kinds of proposals we can make within 
joint deliberation. When we look at these proposals more closely, we make a surprising discovery: 
for each kind of proposal we can make in joint practical deliberation, there is an everyday speech 
act with the very same properties. A certain kind of proposal to make a joint decision regarding 
one’s own actions has the same normative effects, under the same conditions, as a promise. One 
kind of proposal to make a joint decision regarding one’s addressee’s actions has all the essential 
features of a command; another kind of deliberative proposal – with the same content but a 
different method of evaluation – looks exactly like a request. And so on. 
These similarities are too systematic to be coincidental. The only explanation, I argue, is that 
these ordinary speech acts are identical to their doppelgängers within joint practical deliberation. 
Promises and offers are proposals to make joint decisions about what I will do. Commands, demands, 
and requests are proposals to make joint decisions about what you will do. And agreements are joint 
decisions about what we will do. Call this the deliberative theory of these speech acts. 
 
Considering each speech act in turn, I defend the deliberative theory by arguing that it provides 
a uniquely powerful explanation of its targets’ social and moral significance. Once we see how 
naturally these speech acts fall out of our practice of joint deliberation, theories that treat them as 
sui generis – as many moral philosophers now do – will come to seem redundant and 
nonexplanatory. Conversely, thinking of promises, offers, commands, demands, requests, and 
agreements as moves within joint practical deliberation allows us to give an elegant and 
generative theory of these phenomena that have confounded moral philosophers for so long. 
 
Thesis Supervisor: Kieran Setiya 
Title: Professor of Philosophy  
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Introduction 
 
A few words can make a big moral difference. If I say, “I’ll come to your talk, I promise,” 
this transforms my later absence from a mild disappointment into a breach of trust. When the 
commander yells, “Retreat!” the choice to charge ahead is no longer merely imprudent: it is now 
insubordination. If a recovering addict asks you to be her sponsor, then in simply saying “Yes,” 
you undertake a life-altering responsibility. 
These cases illustrate a puzzling fact: some obligations are such that we can create them 
seemingly at will. This is puzzling because so many obligations are not this way: for example, 
nothing anyone says can alter my obligation to not inflict pointless suffering. But when I make a 
promise, offer, or demand, accept a request or agreement, or give a command, I seem to change 
what morality requires simply by declaring it to be so.1 How could this be? 
In this dissertation I will defend a novel answer to this question: these speech acts change 
our obligations by changing what we have jointly decided to do.2 When you and I decide that we 
will get lunch tomorrow, we each become obligated to the other to show up for lunch. This is not 
so puzzling: it is because we are both obligated to follow through on the plans we make with 
others. What we have changed by declaration is not directly what morality requires, but instead 
what our joint plan is – which in turn morality requires us to follow. 
I think that all of the above examples can be explained in this way. To see this, we have to 
understand just how flexible and pervasive joint decision-making is. 
                                                
1 Conspicuously absent from this list is consent, another speech act with the power to change morality by declaration. 
Consent has the power to make otherwise wrongful actions permissible, as when one consents to surgery or sex. Like 
the other speech acts covered in this dissertation, I believe that consent is best understood as a move within joint 
practical deliberation. In particular, I think that consent is a certain kind of proposal to retract a joint decision that is 
already in force. To defend this hypothesis, however, I would need to defend its implications for the nature of the 
rights that consent waives. Given the centrality of rights in moral philosophy – and the massive literature on the 
subject – doing justice to this topic would probably require another dissertation. Sadly, consent will have to wait. 
2 Following convention, I will use the term ‘speech act’ to refer to the kind of communicative action of which 
promises, assertions, questions, commands, etc. are paradigm cases. But I do not assume that such acts can only be 
performed using speech: I might make a promise with a significant nod, or ask a question by raising an eyebrow. 
Thanks to Caspar Hare and Matt Mandelkern for suggesting I clarify this point. 
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The first step is to observe that we can make joint decisions not just about what we will do, 
but also about what you will do or what I will do. If we are building a fire, we might jointly decide 
that you will gather the kindling, leaving it quite open what I will do. This could happen in at 
least two ways. You could offer to gather the kindling, and I could accept your offer. Or, I could 
ask you to gather kindling, and you could accept my request. The result of both these exchanges 
is a joint decision to the effect that you will gather the kindling. 
The second step is to distinguish two methods of joint decision-making (see Ch. 1, §3.1). 
Offers and requests employ what I call the propose-and-ratify method: the speaker proposes a joint 
decision, and then the addressee(s) must explicitly accept the proposal for it to come into force. 
But we can also use what I call the propose-and-challenge method, in which a proposed joint decision 
comes into force by default unless it is explicitly challenged. This, I suggest, is how promises, 
demands, and commands work. Promises propose joint decisions regarding one’s own actions by 
means of propose-and-challenge: “I’ll gather the kindling.” Commands and demands propose 
joint decisions regarding another’s actions using propose-and-challenge: “Go get the kindling!” 
My thesis is that promises, offers, agreements, requests, commands, and demands are all 
moves within joint practical deliberation, the activity of deciding together what to do. Promises and 
offers are proposals to make joint decisions about what I will do. Commands, demands, and requests 
are all proposals to make joint decisions about what you will do. Agreements are joint decisions 
regarding what we will do. Call this the deliberative theory of these speech acts. In the chapters to 
come, I will defend the deliberative theory by showing how it offers a uniquely powerful 
explanation of these speech acts’ social and moral significance. Once we see how naturally these 
speech acts fall out of our everyday practice of joint deliberation, theories that treat them as sui 
generis – as many moral philosophers now do – will come to seem redundant and nonexplanatory. 
The deliberative theory makes claims of the form “X is Y”: e.g., “promises are proposals 
to make joint decisions about one’s own actions.” The theory aims to illuminate various 
phenomena we recognize in ordinary language (promises, commands, etc.) by identifying them 
with elements in a more abstract theory (proposals in joint practical deliberation). In this sense, 
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the deliberative theory offers an analysis of these speech acts: it tells us what they are. On what basis 
might we accept such an analysis? 
Compare an analysis we do accept: the thesis that temperature is mean kinetic energy. (I 
am told that the truth is a bit more complex; but that should not matter for our purposes). 
Suppose you are an eighteenth-century physicist developing a theory of molecular motion. As 
you perform your calculations, you come to a surprising realization: your theory predicts that the 
mean kinetic energy of the molecules that compose a substance will be perfectly correlated with that 
substance’s temperature. Just as increasing a gas’s pressure will heat the gas up, so too it will 
increase the gas’s mean kinetic energy; just as decreasing the temperature of water makes it 
freeze, so too will decreasing its mean kinetic energy. What could explain these observations? 
The best explanation seems to be that temperature and mean kinetic energy are the same 
property. After all, you might reason, it is unlikely that there are two separate properties, 
temperature and mean kinetic energy, which coincidentally happen to have the very same 
characteristics. And by accepting their identity, you gain a great deal of explanatory power. You 
can now explain temperature’s various quirks and qualities by showing how they can be derived 
from the laws of molecular motion (cf. Block & Stalnaker 1999: 23-24). Where before it was an 
isolated phenomenon, practically essential but theoretically opaque, temperature now becomes 
an integrated part of our wider understanding of how particles interact. 
My argument for the deliberative theory takes the same form. I begin by providing an 
independently motivated theory of joint practical deliberation. (In our analogy, this plays the role 
of the theory of molecular motion). My account of this activity, presented in Chapter 1, is based 
on two main ideas. First, joint practical deliberation has the same structure as individual practical 
deliberation, the activity of deciding what to do alone. Second, joint practical deliberation cannot 
require its participants to give up their individual rationality or autonomy. Teasing out the 
consequences of these two constraints, we can derive a detailed account of joint practical 
deliberation’s nature and norms. 
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Varying the parameters of this theory, we can generate a botany of different kinds of 
proposals that can be made within joint deliberation. We can then use the theory to predict the 
normative and communicative properties each proposal will have. When we do so, we make a 
surprising discovery: for each kind of proposal we can make in joint practical deliberation, there 
is an ordinary, everyday speech act with the very same properties. A certain kind of proposal to 
make a joint decision regarding one’s own actions has the same normative effects, under the 
same conditions, as a promise. One kind of proposal to make a joint decision regarding the 
addressee’s actions has all the essential features of a command; another kind of proposal – with 
the same content but a different method of evaluation – looks exactly like a request. And so on. 
These similarities are too systematic to be coincidental. The best explanation, I argue, is 
that these ordinary speech acts are identical to their doppelgängers within joint practical 
deliberation. After all, it is unlikely that there are two separate sets of speech acts that 
coincidentally happen to have the very same characteristics: promises, requests, etc. on the one 
hand, and proposals in joint deliberation on the other. And by accepting this analysis, we gain a 
great deal of explanatory power. We can now explain each speech act’s distinctive quirks and 
qualities by showing how they can be derived from the laws of joint practical deliberation. Where 
before they were isolated phenomena, practically essential but theoretically opaque, promises, 
offers, requests, agreements, demands, and commands now become an integrated part of our 
wider understanding of how people interact. 
The rest of the dissertation applies this explanatory strategy to each speech act in detail. 
We begin, in Chapter 2, with promises. Out of the speech acts that the deliberative theory 
targets, promises have received the most philosophical attention by far. Thus I develop the 
deliberative theory of promises in the most detail, showing how it predicts and explains the well-
studied nuances of this speech act. Why is the obligation to keep a promise owed to the promisee 
in particular? Because the joint decision in which this obligation is based was as much the 
promisee’s as it was the promisor’s. How is it possible for the promisee to release the promisor 
from her obligation? She can do so by proposing to retract the joint decision the promise brought 
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into force. Why are promises induced by coercion or deception not binding? Because if you 
coerce or deceive me into making a promise, you cannot be deliberating with me in good faith, 
and this renders null and void any ‘joint’ decisions we reach. 
Chapter 3 extends the deliberative theory to offers, agreements, and requests – speech 
acts that have received far less philosophical discussion. I point out that these speech acts are all 
deeply similar to promises, sharing promises’ characteristic pattern of normative force and 
validity conditions. This is just as the deliberative theory would predict: since promises, offers, 
agreements, and requests all have the effect of bringing a joint decision into force, we should 
expect their similarities to be more significant than their differences. Other theories have a 
harder time explaining the unity of these speech acts. The only way they can do so, it seems, is by 
claiming that offers, agreements, and requests are special kinds of promises. But, I argue, this 
reductive view fails to capture the features that make offers, agreements, and requests distinctive. 
In Chapter 4, we turn to demands and commands. I argue that these two terms of 
ordinary English pick out the same speech act employed in different situations. Both commands 
and demands are proposals to make joint decisions regarding the addressee’s actions using the 
propose-and-challenge method. We call such proposals demands when they propose actions that 
their addressees were already obligated to do: as when you come across me stomping on a child’s 
sand castle and demand, “Stop that at once!” And we call these proposals commands (or, 
equivalently, orders) when they propose actions that their addressees would otherwise not have 
been obligated to do: as when a sergeant commands her soldiers, “Drop and give me fifty!” 
(Push-ups, that is). In a slogan: commands create new obligations, while demands hold people to 
the obligations they already have. I argue that the deliberative theory explains the common force 
of these speech acts while predicting the differences between them. 
Beginning with demands, I show how the deliberative theory helps to capture our 
intuitive judgments about what we can legitimately demand of one another. There are some 
actions I ought to do, but nobody can demand that I do: brush my teeth, eat my vegetables, 
cultivate my painting hobby. There are other actions that particular people seem to have special 
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standing to demand of me: my mother can demand that I call her on her birthday, my students 
can demand that I grade their papers fairly. Finally, there are actions it seems that everyone can 
demand of me: that I not stomp on children’s sand castles, or dump poison into the ocean. Why 
can people demand some actions of me but not others? It has to do, I suggest, with what reasons 
I share with others in the sense relevant to joint practical deliberation. By looking at the shared 
reasons we take up in joint deliberation, I argue, we can predict when others will have the 
standing to make demands of us, and when they should mind their own business. 
The deliberative theory of commands is surprising. It is odd to describe commands as 
proposing joint decisions, since commands involve a steep asymmetry in power between speaker 
and addressee. I argue that this asymmetry arises because commands employ the propose-and-
challenge method. Propose-and-challenge gives the speaker disproportionate power: her 
proposals come into force by default unless someone raises a convincing objection to them. But 
sometimes we have good reason to give someone this kind of power. If we are unloading a 
moving van, for example, things will go more smoothly if we make one person the ‘leader’, giving 
her exclusive power to direct traffic by propose-and-challenge. By asking when we ought to give 
someone this deliberative power, we can derive a predictive account of what it takes to have 
legitimate authority. 
 The speech acts this dissertation investigates are of more than just theoretical interest. 
They play a critical role in our social lives and moral thought. Our daily schedules are structured 
around the commitments we make using promises, offers, agreements, and requests. You might 
spend the morning reading a draft that your student requested comments on, go to the lunch 
meeting you agreed to attend, drive to pick up the friend whom you offered a ride to the airport, 
and spend the evening taking your daughter to the movies, as you promised her you would. 
Commands and demands may be less salient in daily life, but are of no less significance. 
Many of the institutions of modern civilization – governments, universities, corporations – are 
built on the idea of authority to command. And in our personal lives, we pay careful attention to 
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the question of what our friends, family, and colleagues can demand of us. The thought that we 
might not live up to one of these demands has a motivating force unlike almost any other. 
This dissertation is thus not just about the philosophical puzzle of how it is possible to 
change our obligations with words. Its true aim is to build a framework within which we can 
locate and illuminate these forms of speech that carry so much weight in our daily lives. If you 
have ever gone out of your way to fulfill a promise, been excited by an offer, hashed out the 
terms of an agreement, felt nervous about making a request, resented the commands of an 
authority, or been moved by the thought of what someone could demand of you, this dissertation 
is an attempt to better understand your life. 
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Chapter 1 
Joint Practical Deliberation 
 
Joint practical deliberation is the activity of deciding together what to do.1 When friends 
discuss where to meet for coffee, when doctors debate whether to perform a risky surgery, when 
partners talk about whether to have a third child, they are engaged in joint practical deliberation. 
They are trying to arrive at a single plan of action that expresses and governs all of their wills. 
My account of this activity will be based upon two guiding ideas. The first idea is that 
joint practical deliberation is an activity of the very same kind as individual practical deliberation, 
the activity people engage in when they deliberate alone about what to do. Like making lasagna 
or going for a walk, practical deliberation is the kind of activity that can be performed both 
together and alone. The second idea is that the norms of joint practical deliberation must be 
compatible with the requirements of individual rationality and autonomy. It must be possible to 
fully participate in the activity of joint practical deliberation without giving up one’s individual 
commitment to acting rationally and autonomously. 
Together, these two ideas suggest a strategy for investigating joint practical deliberation. 
The first idea suggests that joint practical deliberation will have the same structure as individual 
practical deliberation. So, we should begin by looking at individual practical deliberation, and 
asking what it would take for two or more agents to engage in a single activity with the same 
structure.2 We can then leverage the second idea to fill in the details of this structure, asking what 
the norms of joint deliberation would have to be in order to be compatible with each of its 
                                                
1 A note to the reader. This chapter lays the foundation for the whole variety of arguments and applications that will 
occupy the remainder of the dissertation. As a result, however, it is an exercise in delayed gratification. To develop 
all the tools we need, the following sections must cover details the relevance of which will not become fully clear until 
later in the dissertation. Readers who are anxious to get straight to the applications are welcome to read the interim 
summary in §4 and then skip to the presentation of the deliberative theory in §6. You can then refer back to the 
other sections of this chapter as needed to understand later arguments. 
2 This strategy distinguishes my account from other work on joint practical deliberation (e.g., Westlund 2009; Laden 
2012; Bratman 2014: Ch. 7): these philosophers put much less weight on the idea that joint deliberation is analogous 
in structure to individual deliberation. 
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participants’ rationality and autonomy. This chapter will pursue this strategy, pulling a theory of 
joint practical deliberation out of the constraints imposed by these two basic premises. 
First, a methodological note. You might have expected that our account of joint practical 
deliberation would have to begin by investigating the nature of joint activity in general. In other 
words, you might think we need to begin by answering the question: what does it take for two or 
more agents to do something together, rather than each acting separately? But, while this question 
is important, I don’t think we need to answer it here. 
To see why, suppose we are investigating some other everyday joint activity: for example, 
the activity of going on a date. The questions we are likely to ask will concern the features that 
distinguish dates from other kinds of joint activities. What is the difference between going to the 
movies as a date and going to the movies as friends? What are the common features that make 
disparate date activities – going to the movies, eating a meal, touring an art gallery – all count as 
dates? But it seems clear that we can answer these questions without saying what it is that makes 
a date a joint activity. In fact, the metaphysics of joint activity seems irrelevant to our inquiry. 
Instead, we should take the fact that dates are joint activities for granted, and focus on the 
specific structure and norms that make dating unique. 
I think we should approach joint practical deliberation in the same way. Instead of 
worrying about what makes joint practical deliberation a joint activity, we should take the 
jointness of this activity for granted, and focus on elaborating its specific structure and norms. 
Proceeding in this way, we can learn a great deal about the nature of joint practical deliberation 
while saying almost nothing about the metaphysics of joint action. Indeed, as far as I can tell, the 
theory of joint practical deliberation offered in this chapter is compatible with any of the theories 
of joint action currently on the market (e.g., Tuomela 2007, Gilbert 2011a, and Bratman 2014). 
 
1. The structure and elements of joint practical deliberation 
Let us begin by looking at individual practical deliberation, and then ask what it would 
take for multiple persons to engage in a single activity with the same structure. 
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What is the structure of individual practical deliberation? Consider a concrete case: I am 
deciding where to get lunch. I am faced with a set of options, the potential actions I am choosing 
between (to go to Clover, to Mexicali, or to Darwin’s).3 My aim is to make a decision that narrows 
those options down to one (say, to go to Mexicali). However, my decision will (typically) not be 
arbitrary – it will be based on reasons. For example, the fact that Clover sources its food from local 
farmers might give me some reason to go there, while the fact that I’m craving a burrito might 
give me more reason to go to Mexicali, which makes a mean burrito. 
Putting these elements together, we can characterize individual practical deliberation as 
the process of making a decision about which of one’s options to perform on the basis of one’s 
reasons. By analogy, we can conclude that joint practical deliberation is a process of making a joint 
decision about which of our shared options to perform on the basis of our shared reasons. 
This schema already tells us something substantive about joint practical deliberation: we 
should reject the game-theoretic idea that joint deliberation is merely a negotiation between 
individuals who each take into account only their own preferences and beliefs. If we take the 
analogy between joint and individual deliberation seriously, then we should see joint deliberation 
as a collective undertaking where the participants start with a shared set of options and reasons 
and work together to reach a single decision that represents all of their wills (cf. Westlund 2009 
and Laden 2012: 184-197). 
Let us treat the italicized phrases in our schema as functional terms: ‘shared options,’ 
‘shared reasons’, and ‘joint decisions’ each refer to whatever it is that plays the same role in joint 
practical deliberation its analogue plays in individual practical deliberation. Our question now is 
what can play the roles picked out by these terms. Let’s consider each in turn. 
 
 
 
                                                
3 Clover, Mexicali, and Darwin’s are all restaurants nearby the MIT philosophy department. 
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1.1. Shared options 
In the individual case, a person’s options are the possible actions she might perform. This 
suggests an idea: in parallel with the popular possible worlds framework for modeling theoretical 
deliberation (e.g., Stalnaker 1984), we can model practical deliberation using a set of possible 
actions (cf. Gibbard 2003: Ch. 3).4 On this model, the content of a decision (to go to Mexicali) is a 
set of possible actions (the set of all actions in which I go to Mexicali), and the effect of this 
decision is to exclude from future consideration any possible actions outside of that set (e.g., going 
to C instead). A person’s options are the result of partitioning her possible actions into mutually 
exclusive subsets, each of which is the potential content of a decision. Thus one of my options  
might be the set of possible actions in which I go to Mexicali, another the set of possible actions 
in which I go to Darwin’s, and so on. 
This model is easily extended to the case of shared options. Instead of considering 
possible actions one person can perform, we can consider the possible combinations of actions 
multiple persons could compatibly undertake. This will include not only paradigm joint activities, 
but also any possible combinations of the relevant people’s individual actions, such as the 
combination in which I teach a class in Paris while you deliver a baby in Los Angeles. Let us 
model the shared options of multiple persons as mutually exclusive sets of possible combinations 
of their actions.5 Joint decisions take one of these sets as their content (say, the set in which we go 
to Mexicali together), and exclude from joint consideration combinations of actions that fall 
outside that set (e.g., my staying at home while you go to Mexicali alone). 
 Using this model, we can see how it is possible to make a joint decision about what you 
will do or about what I will do: we can decide upon a shared option that substantively constraints 
                                                
4 Different theories of options will read the ‘possible’ in ‘possible actions’ differently: see Hedden (2012) for a review. 
5 To clarify: all this model says is that whenever we do something, that involves you doing something and me doing 
something. The model does not say that everything we can do is a sum of something I could do without you and 
something you could do without me: you and I can carry a heavy couch together, though neither of us would be able 
to do our part in this action without the other. Nor does it say that when we break down what we do into what you 
do and what I do, there will be any natural way of describing those individual components: there is likely no natural 
way to describe what I do when we dance a waltz other than to say that I am doing my part in our dancing a waltz. 
Thanks to Kieran Setiya for discussion on this point. 
 18 
only one of our actions. Consider the set of possible combinations of our actions in which I 
gather the kindling for our campfire. Jointly deciding on this set would significantly constrain my 
actions, excluding from consideration any possible combinations of actions in which I don’t 
gather any kindling. However, it would leave your actions largely unconstrained: any action you 
could perform that is compatible with my gathering the kindling is part of one of the 
combinations of actions in this set. Thus it seems that nothing of substance is missing if we 
describe our joint decision simply as a decision that I will gather the kindling, omitting the implicit 
clause ‘and you will not prevent me from doing so.’6 
The most obvious examples of joint deliberation concern joint action: where we will meet 
for lunch, whether we will have a child, whom we should hire. But on reflection, there is no 
barrier to our jointly deliberating about what you or I will do individually. This is a crucial point, 
as many of the speech acts I will argue are proposals in joint deliberation concern only one 
person’s actions. Promises and offers concern only the speaker’s actions; requests, demands, and 
commands concern only the addressee’s. To deny the possibility of joint decisions like this, one 
would have to offer an alternative account of shared options that somehow excludes options that 
constrain only one agent’s behavior while remaining flexible enough to capture the full range of 
possible joint activities. I don’t see a principled way of doing this; nor do I see what would 
motivate the undertaking. The most natural account of shared options leaves room for joint 
decisions about what you or I will do alone. 
 
1.2. Joint decisions 
Our model of shared options entails an account of the content of joint decisions. Just as 
an individual’s decision takes one of her options as its content, our joint decision will take one of 
our shared options as its content. So, the content of a joint decision will be a set of possible 
                                                
6 This clause seems to apply to promises: we would normally be affronted if someone accepted a promise and then 
prevented us from carrying it out. See Darwall (2011: 268-269) and Gilbert (2011b: 99). 
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combinations of our actions: e.g., the content of our joint decision that we will go to Mexicali is 
the set of possible action combinations in which we go to Mexicali. 
But we want to understand not just the content of joint decisions, but their force. In the 
individual case, not just any representation of one’s own actions counts as a decision: I can suppose 
that I will φ, predict that I will φ, or tell a story in which I φ. What distinguishes my deciding to φ from 
these other representations of my φing is its effects on my thought and behavior. If I decide to φ, 
then I should be disposed to take the means I believe to be necessary to φing, and avoid 
performing actions I believe to be incompatible with my φing (Bratman 1987: 15-17). I should 
also be disposed to take it for granted that I will φ in my subsequent deliberation, excluding 
options in which I do not φ from live consideration. These claims are not only descriptions of the 
psychological effects of decisions, but are also normative claims about practical rationality: if I 
decide to φ but fail to be disposed in these ways, then I am failing to conform to the norms of 
individual practical deliberation (cf. Bratman 2009). 
 Similarly, for a representation of a shared option to count as a joint decision, it must have 
implications for the deliberative participants’ ongoing thought and behavior. If we jointly decide 
that I will φ, I should be disposed to take the means I believe to be necessary to φing and to avoid 
performing actions I believe to be incompatible with my φing. I should also be disposed to take it 
for granted that I will φ in my subsequent deliberation, excluding options in which I do not φ 
from live consideration.7 These claims are not only descriptions of the psychological effects of 
joint decisions, but are also normative claims about the requirements of joint deliberation: if we 
jointly decide that I will φ, but I fail to be disposed in these ways, then I am failing to conform to 
the norms of our joint practical deliberation. 
 A joint decision, then, is a representation of a set of possible combinations of our actions 
that commits us to constraining our ongoing deliberation and action within its bounds. 
                                                
7 Later, I will appeal to the exclusionary effect that joint decisions have on subsequent deliberation to explain the 
similar exclusionary effects of promises, commands, and our other target speech acts. See Ch. 2, §2.2; Ch. 3, §1.1, 
§2, and §3.1; and Ch. 4, §2. 
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1.3. Shared reasons 
Practical deliberation, whether individual or joint, is a rational process. Decisions are 
subject to normative standards: some decisions we ought to make, others we ought not. Akratic 
exceptions aside, when we deliberate about what to do, we aim to decide to do what we ought to 
do. In other words, we try to make a decision that is supported by our reasons. Similarly, when we 
deliberate together about what to do, we try to make a joint decision that is supported by our 
shared reasons. Whenever one extols the virtues of one’s favored joint plan, or objects to a joint 
decision on the basis that it is unfair, inefficient or just a bad idea, one is appealing to shared 
reasons. 
It is now customary to distinguish between motivating and normative reasons for action. A 
person’s motivating reasons are the reasons that determine what decisions she in fact makes; her 
normative reasons are the reasons that determine what decisions she ought to make. Similarly for 
the joint case, we can distinguish between the reasons on the basis of which we in fact make our 
joint decisions, and the reasons that determine what joint decisions we ought to make. I will use 
‘shared reasons’ to refer to the latter: our shared normative reasons. So, the question for our 
account of shared reasons is: what are the considerations we ought to take into account when we 
are deciding together what to do? 
Here’s a partial answer to this question: our shared reasons must be reasons for each of us. 
This claim is motivated by our second guiding idea – that participation in joint practical 
deliberation must be compatible with maintaining one’s rationality and autonomy. 
To fully participate in our joint practical deliberation, I must treat our joint decisions in 
the same way I treat my own individual decisions. When we jointly decide that I will φ, this 
should settle the question of whether I will φ directly: there is no further question to be asked, 
within my individual deliberation, of whether to φ. Thus when I φ, I should be acting on our joint 
decision, rather than acting on an individual decision that happens to align with our joint one. 
This raises a worry. Autonomous agency involves acting on the basis of the beliefs, 
desires, values, and intentions that make up one’s individual perspective of practical deliberation. 
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But I seem to be saying that joint practical deliberation requires us to give up our individual 
perspectives and base our actions on the perspective of the group instead. This sounds 
disturbingly like a call for individual subservience to the collective will. 
The way to avoid these totalitarian overtones is to resist the idea that taking up the 
perspective of joint deliberation requires giving up one’s individual deliberative perspective. We 
can render the two compatible by thinking of the former as part of the latter: the part of one’s 
reasons that others share. Rather than thinking of joint practical deliberation as a separate 
process with its own sui generis set of reasons, we should think of our joint deliberation as 
occupying the intersection between our various individual perspectives of practical deliberation. 
Less metaphorically, I am suggesting that we can make joint deliberation compatible with 
individual autonomy by requiring the shared reasons on which joint decisions are based to also 
be reasons for each participant individually. It is widely held that autonomy centrally involves 
acting on the basis of reasons you endorse.8 So, if a joint decision is based on reasons that I can 
endorse within my individual perspective of practical deliberation, then I can act directly on that 
joint decision without sacrificing any autonomy. Conversely, if I am able to act on a joint decision 
autonomously, then it must be based on reasons that I can endorse as my own. Since the same 
reasoning applies to any participant in joint deliberation, our shared reasons must be reasons that 
all of us can endorse. Here’s how I suggest we make this constraint precise: 
UNANIMITY: 
For any persons X, Y, Z, et al., proposition p, and action φ, 
                                                
8 For example, Frankfurt (1971) famously says that the reason why an unwilling addict is not autonomous is because 
she is acting for reasons she does not endorse (namely, her desire for the drug). Other theories of autonomy can be 
seen as pursuing the same idea, but offering different interpretations of what it means to endorse a reason. Frankfurt 
thought of endorsement in terms of higher-order desires: to endorse a reason for acting is to have a second-order 
desire that one act for that reason. In contrast, Watson (1975) argues that no higher-order desires are necessary: 
instead, the reasons one endorses are those that align with one’s reflective judgments about what is good. Bratman 
(2007) proposes that the reasons one endorses are those one has standing, intention-like policies to treat as reasons 
within one’s practical deliberation. We need not decide between these views here: they all agree that, in the central 
cases at least, autonomy requires acting only on reasons one believes to be genuine reasons for action. Thanks to an 
anonymous reviewer for asking the question that prompted this footnote. 
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(i) The fact that p is a shared reason for X, Y, Z, et al. in favor of X φing only if 
the fact that p is a reason for each of X, Y, Z, et al. to prefer that X φ. 
(ii) The weight of the shared reason for X, Y, Z, et al. provided by the fact that p in 
favor of X’s φing can be no greater than the weight of the reason provided by 
the fact that p in favor of preferring that X φ for any of X, Y, Z, et al. 
individually.9 
UNANIMITY says that a consideration can be a shared reason for us only if it corresponds to 
normative reasons of similar content and weight that apply to each of us individually.10 
Two points of clarification are in order. First, UNANIMITY requires that our shared 
reasons for action line up with our individual reasons for preference. This is simply because it doesn’t 
make sense to say that you have reason for me to φ. Your reasons have to bear on your actions or 
attitudes, and my reasons have to bear on my actions or attitudes. To compare reasons across 
persons, then, we need to look at reasons for preference, since I can have reason to prefer that you φ 
and you can have reason to prefer that I ψ. The requirement thus is that p is a shared reason for us 
in favor of my φing only if p is a reason for both you and me to prefer that I φ. ‘Preference’ here 
must be read as all-things-considered preference: what one prefers in light of all of one’s reasons. On 
this interpretation, it would be akratic to say “I ought to φ, though I’d prefer not to.” My reasons 
for preference regarding my own actions are thus one and the same as my reasons for action; but 
my preferences can also concern matters other than my own actions.11 
                                                
9 This second clause requires that we be able to compare the weight a reason has within our joint deliberative 
perspective with the reason it has in each of our separate individual perspectives. This raises tricky issues about 
whether, and how, it is possible to compare the weight of reasons across persons. Addressing these issues would take 
us too far afield, and so I will have to leave it as an undefended premise that interpersonal comparisons of weights 
are intelligible. 
However, the intuitive idea should be clear enough. When we are deciding where to go to lunch, we should take 
the fact that you prefer Mexican food as a consideration in favor of going to Mexicali. However, this isn’t as strong a 
consideration for us deciding together as it would be if you were deciding where to eat lunch alone. Deciding alone, 
each of us would give more weight to our own preferences; deciding together, we should give our individual 
preferences equal weight, as that is the common denominator between our two perspectives. This is the idea 
UNANIMITY is meant to capture. Thanks to Kieran Setiya for asking me about this issue. 
10 I defend UNANIMITY from some apparent counterexamples in §5.2 below. UNANIMITY plays an important role in 
generating the deliberative theory’s predictions about when we have standing to make demands; see Ch. 4, §3.2. 
11 Here there is a contrast between reasons for action and reasons for attitudes such as belief and intention. I can 
have reason to prefer that I believe that God exists (since believing so would make me happier) without thereby having 
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Second, the ‘individual reasons’ with which UNANIMITY says our shared reasons must 
coincide need not be egoistic or self-regarding reasons. My individual reasons are simply the 
reasons that apply within my individual practical deliberation, including other-regarding and 
moral reasons as well as self-regarding ones. Thus UNANIMITY does not say that we have shared 
reason to make a joint decision only if that decision is in each of our interests.12 
UNANIMITY provides a necessary condition for a reason to be shared; but I do not claim 
that it is sufficient. There might be other constraints a reason must meet to count as shared: 
perhaps our shared reasons must be common knowledge between us, or perhaps they must be 
related to our personal relationship or joint projects in the right way. But we need not decide 
these questions here. My aim in this chapter is not to answer every question about joint practical 
deliberation; it is to give an account that is substantive enough to predict and explain the features 
of our target speech acts. And for those purposes, UNANIMITY is all we need to know about 
shared reasons. 
 
2. The norm of joint decisions 
 When an individual deliberates about what to do, she tries to make a decision that is 
justified by her reasons. In doing so, she guides her decisions by a norm that says what decisions 
are permissible given her reasons and options. Similarly, when we deliberate together about what 
to do, we must try to make a decision that is justified by our shared reasons. In doing so, we are 
holding our joint decisions up to a norm that says what joint decisions are permissible given our 
shared reasons and options. Let us dub this the norm of joint decisions. Call joint decisions that are 
permitted by this norm warranted, and those that are not unwarranted. 
                                                                                                                                                       
reason to believe that God exists. I can have reason to prefer that I form an intention to drink a toxin (because an 
eccentric billionaire will pay me money if I have this intention) without having reason to intend to drink the toxin 
(since the payment is not contingent on my actually drinking the toxin; see Kavka 1983). However, I do not think 
that we can similarly pull apart my reasons for preferring that I do an action from my reasons to do that action. If an 
eccentric billionaire offers to pay me money if I φ, this is not just a reason to prefer that I φ: it is also a reason to φ. 
Thanks to Susanna Rinard for discussion here. 
12 Thanks to Sarah Paul and Tamar Schapiro for pressing me to clarify this point. 
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 What is the norm of joint decisions? Part of the answer is simple. An individual person’s 
decision to φ is warranted just in case she has sufficient reason to φ: that is, there is no incompatible 
option ψ such that she has determinately more reason to ψ instead. For example, I am warranted 
in deciding to go to Mexicali just in case there’s no other restaurant I have more reason to 
choose. Extending this idea to the joint case, we get: 
SUFFICIENT SHARED REASON: a joint decision that we will φ is warranted only if 
we have sufficient shared reason to φ, that is, there is no incompatible shared option ψ 
such that we have determinately more shared reason to ψ instead. 
So: we are warranted in jointly deciding to go to Mexicali only if our shared reasons support this 
option at least as much as they support any other shared option (say, going to Clover). 
 However, a joint decision might meet the requirement of SUFFICIENT SHARED REASON 
and still fail to be warranted. Why? Because it could be that our shared reasons sufficiently 
support a joint decision that I will φ, and yet the reasons that apply within my individual, all-
things-considered practical deliberation give me decisive reason not to φ. Though UNANIMITY 
implies that every shared reason is a reason for each of us, the converse entailment does not hold: 
not every reason that applies to each of us individually is a shared reason for us. (In fact, unless 
our individual reasons are identical, UNANIMITY implies that some of them must not be shared). 
There is thus no guarantee that our shared reasons will always favor the same actions that our 
individual reasons do. If you and I are writing a paper together, then perhaps our shared reasons 
will most support my spending the weekend working on our paper; when in fact, all things 
considered, I ought to spend the weekend with my family instead. If we could warrantedly decide 
that I will spend the weekend working on our paper, then I would have to choose between the 
action warranted within our joint practical deliberation (to work on our paper) and the action 
required by my individual reasons for action (to spend time with my family). 
 If joint practical deliberation is to be compatible with individual rationality (which was 
our second guiding idea), these kinds of conflicts cannot be possible. The norm of joint decisions 
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must include a proviso that prevents warranted joint decisions from conflicting with individual 
reasons in this way. I suggest the following: 
JOINT-INDIVIDUAL COHERENCE: a joint decision that we will φ is warranted only 
if, conditional on the joint decision’s having been made, each of us has sufficient 
reason, all things considered, to do his or her part in our φing. 
JOINT-INDIVIDUAL COHERENCE implies that a warranted joint decision will not require any 
person to do something she ought not do at the time the decision is made.13 By building this 
requirement into the norm by which we evaluate joint decisions, we ensure that the results of our 
joint deliberation, if warranted, will respect each of our individual reasons for action. 
 Both SUFFICIENT SHARED REASON and JOINT-INDIVIDUAL COHERENCE give necessary 
conditions for a joint decision to be warranted. Whether meeting both of these conditions is 
sufficient for a joint decision to be warranted, or whether there are other criteria it must meet, 
will have to remain a question for further work. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
13 Two clarifications about the timing of JOINT-INDIVIDUAL COHERENCE. First, it may happen that a joint decision 
that satisfied JOINT-INDIVIDUAL COHERENCE when it was made still ought not be executed at a later time, if the 
situation has changed in relevant respects. In an uncertain world, such diachronic conflicts are inevitable, and will 
occur for individual decisions as well. The only way to avoid diachronic conflict would be to never plan for the 
future. We are interested instead in ruling out synchronic conflict between warranted joint and individual decisions. 
Second, JOINT-INDIVIDUAL COHERENCE only requires that agents have sufficient reason to act in accordance 
with a joint decision conditional on its being made. Thus it does not require that agents have sufficient reason to act in 
accordance with a joint decision before it has been made, but instead only immediately after it is made. This distinction 
becomes important when we consider Prisoner’s Dilemmas: scenarios in which each of us has decisive reason 
individually to ‘defect’ rather than ‘cooperate,’ though we would both be better off if we both cooperated than we 
would be if we both defected. A central function of joint decisions is to allow us to escape these scenarios by jointly 
deciding on the shared option in which we both cooperate. But it is the nature of Prisoner’s Dilemmas that neither of 
us has sufficient reason to cooperate prior to our jointly deciding to do so. The joint decision to cooperate still satisfies 
JOINT-INDIVIDUAL COHERENCE, however, because once the joint decision is made, then we will each have sufficient 
reason to cooperate, since the fact that we have jointly decided to cooperate gives both of us additional reason to do 
so (and thus assurance that the other person will cooperate as well). Thanks to Jed Lewinsohn for discussion on this 
second point. 
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3. The process of joint practical deliberation 
3.1. Two deliberative methods: propose-and-ratify and propose-and-challenge 
 We have now characterized the formal structure of joint practical deliberation; but we 
have yet to say how two or more persons can actually perform an activity that satisfies this formal 
description. How do we actually go about deciding together what to do? 
 To count as an activity of joint practical deliberation, a process must meet two criteria. 
First, for us to count as engaged in joint practical deliberation (rather than an arational decision-
making process), the process by which we make joint decisions must be guided and constrained 
by the norm of joint decisions. Second, for us to count as engaged in joint practical deliberation 
(rather than each deliberating separately), the process by which we make joint decisions must be 
a joint activity: meaning, at minimum, that it must involve all of us playing some part.14 
 One procedure that meets these two criteria is what I call the propose-and-ratify method. 
Propose-and-ratify proceeds in two steps. First, a speaker proposes a potential joint decision that 
she takes to be warranted. Second, the addressees evaluate the proposed joint decision, judge 
whether it is warranted, and then decide whether to accept the proposal on that basis. A 
proposed joint decision comes into force just in case all participants explicitly accept it. 
Propose-and-ratify is what first comes to mind when one thinks of joint decision-making. I 
say, “Shall we go to Mexicali?” You reply, “Sure!” And a joint decision is made. But it is 
important to see that propose-and-ratify is not the only way we can go about making joint 
decisions. By adopting the propose-and-ratify method, we implicitly make non-trivial choices 
about how to proceed in two important scenarios. 
First, suppose a joint decision is proposed and then no further words are spoken. What is 
the result? On propose-and-ratify, the proposal is rejected by default: if the addressees do not 
explicitly accept the proposal, no joint decision is made. Call this the initial default: the result we 
get if a joint decision is proposed and then nothing else is said. 
                                                
14 As explained at the outset of this chapter, I want to remain neutral on what else is required for joint activity. 
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Second, suppose that you propose a joint decision that I disagree with. Arguing it out, we 
are unable to reach a consensus on whether to accept the proposed joint decision. What is the 
result? On propose-and-ratify, the proposal is again rejected by default: if all participants do not 
explicitly accept the proposal, no joint decision is made. Call this the final default: the result we get 
if a joint decision is proposed and then the participants cannot agree on whether to accept it. 
Both the initial and final defaults of the propose-and-ratify method are to reject the 
proposed joint decision. In this way, the propose-and-ratify method is conservative: it errs on the 
side of preserving the status quo. But nothing in the nature of joint practical deliberation forces 
us to be conservative in this way: we could also adopt a more liberal method of deliberation in 
which the default result is for a proposal to be accepted. Call this second deliberative procedure the 
propose-and-challenge method. 
Propose-and-challenge also begins with a speaker proposing a joint decision she takes to 
be warranted. But then, instead of explicitly ratifying the proposal if they think it is warranted, 
the addressees are expected to challenge a proposed joint decision if they think it is unwarranted. 
When someone challenges a proposal, the other participants must then decide whether to accept 
the challenge: does the challenge show that the original proposal was unwarranted? If they think 
so, they accept the challenge; a challenge is successful just in case everyone explicitly accepts it. A 
proposed joint decision comes into force just in case there have been no successful challenges to it 
– meaning either that no challenges have been raised, or that any challenges that have been 
raised have failed to gain acceptance. 
The initial default in propose-and-challenge is for a proposal to be accepted: if nothing is 
said after a proposal is made, the proposed joint decision comes into force by default. The final 
default in propose-and-challenge is also for a proposal to be accepted. A challenge blocks a 
proposed joint decision only if everyone accepts the challenge as warranted. So, while a propose-
and-ratify proposal is accepted only if all participants explicitly accept it, a propose-and-challenge 
proposal is rejected only if all participants explicitly reject it. In other words, while propose-and-
ratify resolves intractable disagreements by rejecting the proposed joint decision, propose-and-
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challenge resolves intractable disagreements in favor of the proposed joint decision, bringing it 
into force. If we think of a deliberative proposal as a defendant in a criminal court, then propose-
and-ratify presumes a proposal guilty until it is proven innocent, while propose-and-challenge 
presumes it innocent until proven guilty.15 
Propose-and-challenge meets our two criteria for a process of joint practical deliberation. 
First, proposals accepted by the propose-and-challenge method are guided by the norm of joint 
decisions, since the participants are expected to challenge proposals they take to violate this 
norm. Challenges are also evaluated by the norm of joint decisions: the participants are expected 
to accept a challenge just in case they believe that it shows the proposal to be unwarranted. 
Propose-and-challenge also meets our second criterion. Each deliberative participant plays a role 
in the propose-and-challenge process by being prepared to raise any objections that come to 
mind. Even when a proposed joint decision is accepted with no further words, it is made jointly 
by all, since the addressees’ silent acceptance signals that the proposal has passed a collective 
process of evaluation.16 
Thus we have two very different procedures in our deliberative toolkit. Which method we 
ought to employ will depend upon our situation. 
Two differences between our deliberative methods stand out as most significant. The first 
regards the two methods’ different propensities to error. Since the propose-and-ratify method 
defaults to rejecting proposals, it makes it more difficult for proposals to come into force. As a 
result, the propose-and-ratify method protects against false positive errors: the error of accepting a 
proposed joint decision that is unwarranted. In contrast, the propose-and-challenge method 
                                                
15 In principle, it should be possible to have a method with different initial and final defaults: say, a proposal that 
initially defaults to acceptance (like propose-and-challenge), but in the case of disagreement defaults to rejection (like 
propose-and-ratify). However, I cannot think of any actual cases that fit this description. The reason, I suspect, is 
that the considerations that favor setting the initial default one way favor setting the final default the same way, and 
vice versa. When we have reason to be slow and careful, we should set both defaults to rejection (propose-and-ratify); 
when we need to be quick and decisive, we should set both defaults to acceptance (propose-and-challenge). The 
reason why we don’t have ‘hybrid’ proposals may be just because we have no need for them. 
16 In the right context, however, even silence could count as a challenge (say, when combined with a pointed stare). 
What matters is not the difference between being silent and uttering words per se, but the difference between 
performing a communicative act that is reciprocally recognized as raising a challenge, and performing no such act. 
Thanks to Bradford Skow for pointing this out. 
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makes it easier for proposed joint decisions to come into force, as it defaults to acceptance. This 
makes propose-and-challenge more prone to false positive errors than propose-and-ratify. But it 
also means that propose-and-challenge is better than its counterpart at avoiding false negative errors: 
the error of rejecting a proposed joint decision that is in fact warranted. In short, our two 
methods make different trade-offs between accuracy and decisiveness: propose-and-ratify favors 
accuracy over decisiveness; propose-and-challenge favors decisiveness over accuracy.  
This makes them appropriate in different situations. Propose-and-ratify is better when we 
want to deliberate carefully. If the stakes are high, and we have ample time to discuss the options, 
we should use propose-and-ratify, making sure a joint decision is made only if everyone explicitly 
accepts it. So, for example, two partners deciding whether to have a child should clearly make 
this decision using propose-and-ratify. In contrast, propose-and-challenge is better when we need 
to be quick and decisive. If the stakes are low, or the costs of taking more time to deliberate are 
high, then we should opt for propose-and-challenge. Suppose we are firefighters rescuing people 
from a burning building. Here it matters more that we decide on a plan, and decide on it quickly, 
than that we choose the best of all possible plans. So it makes sense to use propose-and-challenge: 
“You search the first floor, I’ll go upstairs!” 
The second central difference between our methods concerns the balance of power they 
create between the speaker and addressee(s). Propose-and-challenge gives the deliberative power 
to the speaker; propose-and-ratify gives it to the addressee(s). In propose-and-challenge, the 
speaker’s proposals come into force automatically unless someone raises a convincing challenge 
to them. If a challenge convinces the speaker, then she can accept it and thereby reject the 
proposal. But since the final default is acceptance, then if the speaker is unconvinced by the 
challenges that are raised, her proposal will still go through. Thus propose-and-challenge gives 
the speaker the last word as to whether a proposal comes into force. 
Propose-and-ratify, on the other hand, puts the power in the hand of the addressee(s). A 
proposal made by propose-and-ratify comes into force if and only if the addressee(s) explicitly 
accept it. Thus the addressee of a propose-and-ratify proposal has the power to veto it by 
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withholding her assent, or bring it into force by expressing her acceptance. Thus propose-and-
ratify gives the addressee(s) the last word as to whether a proposal comes into force. 
These different power dynamics play a crucial role in our decisions about which method 
to employ. As we shall see (Ch. 3, §1.3 and §3.3), the speech acts that use propose-and-ratify, 
offers and requests, are most appropriate when we want to give more deliberative power to the 
addressee. The speech acts that use propose-and-challenge – promises, commands, and demands 
– are most appropriate when we have reason to give more power to the speaker. 
 
3.2. Good faith 
Say we go through the deliberative motions: I say, “Shall we go to Mexicali?” and you 
say, “Sure!” Is that all it takes for us to count as having made a joint decision? Not exactly. If our 
acts of proposal and acceptance are to constitute the making of a joint decision, both of these acts 
must be performed in good faith. 
To see what I mean, note that it is possible for two or more people to appear to make a 
joint decision without actually making one. Consider two actors who pretend to make a joint 
decision in a play. If one were to hold the other to their ‘joint decision’ afterwards, she would 
clearly be confused: no joint decision was made. The actors were not deciding together, but only 
pretending to do so. 
Sometimes, the pretense is less public. One person may think she is engaged in joint 
deliberation while the other is only pretending to deliberate with her. To count as deliberating 
with you, I must evaluate potential joint decisions on the basis of our shared reasons, proposing 
and accepting only decisions that I take to be warranted by those reasons. Suppose instead that I 
pay no attention to our shared reasons and instead simply propose and accept joint decisions 
based on whether their acceptance will suit my purposes, whether or not they are justifiable in 
terms you could accept. If I behave in this way, I am not deliberating with you; I am only 
pretending to do so. 
 31 
Let us call this kind of pretending deliberating in bad faith, and its opposite – genuine 
participation in joint deliberation – deliberating in good faith. When I deliberate in bad faith, I am 
not participating in joint practical deliberation at all: I am just pretending to do so. We are not 
deciding together, and so we cannot decide anything together. My failure to participate robs our 
interaction of the mutuality that is essential to joint decision-making. The idea of a joint decision 
implies a meeting of the minds; if I am deliberating in bad faith, no meeting of the minds occurs. 
My bad faith thus renders our joint deliberation impotent: so long as I am deliberating in bad 
faith, we cannot make any joint decisions – though we may falsely appear to do so. 
How do we tell whether someone is deliberating in bad faith? The following seems to be a 
sufficient condition: if a person knows that the norms of joint practical deliberation require her to 
φ, and yet she intentionally does not φ, then she is deliberating in bad faith. Here φing is any 
move within the deliberative process: proposing, challenging, or ratifying a joint decision. If I 
propose a joint decision I know to be unwarranted, accept a joint decision I know to be 
unwarranted, or refrain from challenging a decision I know to be unwarranted, I am deliberating 
in bad faith.17 I am not doing my part in our activity of making decisions together on the basis of 
reasons we share. 
The requirements of good faith help assuage one prima facie worry about the propose-and-
challenge method. You might think that propose-and-challenge allows me to impose any joint 
decision I like on you: all I have to do is propose the decision using propose-and-challenge and 
then refuse to accept any of your challenges. The good faith requirement means that I cannot do 
this. To deliberate in good faith, I must propose only those joint decisions that I believe to be 
warranted by our shared reasons. And if I believe a joint decision to be warranted, I must think it 
is supported by reasons that you can endorse (by UNANIMITY, §1.2) and that, if the joint decision 
is made, you will have sufficient reason to act in accordance with it (by JOINT-INDIVIDUAL 
                                                
17 Note that only proposing or accepting a joint decision one knows to be unwarranted counts as bad faith, not 
proposing or accepting an unwarranted joint decision simpliciter. I can propose or accept an unwarranted joint 
decision in good faith so long as I mistakenly believe that it is warranted. 
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COHERENCE, §2). I cannot propose in good faith any joint decision I take to violate these 
conditions. Moreover, if you raise a challenge to my proposed joint decision, then I must 
consider whether your challenge shows my proposal to be unwarranted, and base my response 
on that judgment. If I judge that your challenge shows my proposal to be unwarranted, then 
good faith requires me to accept your challenge. The only way I can legitimately reject your 
challenge and stand by my proposal is if I believe that it is warranted even after considering your 
objection. Thus while propose-and-challenge gives the speaker the last word, her ‘last word’ must 
be a judgment made in good faith about whether her proposal is justifiable to her addressee(s). 
You cannot use the propose-and-challenge method to unilaterally impose your will on others 
because unilateral imposition is a form of deliberative bad faith. 
The requirements of good faith will also play a central role in explaining why our target 
speech acts are invalid under conditions of coercion or deception. This effect is most salient with 
promises. If I get you to promise by making a coercive threat, or by deceiving you on some 
important matter of fact, then your promise does not bind you in the normal way. In Chapter 2 
(§4), I argue that this is because coercion and deception are both forms of deliberative bad faith.18 
 
3.3. Retraction 
 People can change their minds. Having decided to go to the library, but then seeing that 
it is a beautiful day, I might abandon my earlier plan and decide to work in an outdoor café 
instead. I thereby retract my earlier decision. This reverses the decision’s effects on my thought 
and behavior. Once I’ve retracted my decision to go to the library, I will no longer be disposed to 
go there, or rationally criticizable if I do not, and I can now freely consider options that are 
incompatible with going to the library (such as going to an outdoor café). 
                                                
18 Arthur Ripstein offers a similar explanation of why coerced and deceived consent are invalid: “In cases of force 
and fraud, consent fails for lack of a united will. Both fraud and force stop the parties to an agreement from uniting 
their wills because the person committing either is already unilaterally determining how the other’s means will be 
used” (2009: 131). 
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 Similarly, we can change our minds together, retracting a joint decision we previously 
made. As in the individual case, retracting a joint decision reverses its psychological and 
normative effects. Once we retract our decision to go to Mexicali for lunch, neither of us is 
criticizable if we do not go there, and we can now consider shared options that are incompatible 
with our earlier decision (such as going to Clover instead). 
 How do we retract a standing joint decision? In the same way we make new decisions. 
One of us can propose to retract our standing joint decision; then, the others will assess whether 
the retraction proposal is warranted and signal their acceptance or rejection on that basis. If the 
proposal is accepted, then the joint decision is thereby retracted, expanding the shared options to 
include some of the possible action combinations that the decision had previously ruled out.19 
 Just as we can propose new decisions by means of either propose-and-challenge or 
propose-and-ratify, we can also propose to retract decisions by either of these two methods. And 
so a person who wants to propose retraction faces a choice: use propose-and-challenge, thus 
making the default for the decision to be retracted, or use propose-and-ratify, making the default 
for the decision to stay in force? The same considerations reviewed in §3.1 apply to this choice. 
When one has reason to err on the side of the status quo, or to give the addressee more 
deliberative power, one should propose retraction using propose-and-ratify. But when there is 
less reason to be cautious about retracting a decision, or reason to take deliberative power into 
one’s own hands, then one can propose retraction by means of propose-and-challenge.20 
 
4. Interim summary 
The account of joint practical deliberation I have proposed is as follows. Joint practical 
deliberation is a process of making a joint decision about which of our shared options to perform 
on the basis of our shared reasons. Our shared options are mutually exclusive sets of possible 
                                                
19 The question of which actions are added back in to the shared options is an instance of the problem of permission 
(Lewis 1979a; Yablo 2009). I won’t try to address this notoriously difficult question here. 
20 These considerations play a large role in my explanation of why the addressee of a promise can release the 
promisor from her obligation, while the promisor cannot release herself. See Ch. 2, §1.5 and §3. 
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combinations of our actions (§1.1). We can make joint decisions concerning only one of our 
actions by deciding on a shared option that constrains only that person’s actions. When we make 
a joint decision, we select one of our shared options and commit ourselves to constraining our 
subsequent deliberation and action within its bounds (§1.2). Our shared reasons are the 
considerations that we ought to take into account when deciding between our shared options. I 
argued that such considerations must be reasons for each of us: a fact can only be a shared reason 
for us to φ if it is a reason for me to prefer that we φ and a reason for you to prefer that we φ 
(UNANIMITY, §1.2). 
Any activity of joint decision-making must be guided and constrained by a normative 
standard that I called the norm of joint decisions (§2). When we deliberate together, we try to 
ensure that the joint decisions we make are warranted by the lights of this norm. I proposed two 
necessary conditions for a joint decision to be warranted: it must be supported by our shared 
reasons at least as much as any other decision available to us (SUFFICIENT SHARED REASON) and, 
conditional on our making the joint decision, we must each have sufficient reason, all-things-
considered, to act in accordance with it (JOINT-INDIVIDUAL COHERENCE). 
We can evaluate potential joint decisions using two different deliberative procedures 
(§3.1). In the propose-and-ratify method, a proposed joint decision is rejected by default unless all 
participants explicitly ratify it. In the propose-and-challenge method, a proposed joint decision is 
accepted by default unless all participants accept some challenge to it. These methods have 
different costs and benefits that make them appropriate in different situations. Propose-and-ratify 
is more careful and puts more power in the hands of the addressee(s); propose-and-challenge is 
more decisive and gives more power to the speaker. For either of these methods to result in a 
binding joint decision, however, all parties must participate in good faith (§3.2): they must base 
their proposals, acceptances, and challenges on their actual judgments about whether the joint 
decision in question is warranted by their shared reasons. Finally, just as we can make new joint 
decisions by these deliberative methods, we can also retract our prior joint decisions, thereby 
opening up shared options that were previously closed (§3.3). 
 35 
5. Deciding together in everyday life 
We arrived at our account of joint practical deliberation by unpacking the implications of 
two abstract ideas: the idea that joint deliberation is analogous in structure to individual 
deliberation, and the idea that joint deliberation must be compatible with individual rationality 
and autonomy. The account can be read as a description of what it would take for two or more 
persons to rationally and autonomously engage in a single activity of the very same kind as the 
activity an individual person undertakes when she decides what to do. 
However, one might doubt that this abstract description actually captures our concrete 
practices of everyday joint decision-making. For all I have said so far, it could turn out that we 
never actually perform the activity I have called ‘joint practical deliberation’. Perhaps we make 
decisions together in a way that is less analogous to individual practical deliberation, or less 
scrupulous about respecting rationality and autonomy, than I have suggested. In short, one might 
worry that the theory just presented fails to capture the way we actually make joint decisions in 
everyday life.  
I will consider two objections along these lines. The first charges that my account cannot 
accommodate the possibility of compromise. The second objection targets the UNANIMITY 
constraint on shared reasons I defended in §1.2. 
 
5.1. The possibility of compromise 
 We often manage to make joint decisions in the face of deep disagreements about what is 
or ought to be the case. When things go well, such disagreements end in compromise: the 
participants agree upon a joint decision that neither would have chosen if she had sole control. 
Each person would prefer that a different decision were made, but accepts the agreement 
because she can’t get the other participants to agree to the decision that she thinks is best. 
 This everyday reality seems to be in tension with the good faith requirement I defended 
in §3.2. There I claimed that, to deliberate in good faith, one must accept only joint decisions one 
believes to be warranted. To accept a joint decision one believes to be unwarranted is to ignore 
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the shared norms and reasons that one must attend to in order to count as deliberating at all. 
“But,” our objector might say, “People accept joint decisions they believe to be unwarranted all 
the time! That’s what compromise is: accepting one agreement when you think another would be 
better. Your account implies that compromises are acts of bad faith, and therefore that the 
resulting joint decisions are not valid. But this could not be further from the truth. Far from being 
an act of bad faith, we take the willingness to compromise to be an essential deliberative virtue. 
And compromises are no less binding than any other agreements.”21 
 Where this line of objection goes wrong is in its characterization of compromise: in 
particular, the claim that compromise involves accepting a joint decision one believes to be 
unwarranted. Once we take into account all of the reasons relevant to a compromise – including, 
crucially, the fact of disagreement itself – we see that compromises can be, and often are, the 
optimal choice by everyone’s lights. 
 Consider two examples of everyday compromise: 
MOVIES: My partner Dee Dee and I are choosing a movie to watch together on a 
weekend night. Dee Dee likes funny, happy movies; I like mindless action movies. If Dee 
Dee had her choice, we would watch a musical or a slapstick comedy; if I had my choice, 
we would watch a spy thriller or a blockbuster superhero movie. But we want to watch a 
movie together, so we compromise and watch Beverly Hills Cop, a buddy cop movie that is 
lighthearted and funny (for Dee Dee) but also has some action (for me). 
SHOPPING: My friend Stephen and I are planning a 4th of July barbeque, and are 
shopping for food in preparation. I think that people tend to eat a lot of food at these 
things, while Stephen thinks that we always buy too much food. I grab four packages of 
sandwich rolls off the shelves. Stephen says, “That’s way too much! We only need two.” I 
say, “What if we run out of food?” Stephen sighs. “Fine – we can buy three, but no 
more.” I put one package of rolls back, and we move on. 
                                                
21 Thanks to Sally Haslanger for raising this objection and putting it in a particularly compelling form. 
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Here’s how our objector would describe these cases. In MOVIES, Dee Dee and I disagree about 
what movie we ought to watch. I think the best choice would be Die Hard; she thinks we should 
watch Singing in the Rain. Beverly Hills Cop is neither her top choice nor mine: so when we agree to 
watch it, we are each accepting a joint decision that we think is unwarranted. 
In SHOPPING, the objector would say, Stephen thinks we ought to buy two packages of 
sandwich rolls, while I think we ought to buy four. Neither of us thinks that three packages is the 
right number. Thus when we agree to buy three packages, Stephen and I each accept a joint 
decision we take to be unwarranted. 
To the contrary, I think that in both examples, both of the participants believe the 
compromise decision to be warranted. The objector’s descriptions miss some essential details. 
Start with MOVIES. Dee Dee’s and my conflicting preferences concern what kind of 
movie we would each like to watch if we were watching a movie alone. But we want to watch a 
movie together, and neither of us wants the other to be miserable throughout the experience. Thus 
while I would want to watch Die Hard if I were alone, I don’t want to watch Die Hard with Dee 
Dee unhappy and bored by my side; the same is true for Dee Dee vis-à-vis Singing in the Rain. 
When we take into account the fact that we want to watch a movie together that both of us will 
enjoy, then Beverly Hills Cop stands out as the clear best choice. We both realize this, and so can 
jointly decide to watch Beverly Hills Cop in good faith. 
In SHOPPING, Stephen and I don’t have conflicting preferences: we each want to buy 
enough food for the party without spending more money than is necessary. Instead, we have 
conflicting beliefs. Stephen believes that our guests will only eat two packages of sandwich rolls, 
while I believe that they are likely to eat four packages. Thus it seems plausible to say, with the 
objector, that neither of us believes three to be the best choice. 
However, Stephen and I don’t only want to make the optimal trade-off between price and 
quantity of food; we also want to make our shopping decisions quickly and efficiently. If we took 
the time to try to convince each other of our views about how much we need of every item, our 
grocery shopping experience would be drawn-out and painful. Even if we would save a couple 
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dollars, it wouldn’t be worth the headache. Once we add this third value to the equation, the 
balance of reasons changes: we are both willing to accept some error in the quantity/price trade-
off in exchange for a faster and smoother deliberative process. This justifies our compromise: by 
splitting the difference between our best guesses, we manage to quickly arrive at a decision that 
neither of us thinks is egregiously incorrect. Stephen and I would both rather decide now to buy 
three packages of sandwich rolls than argue further about how much our guests will eat. And so 
we can both accept this compromise in good faith. 
Our examples illustrate two general reasons for compromise. First, we often want to do 
something together on terms that are mutually agreeable, as when Dee Dee and I want to watch a 
movie that neither of us will hate. To do something together rather than separately, we often 
have to compromise, agreeing on an activity that we are both willing to do even if neither of us 
would have chosen it alone. When we do this, our joint decision is still warranted and made in 
good faith, because we care more about finding an activity we can do together than we care 
about what particular activity we do. 
Second, we often compromise simply because it is not worth the effort to argue further 
about what would be best. An analogue of this happens in individual deliberation: we sometimes 
make a decision in full knowledge that if we deliberated longer and more carefully, we would 
likely make a different and better choice. This is because the value that we might gain by 
deliberating more carefully is outweighed by the costs of spending more time deliberating. A 
quick-and-dirty decision is often justified by the fact that it is quick. In joint deliberation, these 
considerations of cognitive efficiency favor compromise. The disagreement that leads to a 
compromise might be such that we could in principle reach an agreement if we took the time to 
talk it through. (Stephen and I could sit down with our guest list, guess how much each individual 
is likely to eat, and calculate a much more precise estimate). But often we would each rather 
make a compromise decision now than argue it out until we reach consensus. It is this shared 
desire for cognitive efficiency that justifies our compromise. 
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I conclude that our account of joint deliberation does not preclude the possibility of 
compromise. Compromise does not require one to accept joint decisions one believes to be 
unwarranted. Compromise instead requires a sensitivity to certain considerations that warrant 
joint decisions that one might not have preferred on other grounds – such as the value of 
deliberating efficiently and acting together. 
 
5.2. A challenge to UNANIMITY 
 The second objection we will consider targets UNANIMITY, the requirement that the 
reasons on the basis of which we make joint decisions must also be reasons for each of us 
individually (§1.2). This requirement seems at odds with some paradigm cases of joint decision-
making. When a legislature passes a law by a narrow majority, the reasons on which the law is 
based (e.g., the fact that it will lower carbon emissions) are bound not to be accepted by a large 
number of the legislature’s members. A hiring committee might choose to hire a candidate for 
the reason that she specializes in Kant, even if some of the committee members think that the 
department does not need a Kant scholar. An admissions committee might admit a student for 
the reason that she is a legacy (descended from alumni), even though some of its members think 
that legacy considerations should not be taken into account. 
 UNANIMITY implies that the people in these examples must be making some sort of 
mistake. They must either be incorrect about what they have reason to prefer individually, or be 
unjustifiably making a joint decision on the basis of a reason that is not shared. But intuitively, 
these examples do not seem to involve any such mistake. To the contrary, they seem to be central 
cases of well-functioning joint deliberation. Why can’t it be the case both that I personally have 
no reason to prefer that we hire a Kant scholar and that, in spite of this, we justifiably decide to 
hire someone on the basis that she is a Kant scholar?22 
                                                
22 Thanks to Bradford Skow for helping me clarify the way in which these examples are in tension with UNANIMITY. 
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 On the basis of examples like these, Michael Bratman argues that, contra UNANIMITY, 
the considerations on which joint decisions are based need not be accepted by all parties to those 
decisions (2014: 132-150). Instead, he suggests, all that is required for us to share a reason is that 
we have a shared commitment to treating it as a reason in our joint deliberation: 
Sharing a commitment to certain weights seems closer to a kind of shared 
intention than to a common value judgment … In participating in such a shared 
intention concerning weights, each person will normally have some sort of 
supporting evaluative judgment. But such background judgments need not 
interpersonally converge, and need not strictly correspond to what is favored by 
the shared intentions concerning weights (137). 
So, though not all members of the admissions committee think that the fact that a student is a 
legacy is a reason in favor of admitting her, they have accepted a shared policy of treating this 
fact as such a reason in their deliberations. And, Bratman submits, this is all it takes for legacy 
considerations to count as a genuine shared reason within their joint deliberation. 
Bratman’s diagnosis points the way to my response. I agree that, in these cases, the 
participants have adopted a joint policy about how to arrive at their decisions. But these joint 
policies themselves must be justified by appeal to a set of shared reasons; and these underlying 
shared reasons are plausibly regarded as satisfying the UNANIMITY constraint. 
To see the idea, consider a different example: 
CHORES: Anna, Bert, and Cora are roommates, and are discussing how to divide up 
household chores. Nobody wants to clean the toilet. So, they decide to determine who 
cleans the toilet by drawing straws: they take three straws, cut one short, and draw them 
blindly. Whoever gets the short straw has to clean the toilet: this time, it’s Anna. 
Anna, Bert, and Cora decide who will clean the toilet on the basis of who draws the short straw. 
So, they seem to treat the fact that Anna drew the short straw as a shared reason in favor of her 
cleaning the toilet. But none of them (Anna least of all) takes the fact that Anna drew the short 
straw to be a reason to prefer that Anna clean the toilet. Is this a counterexample to UNANIMITY? 
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 No. Note that the fact that Anna drew the short straw, taken out of context, does not 
count in favor of her cleaning the toilet. Facts about who drew what straw have no intrinsic 
relevance to the question of who should clean the toilet. It is only when we learn that Anna, Bert, 
and Cora already decided that whoever drew the short straw will clean the toilet that the fact that 
Anna drew the short straw becomes a relevant consideration at all. Anna, Bert, and Cora all have 
reason to prefer that they adopt some quick and fair procedure for determining who gets the 
undesirable chore. This unanimously shared reason justifies their decision to determine who will 
clean the toilet by drawing straws. In turn, the shared reason that justifies their deciding that 
Anna will clean the toilet is the fact that they jointly decided that whoever drew the short straw 
would clean the toilet, plus the fact that unlucky Anna drew the short straw. All of them, 
including Anna, take these facts together as a reason to prefer that Anna cleans the toilet. As little 
as Anna wants to do this chore, she does want to honor her agreement with her roommates. Thus 
the shared reasons in CHORES conform to UNANIMITY after all. 
 We can apply the same line of argument to Bratman’s examples. Focus on the admissions 
committee case. Just as Anna et al. did not take the fact that Anna drew the short straw, on its 
own, to be a reason to prefer that she clean the toilet, the members of the admissions committee 
do not all take the fact that a student is a legacy, on its own, to be a reason to prefer that she is 
admitted. But, given the number of applications they have to get through, the committee 
members have a unanimously shared reason to prefer that they settle on a decision-making 
procedure that includes a clear set of admissions criteria. This deliberative procedure is itself 
likely to be a compromise. Though one member might have opted not to favor legacies if she 
were deciding alone, she might accept a shared policy of favoring legacies because she wants to 
settle on criteria that everyone can agree upon within a reasonable amount of time. 
Once the committee settles on a procedure, they have unanimous reason to prefer that 
they decide in accordance with it: both for the sake of deliberative efficiency, and because they all 
care about honoring their joint commitments. Thus the shared reason that justifies the 
committee’s decision to admit the legacy student is not the mere fact that she is a legacy: it is the 
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fact that she is a legacy plus the fact that the committee has jointly decided to use admissions 
criteria that give preference to legacy students. All the members of the committee, even those 
who are skeptical about favoring legacies, take these combined facts as a reason in favor of 
admitting the student. After all, even the legacy skeptics prefer following the committee’s 
streamlined decision procedure to arguing ad nauseam about whether legacy students should be 
favored. Thus the admissions committee’s shared reasons conform to UNANIMITY after all. 
 I believe the same reasoning applies, mutatis mutandis, to the other examples Bratman 
offers as challenges to UNANIMITY. It is telling that almost all of these examples involve decision-
making in formalized, institutional contexts: hiring and admissions committees, legislatures, 
juries, and so on. (The few non-institutional cases Bratman cites can, I believe, be explained as 
straightforward compromises). Bratman is right that, in these contexts, we often make decisions 
on the basis of criteria that we do not take to be reasons in other contexts. But that is because we 
are engaged in a kind of elaborate drawing of straws: our joint decisions are guided by an agreed-
upon formal procedure that sets out our decision-making criteria (e.g., legacy considerations) and 
methods for resolving disputes (e.g., counting votes, drawing straws, etc.). Immersed in a 
procedure of this kind, it is easy to think that the facts that the procedure tells us to treat as 
reasons are doing all of the justificatory work: e.g., that our shared reason for admitting the 
student is just that she is a legacy. But that misses a crucial part of the justification for our 
decision: our commitment to the procedure itself. If we keep the full set of our shared reasons in 
view, the challenge to UNANIMITY dissipates. Our shared reasons are indeed reasons for us all. 
 
6. The deliberative theory 
We have done the groundwork. Now we can state the theory that the remainder of this 
dissertation will be spent defending. 
We begin from a salient difference between joint and individual practical deliberation: 
while individual deliberation can be performed in solitary thought, joint deliberation needs to 
happen in conversation. We need to communicate with one another to deliberate together. This is 
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why both of our deliberative methods start with a communicative act: the speech act of proposing 
a joint decision. This speech act will be the opening move in any process of joint decision-
making. Given how often we need to decide together what to do, we probably perform this 
speech act quite often. So, the speech act of proposing a joint decision should be quite familiar – 
so familiar, in fact, that we should expect to find a word for it in ordinary language. And since 
there are multiple different ways of proposing joint decisions, we might expect our language to 
distinguish between them, giving different names to different types of proposals. This suggests 
that several recognizable everyday speech acts may be proposals in joint practical deliberation. 
I submit that ordinary English distinguishes between such proposals on the basis of their 
content and their intended method of evaluation. First, we distinguish between proposals to make joint 
decisions concerning only the speaker’s actions (“I will φ”), those concerning only the addressee’s 
actions (“you will φ”), and those concerning multiple participants’ actions (“we will φ”). Second, 
we distinguish between proposals that are meant to be evaluated by propose-and-challenge and 
those meant to be evaluated by propose-and-ratify. My hypothesis is that our everyday speech act 
categories map on to these distinctions as follows: 
 
 
Propose-
and-
challenge 
Propose-
and-ratify 
“I will φ” Promises Offers 
“You will φ” Commands & Demands Requests 
“We will φ” Agreements 
 
Promises and offers propose joint decisions that constrain only the speaker’s actions: “I will 
φ.” They are distinguished by their methods of evaluation: promises employ the propose-and-
challenge method, while offers use the propose-and-ratify method. This captures the fact that 
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offers require explicit acceptance to bind the speaker to perform, while promises do not. If I offer 
to drive you home, and you do not explicitly accept my offer, then I am under no obligation to 
drive you home. But if I promise to drive you home, you don’t need to say anything for my 
obligation to come into effect: so long as you do not object, I am bound (cf. Robins 1984: 101; 
Darwall 2011: 273). 
Commands, demands, and requests propose joint decisions that constrain only the addressee’s 
actions: “You will φ.” Commands and demands do so by means of the propose-and-challenge 
method, while requests use propose-and-ratify. This reflects a difference in uptake conditions that 
parallels the difference between promises and offers. If I ask you to read my draft, but you do not 
explicitly accept my request, then you are not obligated to read my draft. But if a professor 
directs her students to read the first book of Plato’s Republic, they need not explicitly accept her 
command for it to come into force. 
Why do I put commands and demands in the same box? Because, as I argue in Chapter 
4, these speech acts both propose joint decisions regarding the addressee’s actions by means of 
the propose-and-challenge method. What distinguishes the two is the way in which their 
proposed joint decisions are justified. Demands propose what I call commissive joint decisions: joint 
decisions that commit the addressee to doing what she already had decisive reason to do. 
Commands propose what I call enactive joint decisions: joint decisions that decide for the 
addressee which of multiple permissible options she will perform. This distinction captures the 
intuitive difference between commands and demands: commands create new obligations, while 
demands hold people to their existing obligations. 
Agreements are joint decisions that constrain the actions of both the speaker and the 
addressee(s): “We will φ.” Agreements have two features that make them stand out on our table. 
First, unlike our other terms, ‘agreement’ is a success term. While it is perfectly possible to have a 
rejected promise, the phrase ‘rejected agreement’ is oxymoronic. If the parties didn’t agree to it, 
it wasn’t an agreement. So while our other terms refer to proposed joint decisions, the term 
‘agreement’ refers to accepted joint decisions. Thus agreements are not speech acts, strictly 
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speaking; proposals to make agreements are speech acts. Second, we don’t have words in English 
that distinguish between the propose-and-challenge and propose-and-ratify methods of proposing 
agreements. But the distinction still applies: consider the difference between “Let’s go on a walk!” 
and “Would you like to go on a walk?” The former proposal is meant to be evaluated using 
propose-and-challenge, while the latter is meant to be evaluated using propose-and-ratify. 
We can now state the key theses of this dissertation: 
The Deliberative Theory of Promises: For S to promise A that she will φ just 
is for S to propose to A, by means of the propose-and-challenge method, that they 
make a joint decision to the effect that S will φ. 
The Deliberative Theory of Offers: For S to make an offer to A that she will 
φ just is for S to propose to A, by means of the propose-and-ratify method, that 
they make a joint decision to the effect that S will φ. 
The Deliberative Theory of Agreements: For S and A to make an 
agreement that they will φ just is for S and A to make a joint decision to the effect 
that they will φ. 
The Deliberative Theory of Requests: For S to request of A that she φ just is 
for S to propose to A, by means of the propose-and-ratify method, that they make 
a joint decision to the effect that A will φ. 
The Deliberative Theory of Demands: For S to demand that A φ just is for S 
to propose to A, by means of the propose-and-challenge method, that they make a 
commissive joint decision to the effect that A will φ. 
The Deliberative Theory of Commands: For S to command A to φ just is 
for S to propose to A, by means of the propose-and-challenge method, that they 
make an enactive joint decision to the effect that A will φ. 
It is time to begin defending these theses. We begin, in the next chapter, with promises. 
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Chapter 2 
Promises 
 
 Promises have captured the imagination of moral philosophers for centuries. It is easy to 
see why. I can promise you that I will do almost anything – make you a cup of coffee, run a 
marathon, read Anna Karenina, abstain from chocolate for a month – and voila! I am suddenly 
obligated to do it. Promises seem to create new obligations out of thin air. Promises thus make 
vivid the question with which I began this dissertation: how is it possible to change what morality 
requires of us simply by declaring it to be so? This is the puzzle that famously led Hume to 
proclaim promising “one of the most mysterious and incomprehensible operations that can 
possibly be imagin’d” (1739/1978: 524). 
 In the nearly three hundred years that have passed since Hume’s proclamation, a sizeable 
literature on promises has emerged. This makes promises an ideal testing ground for the 
deliberative theory. The detail in which moral philosophers have characterized promises’ 
intuitive features gives us a wealth of data against which to test the deliberative theory’s 
predictions. And, by comparing the deliberative theory to the alternative accounts of promises in 
the literature, we can bring its theoretical advantages into stark relief. 
 In this chapter, I will argue that promises are proposals in joint practical deliberation. 
More precisely, I will defend 
The Deliberative Theory of Promises: For S to promise A that she will φ just 
is for S to propose to A, by means of the propose-and-challenge method, that they 
make a joint decision to the effect that S will φ.1 
                                                
1 I am not the first to propose this view. Margaret Gilbert has defended a “joint decision account of promises: for one 
person to make a promise to another is for them jointly to commit themselves…to the decision that one of them (‘the 
promisor’) is to perform one or more specified actions” (Gilbert 2011b: 99). However, the arguments Gilbert offers 
for this view are very different from the argument I will give in this paper. Gilbert’s main argument for the joint 
decision view is that it vindicates a purported analytic connection between promises and obligation: that the 
proposition that I have promised to φ entails that I am obligated to φ. But this thesis is controversial: I am convinced 
neither that the thesis is true nor that the deliberative theory entails it (see §1.1). Thus I do not think we should be 
convinced by Gilbert’s arguments for the joint decision view. To see the idea’s true potential, we need to take 
another look. 
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My argument for this thesis will take the form sketched in the Introduction to this 
dissertation. The theory of joint practical deliberation offered in Chapter 1 gives us the resources 
to predict the properties that various proposals within this activity will have. If we take a careful 
look at these speech acts, we will make a surprising discovery: one of these speech acts has exactly 
the same properties as promising. A certain kind of proposal to make a joint decision regarding one’s 
own actions turns out to have the very same normative effects, under the very same conditions, as 
a promise. Our target proposals bind in the same way as promises: by bringing a joint decision 
into force, these proposals bind the speaker to perform a certain action (§1.1), obligating her to her 
addressee in particular (§1.2) and constraining her future deliberation to accord with this decision 
(§1.3). As with promises, the addressee alone has the power to release the speaker from the 
obligation created by these proposals, by agreeing to retract the joint decision that they brought 
into force (§1.5). And like promises, these proposals only have their force when they secure 
uptake from their addressee (§1.4) and are not elicited by means of coercion or deception (§2). I 
submit that this cannot be a coincidence: the only viable explanation of these observations seems 
to be that promises are identical to their analogues in joint practical deliberation. 
 Sections 1 and 2 of the chapter spell out this argument in detail. Section 3 addresses an 
objection, and section 4 situates the deliberative theory in relation to the theories of promising in 
the extant literature. 
The chapter concludes, in section 5, with a general challenge to alternative theories of 
promising. If the arguments of sections 1 and 2 are sound, then joint practical deliberation 
necessarily includes a speech act with the very same normative features as promising. Anyone 
who denies the deliberative theory is committed to holding that this speech act is not identical to 
promising. But this implies that promising is redundant: everything we do with promises, we could 
do instead with proposals in joint practical deliberation. This undercuts the motivation for 
alternative theories: why posit a further, sui generis speech act of promising if joint practical 
deliberation already contains a speech act with identical properties? Better to accept that 
promises and the relevant kind of proposals in joint practical deliberation are one and the same. 
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1. Similarities between promises and proposals in joint practical deliberation 
 My thesis is that promises are proposals to make joint decisions regarding one’s own 
actions using the propose-and-challenge method. While we evaluate this thesis, however, it will 
be helpful to have a separate term for the relevant kind of proposal, so as not to beg the question 
regarding its relation to promises. Let us coin the term I-proposal to refer to a proposal to make a 
joint decision regarding one’s own actions (“I will φ”) by means of propose-and-challenge. This 
allows us to state the deliberative theory more succinctly: promises are I-proposals. My argument 
for this thesis is founded on the claim that I-proposals have the same properties as promises. In 
this and the next section I defend this claim. This section surveys five of promises’ most 
important features and argues that I-proposals have each of these features as well. 
 
1.1. Bindingness 
 Promises create obligations. When I promise you that I will read your paper, I thereby 
become obligated to read your paper. However, while promises typically generate obligations, this 
connection is defeasible (pace Gilbert 2011b: see footnote 3). It is sometimes permissible to break a 
promise: if I promise to come to your talk, but then come across an injured person who urgently 
needs to be taken to the hospital, I plausibly ought to break my promise and help the person 
instead. More carefully, then, we can say that when I promise to φ under normal conditions,2 I 
come to have a strong pro tanto reason to φ that typically, though defeasibly, obligates me to φ. 
 Are I-proposals similarly binding? I think so. Suppose that you and I jointly decide to 
read each other’s papers. This joint decision plausibly obligates each of us to read the other’s 
paper. Suppose you carefully read and give detailed comments on my paper, and come to our 
meeting to find that I have not even glanced at your paper. You would rightly feel wronged. (See 
§1.2 below for more on this ‘directed’ nature of the obligation to keep promises and joint 
decisions). So, when we make a joint decision, we each become obligated to do our part in seeing 
                                                
2 By ‘under normal conditions’ I mean that (a) the promisee does not reject the promise and (b) no coercion or 
deception is involved. Please take this qualification as understood unless context indicates otherwise. 
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it through. As with promises, this obligation can be overridden – if enough is at stake, it can be 
permissible for me to violate our joint plan – but even when it is, the fact that we made a joint 
decision is a strong pro tanto reason in favor of my carrying it out. 
 If you grant that the above joint decision is binding, then it is hard to deny that joint 
decisions made by means of I-proposals are too. The fact that a joint decision concerns only the 
speaker’s actions, or that it was proposed by means of the propose-and-challenge method, does 
not seem to diminish its moral relevance. So, if we jointly decide just that I will read your paper, 
and we decide this by means of propose-and-challenge, this joint decision will similarly obligate 
me to you to read your paper. Thus I-proposals, like promises, (defeasibly) generate obligations 
that are owed to their addressees. If we take on the deliberative theory, we can thus explain the 
normative force of promises by appeal to the normative force of joint decisions.3 
 The obvious next question is: why should we abide by our joint decisions? I will not 
endorse any particular answer to this question. Instead, I will show how the most popular 
accounts of promises’ normative force can also be used to vindicate the normative force of joint 
decisions. Thus there is no principled basis for accepting the normative force of promises while 
denying the normative force of I-proposals. In short: if promises are binding, then I-proposals are too. 
Consider first Rawls’s conventionalist account: we have reason to keep our promises 
because to break a promise would be to unfairly free-ride on the beneficial promising practice, 
violating the principle of fairness (1971: 343; for more on conventionalism, see §4.1). The 
principle of fairness applies to joint decisions as well: to make a joint decision and then violate it 
is to free-ride, helping oneself to the benefits of joint deliberation without doing one’s part in the 
practice by obeying its rules. Thus the principle of fairness equally plausibly gives us reason to 
abide by our joint decisions. 
Second, consider the style of account offered by two-tier theories such as contractualism 
and rule consequentialism. On these accounts, the principle requiring us to keep our promises is 
                                                
3 You might be worrying that the obligation to abide by a joint decision seems weaker than the obligation to keep a 
promise. This objection is important enough to get its own section (§3); until then, let us set it aside. 
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a basic axiom of our moral theory, not reducible to any more general principle. But this principle 
itself is justified by appeal to our interests: our interest in the principle’s being generally followed 
(Scanlon 1998; Hooker 2011) or our ‘normative interest’ in its being true (Owens 2012). (I discuss 
this style of account further in §4.3 of this chapter). Along similar lines, we might posit a principle 
requiring us to abide by our joint decisions as a basic axiom of our moral theory. We could then 
offer the very same two-tier justifications for this joint decision principle. We surely have an 
interest in this principle’s being generally followed. And if we do have a normative interest in the 
promissory principle’s being true, I cannot see why we would not have a similar interest in the 
truth of the joint decision principle. 
 Third, consider a Kantian account. Kant’s Formula of Humanity enjoins us to “so act 
that you use humanity…always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means” (Kant 
1785/1996: 80). On an influential interpretation, treating a person as an end in herself requires 
acting in a way she could coherently agree to (O’Neill 1985; Korsgaard 1986; Langton 1992). On 
this view, it is wrong for me to break my promise to you because you could not coherently agree 
to my doing so. For, by agreeing to my breaking a promise, you would thereby release me from 
the promise, and thus make it the case that I am not breaking a promise after all. Your 
agreement would thus be self-defeating: the action you are agreeing to – breaking my promise – 
is of a kind that can only be performed in the absence of your agreement. This argument applies 
equally well to joint decisions. Consider whether you could coherently agree to my violating our 
joint decision. By the same reasoning, this agreement would be self-defeating: by agreeing to my 
violating our joint decision, you would thereby retract that joint decision, and thus make it the case 
that my action would not violate any joint decision after all. Violating our joint decision is the kind of 
action that can only be performed in the absence of your agreement. Thus the Kantian can also 
say that my violating our joint decision is wrong because doing so treats you as a mere means. 
Finally, consider an act consequentialist account, on which we should keep our promises 
because acts of promise-breaking are bad in themselves. Why think that promise-breaking is bad 
in itself? Because (we might say) the practice of making and keeping promises is valuable not only 
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as a means, but also valuable as an end, non-instrumentally (Smith 2011). Compare a musical 
performance: we might value playing Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony well for its own sake, not just as 
a means to pleasure or prestige. And if this is so, it seems that we have reason to play the right 
notes, because playing the wrong notes would lessen the performance’s value. Similarly, the 
consequentialist can argue that people have reason to keep their promises because doing 
otherwise would lessen the value of the promising practice.4 
Could we similarly contend that the act of violating a joint decision is bad in itself? 
Perhaps. Compare the individual case. Granted, it is not so plausible to think that deliberation is 
valuable for its own sake – should we linger on each decision, so as to maximize the amount of 
deliberation we get to do? But being an autonomous, self-governing agent is plausibly valuable 
for its own sake; and one important component of such self-governance is following through on 
the decisions one makes in practical deliberation (cf. Bratman 2009). Along similar lines, we 
should grant that the activity of joint deliberation itself is not valuable for its own sake. But, we 
might claim, the activity of governing our lives together is valuable for its own sake, and one important 
component of such ‘shared governance’ is following through on the decisions we make in joint 
practical deliberation. Thus we might maintain that the act of violating a standing joint decision 
constitutively undermines the value of our activity of shared governance, and is therefore bad in 
itself. Thus the most plausible consequentialist account of the bindingness of promises is at least 
as (and likely more) plausible as an account of the bindingness of joint decisions. 
So, whether your favorite account of promises’ normative force appeals to Rawls’ 
principle of fairness, a two-tier theory like contractualism or rule consequentialism, Kant’s 
formula of humanity, or the non-instrumental value of the promising practice, a similar account 
will vindicate the normative force of joint decisions. Without deciding here which of the above 
                                                
4 The claim is that promise-breaking acts undermine the value of the promising practice constitutively, regardless of 
their downstream causal consequences. Thus this account avoids the false prediction that you can break promises if 
you know you won’t get caught: even undetected promise-breakings undermine the value of the practice they violate. 
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accounts is best, we can conclude the following: if promises are binding, then I-proposals are too 
– and likely for the very same reasons. 
 
1.2. Directedness 
 Promises don’t just create obligations simpliciter. They create directed obligations: 
obligations owed to the promisee in particular. If I promise you that I will φ, then typically I am 
thereafter obligated to you to φ; my failing to φ would wrong you. When I promise you that I will 
read your paper, I become obligated to you to do so: my failing to read your paper would wrong 
you. You have a special standing to hold me accountable to my promissory obligation: you can 
demand that I fulfill my promise and resent me personally if I break it (Gilbert 2004; Darwall 
2011). 
Can we say the same for I-proposals? When I make an I-proposal to φ, do I then become 
not only obligated to φ, but obligated to my addressee(s)? I think so. When I make an I-proposal to 
you and you do not object, the resulting joint decision is one that you and I made together. 
Whether or not I abide by this joint decision matters to you in a way it does not matter to anyone 
else. As the other party to our joint decision, you have a special stake in its fulfillment, and thus 
have special standing to complain about its violation. So, when we make a joint decision, we each 
become obligated to the other to do our part in seeing it through. 
We can bolster the case for thinking that I-proposals are similar to promises in this respect 
by focusing on the promisee’s special standing to demand that the promise is fulfilled (Gilbert 
2004; Darwall 2012). This authority is usually given to the promisee alone: third parties may not 
have standing to demand the promise’s fulfillment. Suppose, for example, that I promise my 
partner Dee Dee that I will wash the dishes tonight. Our neighbor George knows about this 
promise, and sees the dishes festering in the sink. He demands: “Brendan, wash the dishes!” Is 
George’s demand legitimate? I don’t think so. My friend may be perfectly entitled to advise me to 
wash the dishes, but to demand that I do so is to overstep his authority. I could rightly respond, 
“It’s none of your business whether I wash the dishes!” (cf. Gilbert 2004: 101). Only Dee Dee is in 
 53 
a position to hold me to my promise: she alone has the authority to demand that I wash the 
dishes. 
I submit that I-proposals have the very same effect: they give their addressees special 
standing to demand that the speaker abide by the joint decision she proposed. Recall the 
deliberative theory of demands: a demand is a proposal to make a joint decision regarding the 
addressee’s actions by means of propose-and-challenge.5 Given this hypothesis, it is easy to see 
why I-proposals give their addressees standing to demand their fulfillment. A joint decision that 
the speaker proposes by saying “I will φ” (an I-proposal) will be expressed by the addressee by 
saying “you will φ” (a demand). Thus the addressee’s demand that the speaker act in accordance 
with her I-proposal expresses the same joint decision that the speaker proposed in the first place. If 
the initial I-proposal was warranted, then the addressee’s demand will be too, since these two 
speech acts express the very same joint decision. 
So, we can explain our example as follows. According to the deliberative theory, my 
promise to Dee Dee brought into force between us a joint decision to the effect that I will wash 
the dishes. Dee Dee, as a participant in the process of joint deliberation within which this 
decision was made, has the standing to express this decision by demanding that I wash the 
dishes.6 However, my neighbor George is not a participant in the joint deliberation I share with 
Dee Dee – he and I have our own, separate process of joint deliberation. There is no standing 
joint decision between us to the effect that I will wash the dishes. Moreover, we may not be 
warranted in jointly deciding that I wash the dishes, for the reasons I share with George may not 
sufficiently support my washing the dishes, though the reasons I share with Dee Dee do. Whether 
or not third parties can demand compliance with a promise is thus a contingent matter, 
depending on the extent to which the reasons they share with the promisor are at stake in the 
                                                
5 I defend this theory of demands in Chapter 4. 
6 But hasn’t the joint decision that I will wash the dishes already been made? How, then, can the demand propose it 
again? Rather than seeing Dee Dee’s demand as proposing the joint decision be drawn anew, I think we should see it 
as reiterating our joint decision. Seeing that I am liable to violate our joint decision, Dee Dee expresses it again. 
Compare reiterating an assertion: I’ve told you that it’s raining, but you walk out the door without an umbrella. I say 
again: “it’s raining out there!” I am not telling you something new; I am reiterating the assertion I already made. 
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promise’s fulfillment. In contrast, the promisee’s standing to demand fulfillment is far less 
contingent, as it is based directly in the joint decision that the promise brought into force. Thus 
the deliberative theory predicts that this central feature of promissory obligation – the promisee’s 
special standing to demand the promise’s fulfillment – will attach to the obligations created by I-
proposals as well. 
 
1.3. Exclusion 
Most agree that our reason to keep our promises is only pro tanto and can be overridden if 
enough is at stake. But some have argued that it is still inappropriate for a promisor to think of 
the fact that she promised to φ as just another consideration to be weighed up when deciding whether 
to φ (Raz 1977; Hart 1982: 255; Robins 1984; Owens 2012: 89-91). Why? Because a promise to 
φ should settle the question of whether to φ for the promisor. To weigh up reasons for and against 
keeping one’s promise is to open a question that one should be treating as closed. 
 The attitude one should take towards actions one has promised to do is tellingly similar to 
the attitude theorists of intention have argued one should take towards actions one intends to do 
(Bratman 1987; Holton 2004). Like promises, intentions settle deliberative questions, excluding 
options incompatible with the intended action from further consideration. Moreover, intentions 
resist reconsideration: having decided to φ, a rational agent should be disposed not to reopen the 
question of whether to φ unless her situation changes in some unexpected way. 
 Given the analogy we have pursued between joint and individual deliberation, these 
observations about individual intentions should apply to joint intentions as well. So, just as I 
should be disposed to exclude options incompatible with my standing decisions from my 
deliberation, I should similarly be disposed to exclude options incompatible with our standing 
joint decisions from my deliberation. And just as I should not be over-ready to reconsider my 
intentions, I should not be over-ready to reconsider our joint decisions. If I fail to have these 
dispositions, this means that I am not taking our joint decisions as seriously as I take my own 
individual intentions. Thus, like promises, I-proposals have exclusionary force: a successful I-
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proposal that I will φ, by bringing a joint decision into force, will typically make it inappropriate 
for me to seriously consider the question of whether to φ in my subsequent practical deliberation. 
The deliberative theory can thus explain the exclusionary force of promises by appeal to 
the exclusionary force of intentions (cf. Raz 1975: 69-70; Robins 1984). One should not think of 
a promise as just another consideration to be weighed up in deliberation because, in doing so, 
one fails to treat the joint decision one’s promise brought into force as what it is: a decision. 
 
1.4. Uptake 
Many have observed that promises require uptake from the promisee to be binding 
(Thomson 1990: 297; Darwall 2011: 268; Owens 2012: 224-226; Roth 2016: 89-92). If I make a 
promise that you neither hear nor acknowledge, then my promise misfires, failing to obligate me 
at all. But it is hard to say exactly what kind of uptake promises require. For promises do not 
seem to require explicit affirmation from both parties in the way agreements, offers, and requests 
do. Promises seem unilateral in a way that offers or agreements are not. On the other hand, the 
promisee must recognize a promise for it to be binding, and can block a promise’s effects by 
refusing it. 
 Notably, both of these features characterize I-proposals as well. Any proposed joint 
decision comes into force only if its addressees recognize it and signal their acceptance. But in the 
propose-and-challenge method, a proposal need not be explicitly accepted to come into effect: all 
that is required is for the addressee to recognize it and refrain from challenging it in good faith 
(see Ch. 1, §3.2). Thus I-proposals require the same kind of uptake that promises do: recognition 
and the absence of objection. And if we take on the deliberative theory, we can explain why 
promises seem unilateral: because they employ propose-and-challenge.7 
                                                
7 Hallie Liberto (forthcoming) has recently raised several cases in which promissory obligation appears to come into 
force before uptake is secured. Here’s one: on Monday, Bertha sends Albert a letter promising to be monogamous; 
knowing that Albert won’t receive the letter until Friday, Bertha has one last romp with her ex on Thursday. 
Bertha’s action seems wrong, indicating that her promise was binding before it received uptake from Albert. 
Prima facie, this seems problematic for the deliberative theory. For surely Bertha and Albert can’t count as having 
made a joint decision until after Albert receives the letter. So this appears to be a case where a promissory obligation 
comes into force before any joint decision is made. 
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This account of uptake helps to assuage one prima facie worry about the deliberative 
theory. Perhaps the most immediate objection to the view is: “But promising doesn’t feel like 
making a proposal.” True enough: on the ordinary use of ‘proposal’, a proposal must be 
explicitly accepted to come into force. Still, I call promises ‘proposals’ because they do require 
their addressees’ acceptance to come into force, even though this acceptance is usually tacit. Here 
assertion is a helpful analogy. On a popular account, an assertion is “a proposal to change the 
context by adding [its] content to the information presupposed” (Stalnaker 1999: 10). But 
assertions, like promises, do not require explicit acceptance to come into effect; they only require 
their addressees to recognize them and refrain from objecting. So, promises are proposals in the 
same technical sense that assertions are. 
 
1.5. Release 
Suppose I promise my partner Dee Dee that I’ll wash the dishes tonight. But before I pick 
up the sponge, Dee Dee says, “On second thought, don’t worry about doing the dishes. You 
should relax instead.” Dee Dee has released me from my promise: I am no longer obligated to do 
the dishes. The moral situation is much like it would have been if I had never promised at all. In 
general, promisees have the power to release promisors from their promissory obligations. 
The addressee of an I-proposal has a similar power: he can propose to retract the joint 
decision the I-proposal brought into effect. Just as individual decisions can be retracted, so too 
can joint decisions. When we retract a joint decision, its normative effects are reversed: our 
reason to abide by our joint decisions no longer gives us reason to abide by this decision, as it no 
                                                                                                                                                       
True, but Liberto’s cases are surprising for any theory of promises that includes an uptake requirement. The 
lesson Liberto draws from these cases is not that promises do not require uptake, but that uptake can have a 
backward-reaching effect, retroactively making it the case that the promisor was under a promissory obligation from 
the moment she ‘launched’ the promise. I see no reason why the uptake of a joint decision cannot have this 
backward-reaching effect as well. Indeed, Bertha’s Thursday night romp seems no less wrong if her letter proposes 
an explicitly joint decision: “I’m ready. Let’s be monogamous.” (Curiously, the backward-reaching effect only seems 
to arise for propose-and-challenge proposals. If Bertha wrote, “I’m ready. Would you like to be monogamous?” her 
Thursday romp would be less objectionable). So while the backward reach of uptake is a surprising phenomenon in 
need of explanation, I do not think it poses any special problem for the deliberative theory. 
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longer stands. So, the addressee of an I-proposal can release the speaker from the obligation it 
creates by proposing to retract the joint decision the I-proposal brought into force. 
But this seems to miss an essential detail. Any participant in joint practical deliberation 
can propose to retract a joint decision, including the person who originally proposed it. The 
power to retract joint decisions thus seems to be symmetrical. In contrast, the power to release 
someone from a promise is asymmetrical. A promisor cannot release herself from her promise; only 
the promisee can release her. How can the deliberative theory explain this asymmetry? 
 The answer is that both promisor and promisee can propose to retract the joint decision 
brought into force by a promise, but their proposals should be evaluated by different methods. A 
promisor’s proposal to retract should be evaluated by the propose-and-ratify method, while a 
promisee’s proposal to retract should be evaluated by the propose-and-challenge method. Why? To 
correct for both parties’ natural biases. The promisor is likely to be overeager to retract the joint 
decision brought into effect by her promise, since the costs of fulfilling it will fall primarily on her. 
So, it makes sense to evaluate promisors’ retraction proposals conservatively, requiring the 
promisee’s explicit acceptance for them to succeed. In contrast, promisees may be reluctant to 
retract the joint decisions brought into force by promises, since often they stand to benefit from 
the promise’s fulfillment at little cost to themselves. And so it makes sense to evaluate promisees’ 
retraction proposals using the more liberal propose-and-challenge method. 
On the deliberative theory, then, what is unique about the promisee’s power of release is 
not that only she can propose to retract the promise, but that only her proposals should be 
evaluated using propose-and-challenge. When Dee Dee proposes to retract our joint decision 
(“don’t worry about doing the dishes tonight”), I need not explicitly accept her proposal for the 
decision to be retracted.8 But suppose instead I turn to Dee Dee and say, “I’m pretty tired. 
Would you mind if I left the dishes until tomorrow?” I thereby propose to retract the decision 
                                                
8 This account does imply that I could challenge Dee Dee’s attempt to release me from my promise. This might be 
surprising: we rarely object to being released from our promises. But sometimes we do. Say you promise your proud 
but frail grandmother that you will help her move into her new home. Being proud, she tries to release you from 
your promise: “You don’t have to help, I’ll be fine.” Since she does need your help, you reply: “I insist: I gave you my 
word and I’m sticking to it!” You thereby challenge your grandmother’s proposal to release you from your promise. 
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brought into force by my earlier promise. But notably, my proposal will only succeed with Dee 
Dee’s explicit blessing. If she says, “Sure, that’s fine,” our joint decision is then retracted, and I 
am released from my promise. But if she rejects my proposal (“I’m sorry, but the dishes need to 
be done tonight”), my promise remains in force. This is just what we should expect if promisors’ 
retraction proposals are evaluated by the propose-and-ratify method (cf. Gilbert 2011b: 99-100). 
 This asymmetry in deliberative methods guarantees that the speaker of an I-proposal will 
be released from her resulting obligation only if her addressee explicitly agrees to her release: 
either by proposing to retract the decision himself, or by explicitly accepting the speaker’s 
proposal to do so. No such power is given to the speaker: the addressee does not require the 
speaker’s explicit acceptance to release her. Thus just as promises give promisees the power of 
release, I-proposals give their addressees a tellingly similar power to reverse their effects. 
 
2. The validity conditions of promises 
 Sometimes, promises don’t bind at all. A person promises to φ, and yet, due to unusual 
circumstances, her promise fails to create any reason for her to φ (at least in the usual way). Such 
promises are called invalid.9 The paradigm cases of invalid promises are those elicited by coercion 
and by deception, as in these colorful examples from Judith Jarvis Thomson: 
BANK: “[Bert] is not among the more efficient extortionists: he holds a gun to [Anna]’s 
head and says ‘GIVE ME YOUR WORD THAT YOU WILL GO TO YOUR BANK 
AND FETCH ME BACK A THOUSAND DOLLARS OR I’LL SHOOT YOU!’ 
[Anna] says ‘Yessir’” (Thomson 1990: 310). 
VAN GOGH: Diego offers to sell Cora his Van Gogh for $1000, and Cora promises to go 
to the bank and get $1000 to pay him straightaway. On the way, Cora learns that the 
painting is forged, and Diego knew this was so (paraphrase of Thomson 1990: 312-313). 
                                                
9 I assume that invalid promises are still promises: a promise was made; it just failed to generate any reasons. 
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The promise in BANK is invalid due to coercion; the promise in VAN GOGH is invalid due to 
deception. These background conditions somehow rob the promises of their moral force: neither 
promisee would be wronged if the promisor did not give him the promised money. 
 Are I-proposals also invalidated by coercion and deception? I will argue that they are. In 
particular, I will argue that I-proposals induced by coercion or deception fail to result in the making 
of the joint decisions they propose. There is a gap between the making of an I-proposal and the making 
of a joint decision: the former can fail to bring about the latter. A simple way for this to happen is 
for the proposal to be rejected: if you refuse my I-proposal, no joint decision is made. This is not 
what happens in BANK and VAN GOGH: in both cases, the addressee accepts the speaker’s 
proposal wholeheartedly. Yet, I claim, the interaction between speaker and addressee in these 
cases fails to constitute the making of a joint decision. 
Why? Because coerced and deceived promises cannot be accepted in good faith (see Ch. 
1, §3.2). Good faith participation in joint practical deliberation requires one to accept only those 
proposed joint decisions one believes to be warranted by the shared reasons. But, I shall argue, 
when someone induces a promise via coercion or deception, they are always in a position to 
know that the promise they have induced is unwarranted. Thus, if she is deliberating in good 
faith, the recipient of a coerced or deceived promise would challenge that promise on the basis 
that it is unwarranted. By intentionally withholding that challenge, the promisee accepts a joint 
decision she knows to be unwarranted, and so cannot be deliberating in good faith. 
 As I argued in Chapter 1, bad faith joint deliberation is not really joint deliberation at all. 
The person who deliberates in bad faith is only pretending to engage in joint decision-making 
with her fellow participants. Thus one person’s bad faith renders any resulting ‘joint decisions’ 
null and void: her failure to play her part in the deliberative process blocks the kind of joining of 
wills that is essential to joint decision-making. Since, according to the deliberative theory, the 
normative force of promises is grounded in the normative force of joint decisions, we can predict 
that a promise accepted in bad faith will fail to bind the speaker to action. This suggests the 
following account of promises’ validity conditions: 
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The Good Faith Account of Validity: A promise is valid if and only if it is made 
and accepted in good faith. An accepted promise is invalid when either the 
promisor made it in bad faith, or the promisee accepted it in bad faith.10 
I will now argue that the good faith account predicts and explains our nuanced intuitions about 
when promises are and are not valid. But first, a stylistic note. In section 3, I treated I-proposals 
as distinct from promises, so that we could investigate their properties without assuming the 
deliberative theory. In this section, I will abandon this device, taking on the deliberative theory’s 
thesis that promises are I-proposals and seeing what follows from this assumption. This will help 
us to see how the deliberative theory not only captures the validity conditions of promises, but 
explains them. 
 
2.1. Deceived promises 
Begin with deceived promises. In VAN GOGH, Cora promises to pay Diego $1000 for his 
Van Gogh. But she only makes this promise because she believes the painting to be genuine, 
while Diego knows it to be a forgery. Diego’s deception renders Cora’s promise invalid. Why? 
On the deliberative theory, Cora’s promise is a proposal to jointly decide that she will go 
fetch $1000 in payment for Diego’s painting. If the painting were a genuine Van Gogh, this joint 
decision would be warranted. But Diego knows that the painting is a forgery. So, the reason Cora 
takes to warrant jointly deciding that she will fetch Diego $1000 – namely, that he will give her a 
Van Gogh in return – is not a shared reason for Diego and Cora, since Diego does not believe it to 
                                                
10 Here the details of the deliberative theory substantively differ from those of Margaret Gilbert’s similar account 
(2011b). (Recall, however, that the most important difference lies in the different arguments Gilbert and I give for the 
view; see footnote 1). Gilbert also holds that valid promises bring into force a joint decision regarding what the 
promisor will do; but she gives a different account of the process whereby joint decisions are made. Gilbert holds that 
a joint decision J comes into effect just in case (a) all parties to the decision have expressed their readiness to be 
jointly committed to J and (b) this fact is common knowledge between them (1993a: 695; 2011a: 311). Importantly, 
the parties to the joint decision may express their readiness to accept it for whatever reason, including reasons that 
depend upon their having been coerced or deceived. Thus Gilbert’s theory predicts that promises made under 
coercion or deception result in bona fide joint decisions and so are binding (a result she embraces: see her 1993a). In 
contrast, as I will argue presently, the deliberative theory entails that coerced and deceived promises bring no joint 
decisions into force and thus are not binding. So, the account of promises’ validity conditions I offer here depends 
upon a very non-Gilbertian theory of joint practical deliberation. 
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be true. This follows from UNANIMITY (Ch. 1, §1.3), given the plausible assumption that p cannot 
be a reason for someone who does not believe that p. Since Diego does not believe that the 
painting is a Van Gogh, this ‘fact’ cannot be a reason for him individually; and if it is not a 
reason for Diego, it cannot be a shared reason for Diego and Cora. But without the assumption 
that the painting is a Van Gogh, Cora’s proposed joint decision is not warranted: a forged Van 
Gogh is not worth $1000 to Cora. 
Diego knows all of this. So, if he were deliberating with Cora in good faith, Diego would 
challenge her promise as follows: “You are only promising to pay me $1000 for this painting 
because you believe it is a genuine Van Gogh. But I lied to you: the painting is a forgery. Given 
that the painting is a forgery, you shouldn’t pay me $1000 for it, and so I can’t accept your 
promise to do so.” Of course, our duplicitous Diego is unlikely to have this sudden change of 
heart. But that’s the point: the fact that Diego does not raise this challenge shows that he is not 
participating in the propose-and-challenge process in good faith, and this is what invalidates 
Cora’s promise. The promise fails to bring its proposed joint decision into force because it was 
not accepted by means of good faith joint deliberation. 
To generalize: say the promisee knows that ~p, but has deceived the promisor into 
believing that p. When a promise is invalidated by deception, this will be because the warrant of 
the joint decision it proposes depends upon the truth of p in a certain way: given p, it would be 
warranted, but without the assumption that p, it is unwarranted.11 The speaker promises to φ 
because she takes the shared reasons to support her φing, given her belief that p. But p is not part 
of the shared reasons, since the promisee believes p to be false (by UNANIMITY). Without p, the 
shared reasons do not sufficiently support the promisor’s φing, and thus the joint decision that she 
φ is unwarranted (by SUFFICIENT SHARED REASON; Ch. 1, §2). Since he knows that ~p, the 
promisee must also know that the joint decision proposed by the promise is unwarranted. If he 
were deliberating in good faith, the promisee would challenge the promise on this basis; the fact 
                                                
11 Dougherty (2013: 731) makes a similar point about how deception invalidates consent. 
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that he doesn’t shows that he is deliberating in bad faith. Because it is accepted in bad faith, the 
deceived promise cannot yield a joint decision. This is why deceived promises are invalid. 
 
2.2. Coerced promises 
In BANK, Anna’s promise is invalid because it is elicited by Bert’s coercive threat. Does 
that mean that all promises elicited by threats are invalid? No: consider 
PICASSO: Cora wants to purchase a (genuine) Picasso Diego is selling. Cora tells Diego 
that she is willing to pay $1000 for the painting, but she doesn’t have the money on her 
person. Diego replies: “This Picasso is highly in demand, so I can’t hold it for you unless I 
have a guaranteed sale. Give me your word that you will go to your bank and fetch me 
back a thousand dollars, or I’ll sell the Picasso to someone else.” Cora says, “Yessir.” 
In both PICASSO and BANK, the promisor promises to fetch $1000 only because the promisee 
threatens to do something if she doesn’t. And yet Cora’s promise in PICASSO is intuitively valid. 
So, the mere fact that a promise was elicited by a threat is not enough to render it invalid. 
The relevant difference between BANK and PICASSO seems to be that Bert’s threat to 
shoot Anna is illegitimate – he has no right to shoot her – while Diego’s threat to sell the Picasso to 
someone else is legitimate – he has every right to do so (cf. Scanlon 1990: 224 and Chwang 2011: 
160-161). What does this distinction amount to? Following Japa Pallikkathayil (2011: 12), I 
suggest that a threat is illegitimate just in case its addressee can warrantedly demand that it not be 
carried out. So, Bert’s threat is illegitimate because Anna can warrantedly demand of Bert that 
he refrain from shooting her, while Diego’s threat is legitimate because Cora cannot warrantedly 
demand of Diego that he refrain from selling the painting to someone else. Our datum, then, is 
that promises elicited by illegitimate threats are invalid. Why is this the case? 
When someone makes a threat, she attempts to unilaterally exclude a certain shared 
option from consideration. When I threaten, “If you φ, I’ll [insert threat here],” I am attempting 
to rule out the shared option in which you φ and I don’t carry out my threat. If my threat is 
illegitimate, this restriction cannot be warranted. To show this, we must appeal again to the 
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hypothesis that demands propose joint decisions regarding the addressee’s actions. Given this 
hypothesis, if you can warrantedly demand that I not carry out my threat, the joint decision that 
I will not carry out my threat must be warranted. Thus my threat restricts our shared options in 
exactly the wrong way: it attempts to rule out the option in which you φ and I don’t carry out my 
threat, while we should in fact rule out the option in which you φ and I do carry out my threat. 
Thus, if you can demand that I not carry out a threat, our shared options should reflect this, 
letting you do as you please without fearing that I will do what I threatened. 
With this in mind, consider BANK. When Bert makes his threat, he unilaterally rules out 
the shared option in which Anna retains both her money and her life. Anna is left with a choice 
between promising Bert $1000 and being shot; she understandably opts for the former. But 
Anna’s promise is premised on the wrong set of shared options. Anna has the standing to 
demand that Bert not shoot her whether or not she promises him $1000. Thus her choice should 
not be between promising Bert $1000 and being shot by Bert, but instead between promising Bert $1000 
and not promising Bert $1000, with Bert’s shooting her squarely off the table. 
Bert is in a position to know all of this. So, if he were deliberating with Anna in good 
faith, Bert would challenge her promise as follows: “You’re only promising to go fetch me $1000 
because I threatened to shoot you if you didn’t. But I should never have threatened to shoot you 
in the first place – doing so would be wrong. So let’s agree that I won’t shoot you, and then you 
can decide whether or not to promise me $1000 on your own.” Of course, our belligerent Bert 
won’t raise this challenge unless he has a sudden and miraculous change of heart. But the fact 
that Bert doesn’t raise this challenge, which he knows to be warranted, shows that he is not 
deliberating with Anna in good faith. So the proposed joint decision that Anna will go fetch Bert 
$1000 does not come into force, as it was not jointly made. This is why Anna’s promise is invalid. 
To generalize: promises elicited by illegitimate threats are necessarily premised on a 
flawed set of shared options. Say you promise to φ because I illegitimately threaten, “if you don’t 
φ, then I’ll [insert threat here].” You are only promising to φ because you prefer the shared 
option you φ, I don’t carry out my threat over the option you don’t φ, I carry out my threat. But this is a 
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false choice, imposed on you by my illegitimate threat. Since you would be warranted in 
demanding that I not carry out my threat, we should rule out the shared option you don’t φ, I carry 
out my threat and instead open the option you don’t φ, I don’t carry out my threat. The relevant 
deliberative question is whether the proposed joint decision is warranted relative to this set of 
shared options. Since I am aware of this, I should challenge your promise on the basis that it is 
premised on the wrong set of shared options. If I do not raise this challenge, I cannot be 
deliberating in good faith, and so your promise is invalid. 
Crucially, this argument does not extend to promises elicited by legitimate threats. These 
promises are also premised on a restricted set of shared options. But the fact that the promisor 
cannot demand that the promisee not carry out his threat implies that the promisee has warrant to 
restrict the shared options in this way. When, in PICASSO, Diego tells Cora, “I won’t hold the 
painting for you unless you promise me payment,” he is unilaterally ruling out the shared option 
in which he holds the painting for Cora without a promised sale. But since Cora cannot demand 
that Diego do this, the resulting restricted set of shared options is warranted: it simply takes 
Diego’s permissible plans into account. Thus Cora’s promise can be warranted despite being 
premised on Diego’s threat, and Diego can accept it in good faith. This is why promises induced 
by legitimate threats can be valid, though those induced by illegitimate threats are not. 
 
2.3. Comparison with other accounts 
 I know of two major alternative accounts of the validity conditions of promises: 
The Freedom Account: an accepted promise is invalid if and only if the promisor did 
not make it freely and voluntarily. 
The Wronging Account: an accepted promise is invalid if and only if the promisee 
elicited it by means of wronging the promisor. 
How do these alternatives compare to the good faith account? 
 Begin with the freedom account. This view gets its great prima facie plausibility from the 
fact that the paradigm case of an invalid promise, a coerced promise, is also a paradigm case of 
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unfree action. When I make a promise at gunpoint, I clearly do not make that promise freely and 
voluntarily, and so it is plausible to suppose that this explains why my promise is not binding. 
Perhaps this is why many theorists simply assume the freedom account without argument.12 
 Though the freedom account may be able to capture our intuitions regarding coercion, it 
runs into trouble in explaining invalidity by deception. To explain these cases, the freedom 
account must appeal to the excuse from responsibility that deception provides. Deception can 
excuse by showing that it was rational for the deceived agent to do what she did, given what she 
reasonably believed to be true. For example, we would not criticize Cora for promising to buy a 
forgery, since she reasonably believed it to be a genuine Van Gogh. Perhaps the fact that Cora’s 
promise can be excused in this way shows that it was not made freely. Accepting this premise 
would enable the Freedom Account to predict that deceived promises are invalid. But this 
strategy overgenerates. Deception excuses because the deceived agent is ignorant of some 
relevant matter of fact. So, if deception by the promisee renders a promise unfree, so too will 
simple ignorance or deception by a third party. Consider 
DEGAS: Cora promises Diego that she will go fetch $1000 to pay for Diego’s (genuine) 
Degas. Cora is buying the Degas as a gift for her friend Ellen, whom she believes is a 
great lover of Degas’ work. In fact, Ellen hates art, but told Cora that she loves Degas in 
order to impress her. If Cora knew this, she would not have made her promise to Diego. 
The promise in this case is clearly valid. If Cora reneged on her promise, she could not justify 
herself to Diego by explaining that she was deceived about Ellen’s preferences. Yet the freedom 
account cannot plausibly claim that deception by the promisee invalidates promises without also 
maintaining that deception by third parties invalidates promises. In contrast, the good faith 
account predicts the difference between these cases. If a promisee elicits a promise by deception, 
then he can only accept it in bad faith. But if a promise is based in deception by a third party, 
                                                
12 Rawls, for example, explains the validity conditions of promises by appeal to the requirement that “[the 
promisor’s] words must be spoken freely or voluntarily” (1971: 345). Similarly, Scanlon writes into his account the 
requirement that “A voluntarily and intentionally leads B to expect that A will do X” (Scanlon 1998: 304; my emphasis). 
For explicit defense of the freedom account, see McMahon (1989: 241) and Chwang (2011). 
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then so long as the promisee is also ignorant of the relevant fact, he can accept the promise in 
good faith. 
 Let us turn to the wronging account, which has recently been defended by David Owens 
(2007; 2012). Owens argues that promises elicited by wrongful means are invalid because “the 
promisor’s interest in (say) expressing himself by changing the normative situation in favour of 
the promisee will not be served where the promise has been given only because the promisee has 
flouted some of the norms governing relations between them” (Owens 2012: 243). On this basis, 
Owens concludes: “promises induced by duress or misrepresentation are invalid where by getting 
someone to promise in that way you wrong him” (Owens 2007: 299). 
 The wronging account and the good faith account yield the same verdicts in nearly every 
case. Plausibly, deliberating in bad faith wrongs one’s co-deliberator; so, whenever the promisee 
accepts a promise in bad faith, he wrongs the promisor as well. Thus whenever the good faith 
account predicts a promise to be invalid because the promisee accepted it in bad faith, the 
wronging account will agree (because the promisee wronged the promisor). However, the 
accounts diverge in at least one kind of case: when a promisee induces a promise by wronging the 
promisor, but does not deliberate in bad faith. Here I think the good faith account yields the 
correct verdict. Consider two examples: 
COMIC BOOKS: Cora is buying paintings from Diego again. Before they get to business, 
Cora and Diego are making small talk. Cora notices that Diego has a large collection of 
superhero comics on his bookshelf, and casually inquires, “I take it you like comic 
books?” Now, Diego does like comic books, but he knows that Cora is an obsessive comic 
book fan – so much so that, if she gets started talking about comic books, she’ll talk so 
long that she will never get around to buying a painting. In order to avoid this eventuality 
and thus get Cora to promise to buy a painting, Diego lies: “Oh, those are just for my 
nephew – I’ve never read one myself.” The conversation moves on to business, and Cora 
promises to pay Diego $1000 for his (genuine) Rembrandt. 
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PUSHY ACTIVIST: Ellen and Frank are together in an elevator. Suddenly, Frank presses 
the emergency stop button. “I work for the Animal Rights Corps,” Frank says. “We need 
donations, but we can never get people to sit still long enough to hear our case. I have the 
key to this elevator, and I’m not letting you out until you listen to what I have to say.” By 
these means, Frank intends to get Ellen to promise a donation to his organization. Ellen 
begrudgingly listens to Frank’s spiel. But as she hears his arguments, Ellen is convinced of 
the importance of his cause. When Frank is done, he unlocks the elevator. He says, 
“You’re free to go now, but if you feel compelled by what I said, please pledge a 
donation.” Ellen replies, “Though it was wrong of you to lock me in here, I was 
convinced by your arguments. I promise to donate $1000 to your organization.” 
 It seems to me that Cora and Ellen’s promises in these cases are both valid. Cora’s 
promise to pay Diego for the Rembrandt seems binding despite Diego’s fib. If Cora were to find 
out on the way to the bank that Diego lied to her about his comic books in order to prevent her 
from talking his ear off, she might be understandably chagrined, but could not reasonably 
conclude that she was off the hook. Diego still has a legitimate claim to payment. Similarly, 
Ellen’s promise of a donation to Franks’s organization seems binding despite the objectionable 
way in which Frank solicited it. Though Frank forced Ellen to listen to his arguments, he did not 
force her to promise the donation. So Ellen should hold to her word, even if she remains 
understandably angry with Frank. 
But in both of these examples, the promisee elicits the promise by means of wronging the 
promisor. Diego wronged Cora by lying – but if he had not done so, she would have talked his 
ear off and never gotten around to promising to buy his painting. Frank wronged Ellen by 
locking her in the elevator – but if he had not done so, she would not have listened to his 
arguments and been convinced to promise a donation to his organization. Thus both of these 
cases are examples of the promisee getting the promisor to make a promise by means of an action 
that wrongs her. So, the wronging account predicts that the resulting promises are invalid. 
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 It might be objected that the causal link between the wronging and the promise in these 
cases is too indirect for the wronging account to apply. As I granted, Frank did not force Ellen to 
promise a donation, just to listen to his spiel; and Diego did not deceive Cora into promising, just into 
not talking his ear off. Thus the promisee’s wrongdoing did not bring about the promise itself, just 
the situation that enabled the promise to be made. The challenge is to find a non-ad-hoc rationale 
for saying that this distinction is relevant to the validity of promises. If it is in our interest to count 
promises induced directly by wronging as invalid, why wouldn’t it also be in our interest to count 
promises induced indirectly by wronging as invalid? The advocate of the wronging account must 
say more if she is to explain why these promises, brought about by wrongful means, are yet valid. 
 In contrast, the good faith account provides a principled basis for distinguishing these 
cases from the paradigm cases of coerced and deceived promises. Though Diego and Frank 
elicited their promises by means of deception and coercion, they did not accept those promises in 
bad faith. The fact that Diego enjoys comic books is irrelevant to the warrant of Cora’s promise 
to buy the Rembrandt. So, Diego can correctly judge Cora’s promise to be warranted, and 
accept it in good faith. Since Ellen’s options are no longer constrained by Frank when she makes 
her promise, it is not based in a flawed conception of the options in the same way that Anna’s 
promise in BANK is. So there is no challenge that Frank ought to raise to Ellen’s promise – no 
threat that he ought to withdraw – and he can thus accept it in good faith. While the wronging 
account would have to contort itself to accommodate these cases, the good faith account explains 
them straightforwardly. 
 
2.4. Insincere promises 
 While coercion and deception involve the promisee deliberating in bad faith, the good faith 
account also predicts that a promise can be invalidated by the promisor’s bad faith. This has a 
surprising, and admittedly counterintuitive, implication: insincere promises – i.e., promises that 
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one does not intend to keep – are invalid.13 For, unless she is akratic, a promisor who does not 
intend to keep her promise will almost always judge that she does not have sufficient reason to do 
so. Thus she cannot take her promise to be warranted (by JOINT-INDIVIDUAL COHERENCE), and 
so cannot make it in good faith. Insincere promises involve the same absence of mutuality that 
invalidates coerced and deceived promises; so, the good faith account implies that they are 
invalid as well. 
 This prediction is problematic, since insincere promises intuitively seem to be binding. 
Suppose I promise to come to your talk while having no intention of doing so. Still, it seems I am 
obligated to keep my promise – when I don’t show up, you should feel wronged. And if you 
confront me for breaking my promise, it would be absurd for me to defend myself by saying, 
“Oh, that promise wasn’t binding, since I didn’t intend to keep it.” 
 However, I stand by the deliberative theory’s prediction that insincere promises are 
invalid. To defend this claim, I will offer an error theory, showing how our intuitions might be 
explained under the assumption that insincere promises are not binding. Then, I will offer an 
independent argument for the view that insincere promises are not valid. 
 My error theory begins from the observation that making an insincere promise is itself 
wrong. Say that, after insincerely promising to do so, I come to your talk anyway. If you then 
find out that my promise was insincere, you still have standing to complain. By making a promise 
I didn’t intend to keep, I wronged you, even though I ultimately kept it. I want to suggest that 
this is also why you should feel wronged when I don’t show up to your talk: not because I did not 
do what I promised, but because I promised what I did not intend to do. 
 Moreover, even if insincere promises are not binding, there are other reasons why an 
insincere promisor will typically be obligated to do what she promised anyway. First, my 
insincere promise led you to believe that I will be at your talk. You may have then relied on this 
                                                
13 Neither the freedom account nor the wronging account considered in the previous section predict that insincere 
promises are invalid. Prima facie, this is a point in these other accounts’ favor. Whether the point is decisive will 
depend on how convincing you find the arguments I offer in the remainder of this section. 
 70 
expectation in ways that would cost you if it were now disappointed. The best way for me to 
avoid inflicting these costs on you is to do what I promised, so that your expectation turns out to 
be true after all. Second, since I wronged you by promising insincerely, I am obligated to make 
amends for my wrongdoing. Typically, actually doing what I insincerely promised to do will be the 
best first step towards making amends. Keeping my promise will not only prevent you from 
suffering further harm, but will also demonstrate my commitment to being more trustworthy in 
the future. Thus, even if my insincere promise does not bind in the normal way, I will still usually 
be obligated to keep it. 
 Why, however, should we accept this roundabout account of the obligation to keep 
insincere promises, instead of the much simpler explanation that these promises are valid? 
Because, as I shall now argue, there is independent reason to think that sincerity is a validity 
condition for promises. 
 Promises communicate intentions: by promising to φ, I communicate that I intend to φ. 
This is why promising without intending is insincere: it communicates that one has an intention 
one does not have. Indeed, to say “I promise to φ, but I don’t intend to φ” seems to be self-
undermining in the same way that the Moorean assertion “p, but I don’t believe it” is. But if 
intending to do what one promises is not a validity condition for promises – that is, if insincere 
promises can be valid – then this observation becomes puzzling. If I can make a perfectly valid 
promise to φ without intending to φ, then why can’t I do so openly, promising to φ while 
declaring that I have no intention to do so? 
 We could answer this question easily if we adopted the expectation theory of promising 
(see §4.2 below). On this view, to promise to φ is to lead one’s promisee to form a particularly 
strong expectation that one will φ. Thus saying “I promise to φ, but I don’t intend to φ” will be 
self-undermining because declaring one’s lack of intention undermines the promisee’s 
expectation that one will φ. However, if we reject the expectation theory – which, as we shall see, 
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there is good reason to do (§4.2) – then we cannot avail ourselves of this answer.14 If we think that 
promises are distinct from testimony regarding one’s future conduct, then the fact that promises 
communicate intentions requires a different explanation. 
 Perhaps we can argue as follows: when I promise to do something, I become obligated to 
do it; and when I am obligated to do something, I should intend to fulfill that obligation. So, a 
promise to φ will implicate that one intends to φ, since the latter ought to accompany the former. 
But this understates the connection between promising and intending. For obligation in general, 
the implicature can be cancelled: one can undertake an obligation while publicly declaring an 
intention to violate it. Say I step on your foot, thereby incurring an obligation to step off. I might 
do so while saying: “I know I am obligated to get off your foot, but I have no intention of doing 
so. So there!” Though spiteful and perhaps akratic, my behavior is not unintelligible.15 But I think 
it would be unintelligible for me to say: “I promise to come to your talk, but I have no intention of 
doing so. So there!” This promise would not even accomplish my spiteful goal of creating an 
obligation to violate – it seems to misfire from the outset. Thus the connection between promises 
and intentions seems to be even tighter than the connection between obligations and intentions. 
 The point is even clearer if we move to the weaker claim that the effect of a promise is to 
give oneself pro tanto reason to do what one promised (§1.1). For it is not even akratic to give 
oneself pro tanto reason to φ while openly intending to do the opposite: I might make it more 
difficult for myself to finish the race, say by refusing water, in order to demonstrate the strength 
of my commitment to doing so. Why, then, can’t I coherently promise to not finish the race in 
order to demonstrate the strength of my commitment to finishing it? If intention is not a validity 
condition for promises, then such a promise would be binding. Why, then, would it be so strange 
to make it? 
                                                
14 Moreover, our error theory explains the obligation to keep insincere promises by appeal to the very considerations 
the expectation theorist takes to explain promissory obligation in general (namely, the promisee’s expectations). Thus 
the expectation theory attributes no more force to insincere promises than the deliberative theory does. 
15 Sensitive to this very point, Owens (2008) concludes that promises do not communicate intentions at all. He 
argues that there is nothing self-undermining about promising to do something while denying that you intend to do 
it. In this case, Owens’ modus ponens is my modus tollens: I find it far less strange to accept that insincere promises are 
invalid than to accept that “I promise to φ, though I don’t intend to” is perfectly coherent. 
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 If, on the other hand, we accept that intending to do what one promises is a necessary 
condition for one’s promise to be valid, we get a simple account of why promises communicate 
intentions. In general, any speech act presupposes that the conditions of its own validity are met. 
When I command you to do something, I presuppose that you are able to do it, since my 
command cannot be binding if it is impossible to obey. When I testify that p, I presuppose that I 
know p is the case, since I cannot give you knowledge I do not have. This is why it is insincere to 
command you to do something I know to be impossible, or to testify something I don’t take 
myself to know. This is also why it is self-defeating to say “I command you to φ, though you 
can’t” or “p, though I don’t know it.” These statements purport to do something while, in the 
same breath, denying the possibility of its being done. Similarly, if intending to φ is a necessary 
condition for validly promising to φ, then in purporting to make a valid promise, I presuppose 
that this condition is met. This explains why promises communicate intentions. It also explains 
why it is self-undermining to say, “I promise to φ, though I don’t intend to φ”: because the truth 
of the second clause is incompatible with the performative success of the first. 
 Thus I suggest that the best explanation of why promises communicate intentions is that 
one must intend to do something in order to validly promise to do it. And this is because one 
cannot promise in good faith to do something one does not intend to do. Despite appearances to 
the contrary, then, perhaps we should conclude that insincere promises are not valid after all. 
 
3. An objection: are joint decisions weaker than promises? 
 Suppose the arguments so far have convinced you that promises and joint decisions have 
a shared pattern of normative effects. Still, you might have a nagging feeling that promises are 
somehow more forceful than joint decisions. To make a promise is to undertake a solemn moral 
obligation, which would be a serious wrong to break. But making a joint decision seems a less 
serious matter. To make this objection vivid, consider two examples: 
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PLANNED WALK: On a Saturday morning, I propose to my partner Dee Dee that 
we take a walk in the afternoon. She agrees. Later, I tell Dee Dee, “Sorry, I can’t 
go walking after all – I need to finish writing this section.” 
PROMISED WALK: I propose a Saturday afternoon walk to Dee Dee; she agrees. 
Then, remembering my tendency to abandon our walking plans, Dee Dee says: 
“Okay, but I want to know that you won’t change your mind this time. Do you 
promise you’ll go on a walk with me this afternoon?” I say, “Yes, I promise.” 
Granting that joint decisions generate obligations, the obligations Dee Dee and I undertake to 
one another in PLANNED WALK still appear fairly weak. If either of us simply forgot to make time 
for the walk, it wouldn’t be a big deal. It also appears to be rather easy to get out of our 
obligations: telling Dee Dee that I’m busy writing seems to be enough to get me off the hook. In 
contrast, it would be a big deal if, after I promise to go on a walk with Dee Dee in PROMISED 
WALK, I failed to do so. And I can’t get out of this obligation simply by informing Dee Dee that I 
need to do my work instead; I am bound unless she explicitly releases me from my promise. So, 
my obligation in PROMISED WALK is stronger than my obligation in PLANNED WALK in at least 
two ways: it is more important that I fulfill it, and it is more difficult to extract myself from it. 
 Prima facie, this contrast appears flatly incompatible with the deliberative theory. The 
deliberative theory seems to predict that the obligations in PLANNED WALK and PROMISED 
WALK will be identical. After all, it holds that there is no difference between my promising Dee Dee 
that I will go on a walk with her and my proposing to jointly decide that I will do so. Worse, the 
deliberative theory doesn’t seem able to even make sense of the interaction in PROMISED WALK. 
Dee Dee asks me to promise to do something that we’ve already jointly decided that I will do. On 
the deliberative theory, this request seems redundant, perhaps even incoherent. But if promising 
is different from proposing a joint decision, Dee Dee’s request makes perfect sense. Thus it seems 
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the only way to explain the contrast between our examples is to accept that promises are not 
proposals in joint deliberation.16 
 Not so fast! Appearances notwithstanding, the deliberative theory has the resources to 
explain the contrast between PLANNED WALK and PROMISED WALK. The trick is to recognize 
that some joint decisions generate stronger and stickier obligations than others. What makes the 
obligation in PROMISED WALK stronger than the obligation in PLANNED WALK, I claim, is that 
the joint decision generated by my promise in PROMISED WALK is more resolute and harder to retract 
than the joint decision in PLANNED WALK. Let me elaborate on these two differences. 
 Begin with resolve. Consider the difference between casually planning to make spaghetti 
for dinner and solemnly deciding (say, as a New Year’s resolution) to go to the gym three times 
every week. The latter decision is more resolute than the former: one is more committed to seeing 
it through. I might change my dinner plans on a whim; but I will be reluctant to give up my 
resolution to go to the gym, and disappointed in myself if I do. Similarly, joint decisions can be 
more or less resolute. Some joint decisions, like a plan to go for a walk this afternoon, are fairly 
casual; others, like the decision to get married, are more serious. The more resolute our joint 
decision, the more reluctant we will be to reconsider it, and the more disappointed we will be in 
ourselves (and each other) if we fail to see it through. 
To be clear, resolve thus understood is a descriptive concept. It is a feature of the attitude 
we take towards our (joint or individual) decisions. But it has a direct normative upshot: plausibly, 
more resolute joint decisions generate stronger obligations. 
 A second way in which joint decisions can differ is in their retraction conditions. As I argued 
in §2.4, the joint decisions brought into force by promises have asymmetric retraction conditions. 
While the promisee can propose to retract the joint decision using propose-and-challenge, the 
promisor can only propose retraction by means of propose-and-ratify. By design, this asymmetry 
of methods makes it more difficult for the promisor to get out of her obligation, but relatively 
                                                
16 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for bringing this objection to my attention, and to Thomas Hurka for helping 
to sharpen it considerably. 
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easy for the promisee to release her. In contrast, most agreements (i.e., joint decisions that 
concern both parties’ actions) will have symmetrical retraction conditions. A casual agreement 
might allow both of us to propose retraction using propose-and-challenge; a more serious 
agreement might require us to retract by the more explicit means of propose-and-ratify. 
 Here, then, is how I suggest we understand the contrast between our cases. In PLANNED 
WALK, the joint decision Dee Dee and I make to go on a walk is weak in resolve and easy to 
retract. Since our decision is not very resolute, it entails a relatively weak obligation to see it 
through – which is why it is not a big deal if we fail to do so. And since there’s no strong reason 
to avoid reconsidering our plan, it is plausible that both Dee Dee and I can propose to retract our 
joint decision using propose-and-challenge. This is exactly what happens when I say “Sorry, I 
can’t go walking after all” – and since Dee Dee does not object, our plan is thereby withdrawn. 
In PROMISED WALK, our initial joint decision (before Dee Dee asks me to promise) is just 
like the decision in PLANNED WALK. But Dee Dee realizes that so long as our plan is casual and 
easy to retract, I am likely to abandon it. So she asks me to promise. My promise brings into 
force a joint decision that has the same content as our prior decision (that we will go on a walk), 
but that is more resolute and harder to retract. Since the resulting decision is more resolute, my 
obligation to go on a walk with Dee Dee is stronger, and can’t be overridden by (e.g.) my desire 
to finish some writing task. And our joint decision now has the asymmetric retraction conditions 
characteristic of promises. I now need Dee Dee’s explicit permission to be released from my 
obligation to go on a walk; I can’t get off the hook just by saying “Sorry, I can’t go.” When Dee 
Dee asks me to promise, she is really asking me to re-propose our joint decision with greater 
resolve and asymmetric retraction conditions. By endowing our joint decision with these features, 
my promise generates an obligation that is stronger and stickier than the one I had before. 
But this raises a further question. Why does Dee Dee communicate her wish to make our 
joint decision more resolute and harder to retract by asking me to promise? She seems to be 
presupposing that a joint decision made via a promise will be more resolute and harder to retract 
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than one made via an agreement. What warrants this presupposition? The answer lies in the 
characteristic functions that promises and agreements play in our everyday lives. 
 Starting again from the individual case, we can distinguish two functional roles of 
decisions: a planning function and a committing function. The planning function of decisions is the role 
they play in helping us to coordinate our actions over time, in particular by enabling us to treat 
our prior decisions as fixed when deliberating about what to do (Bratman 1987). For example, 
having decided to cook spaghetti for dinner makes it easier for me to decide what to buy at the 
grocery store. Decisions can serve this function without being particularly resolute, so long as 
they settle the question. The committing function of decisions is the role they play in 
strengthening our commitment to a course of action, often in order to preemptively ward off 
temptation to do otherwise (Holton 2004). My decision to go to the gym three times a week 
serves this function. To successfully play this role, a decision needs to be more resolute and 
resistant to reconsideration.17 
 Similarly, joint decisions can serve both planning and committing functions. Sometimes 
the main point of a joint decision is simply to coordinate our plans, as when we decide where to 
meet for coffee. But sometimes the purpose of a joint decision is to strengthen our commitment to 
a course of action, as when we decide to train for a marathon together. As with individual 
decisions, joint decisions that primarily serve a planning function can be low in resolve and easy 
to retract, while joint decisions that serve a committing function must be more resolute and 
resistant to retraction. 
 Here’s my hypothesis: while agreements are often used to make joint decisions that 
primarily serve a planning function, promises are almost always used to make joint decisions that 
also serve a committing function. 
Since agreements concern both agents’ actions, they often serve to help us plan and 
coordinate joint actions. So, for example, our agreeing to meet at Starbucks at 3pm enables each 
                                                
17 The planning and committing functions are not mutually exclusive, and plausibly all decisions serve both functions 
to a certain extent. But decisions can differ in the extent to which each function is essential to their purpose. 
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of us to plan on the assumption that the other will be at Starbucks at 3pm. This planning 
function is immensely useful in making joint action possible; but a joint decision need not be high 
in resolve or resistant to retraction to serve this function. Thus it is common to make agreements 
that are low in resolve and easy to retract, such as the agreement in PLANNED WALK. 
 Since promises concern only the speaker’s actions, they don’t automatically earn their 
keep by enabling joint action. Indeed, if all you need is to be able to plan on the assumption that 
I will φ, then often my simply informing you that I intend to φ will be enough. When might we 
need to go beyond this and jointly decide that I will φ? The clear answer is: when I need to give 
you a stronger commitment than a statement of intention can provide. Thus the contexts in 
which I have reason to promise will usually be contexts in which I have reason to strengthen my 
commitment to a course of action. This committing function will be best served by a joint 
decision with high resolve (so as to strengthen my commitment to the action) and asymmetric 
retraction conditions (so as to make it difficult for me to back out). And so we can predict that 
promises will usually result in joint decisions that are high in resolve and difficult to retract. 
 When Dee Dee asks me to promise, she is appealing to our common knowledge that 
promises are generally used to make joint decisions that are resolute and hard to retract. We both 
implicitly understand that, by promising Dee Dee that I’ll go on a walk with her, I am proposing 
a joint decision with these properties. This change in the resolve and retraction conditions of our 
joint decision, in turn, explains why my obligation in PROMISED WALK is stronger and more 
difficult to get out of than that in PLANNED WALK. 
 Zooming out from these examples, the worry with which we began was that promising is 
a more serious matter than joint decision-making. We can now see that this objection stems from 
a misreading of a nearby truth. Which is: joint decisions concerning one person’s actions are 
generally a more serious matter than joint decisions concerning both parties’ actions. This is 
because joint decisions concerning both parties’ actions often serve a purely planning function, 
while joint decisions concerning one person’s actions usually serve a committing function. Since 
the paradigm joint decision concerns all parties’ actions, it is natural to think that all joint 
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decisions are as casual as a plan to go on an afternoon walk. But this is too narrow a view of joint 
deliberation. When we fully appreciate joint deliberation’s versatility, we see that it can 
encompass both the weak and revisable obligations of everyday plans and the solemn and 
stubborn obligation of a promise. 
 
4. Other theories of promising 
 In this section I situate the deliberative theory in relation to the three most prominent 
theories of promising in the literature: conventionalism, the expectation theory, and the 
normative powers theory. 
 
4.1. Conventionalism 
 Conventionalism is the view that promising is a move in a conventional social practice. 
Following Rawls, we can understand a practice as “any form of activity specified by a system of 
rules which defines offices, roles, moves, penalties, defenses, and so on, and which gives the 
activity its structure” (1955: 3). Examples include baseball, voting, weddings, jury trials, and 
queuing in a line. The conventionalist locates promising within a ‘promising practice’ that has 
two roles (promisor and promisee), two moves (promising and releasing), and one rule: if a 
promisor promises a promisee that she will φ, then the promisor must φ unless (i) the promisee 
releases her from the promise or (ii) certain invalidating conditions (e.g. coercion or deception) 
obtain (Jones 1966: 288; Rawls 1971: 344-345; Kolodny and Wallace 2003: 120). This allows the 
conventionalist to ground the obligation to keep promises in a wider obligation to abide by the 
rules of beneficial practices (Rawls 1971: 342-50).18 
                                                
18 A clarification. Speaking a language is a social practice; so, if we assume (likely falsely) that promises can only be made 
using language, then there is a boring sense in which promises are moves within a practice. Friends and enemies of 
conventionalism alike should agree that this uninteresting claim is not its thesis (see Raz 1972: 100; Scanlon 1990: 
213-216). One way to avoid this confusion is to distinguish between the claim that promising is necessarily 
performed by means of a move within a practice and the claim that promising is a move within a practice. Consider 
the difference between hitting a home run and making the crowd go wild. Hitting a home run is a move within the practice of 
baseball; making the crowd go wild is not itself a move within baseball, but instead something you can do by means of a 
move within baseball (cf. Austin 1962 on the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts). The boring 
claim is that promising is typically performed by means of a move within a practice (uttering a sentence in a language); 
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 After a long reign as orthodoxy,19 conventionalism has recently fallen out of favor, largely 
due to the objections raised by T. M. Scanlon in his agenda-setting “Promises and Practices” 
(1990).20 This presents a worry for the deliberative theory. For, like conventionalism, the 
deliberative theory also holds that promising is a move within a social practice: the practice of 
joint practical deliberation. So we must consider whether the objections that toppled 
conventionalism also provide grounds for rejecting the deliberative theory. I will discuss the two 
objections that have been the most influential. 
The first objection claims that conventionalism cannot explain why promises generate 
obligations that are owed to the promisee in particular (Scanlon 1990: 221; Darwall 2011: 263-264; 
Owens 2012: 135). For, the argument goes, conventionalism says that promise-breaking is wrong 
because it violates the rules of a certain practice. But breaking the rules of a practice plausibly 
wrongs everyone who participates in that practice (excepting oneself). So, if the relevant practice is 
that of promising generally, then breaking a promise seems to wrong everybody who has ever made 
a promise, not just the promisee. 
This argument hinges on the assumption that there is a single promising practice in which 
all promising agents participate. The conventionalist should reject this assumption. Consider the 
practice of playing chess. Each pair of chess players has their own distinct game of chess; they are 
not all playing a single enormous game. So, if I cheat in our game of chess, I do wrong everyone 
else who participates in this practice – but since you are the only other player in our game, this 
means that I wrong you and you alone. To assume that breaking the rules of chess must wrong 
every chess-player that has ever lived is to conflate types of practices with token instances of a 
practice type. Every chess player participates in the type of practice, chess, in which we are 
engaged; but they do not all participate in our token game of chess. 
                                                                                                                                                       
the conventionalist’s claim is that promising is a move within a practice. But if you are skeptical of this distinction, 
there is a brute force solution: we can say that conventionalism’s thesis is that promising is necessarily a move within 
a practice other than the practice of speaking a language. Thanks to Judith Jarvis Thomson for discussion here. 
19 Influentially defended by David Hume (1739/1978: 516-525), conventionalism was popular through the late 20th 
century, winning the allegiance of John Rawls (1955; 1971), John Searle (1969), and G. E. M. Anscombe (1978), 
among others. 
20 Some exceptions to this trend are Deigh (2002), Shockley (2007), and Taylor (2013). 
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The conventionalist should say that promising, like chess, is (usually) a two-person game. 
(If a promise has two addressees, it is a move within a three-person practice, and so on). When I 
break my promise to you, I am violating the norms of our two-person practice of making 
promises to one another. My violation does wrong everyone else who participates in this practice 
– but since you are the only other participant in our token promising practice, this means that I 
wrong you and you alone. The deliberative theory can co-opt this response: breaking my promise 
wrongs you in particular because it violates the norms of our two-person practice of joint 
practical deliberation. 
The second objection charges that conventionalism makes the existence and nature of 
promising too contingent. Conventionalism entails that our ability to make promises depends upon 
the prior existence of a social practice of promising. Since we could conceivably fail to have a 
practice of promising, conventionalism seems to imply that we could lack the ability to make 
promises to one another. Yet many have thought that morally competent persons necessarily have 
the power to make binding promises (Locke 1689/1980: 13; Raz 1977: 214-215; Scanlon 1990: 
201; Thomson 1990: 303-304; Shiffrin 2008; Pink 2009: 400-401). 
Scanlon makes this point vivid with a ‘state of nature’ case. Suppose that I encounter a 
stranger on a desert island, standing on the opposite bank of a river. Each of us has lost his 
weapon on the other’s side. Gesturing, I convince the stranger that I will throw his boomerang to 
him if he first throws my spear back to me. The stranger throws me the spear – and I walk away, 
leaving the boomerang where it was. Scanlon judges that “what I have done in this example is no 
less wrong than it would have been if I had promised the stranger that I would return his 
boomerang … it is the same kind of wrong” (1990: 201). But the stranger and I are members of 
societies that have made no contact, and so presumably have no shared practice of promising. 
Pressing the objection further, Seana Shiffrin argues that since “the power to promise is 
an essential tool to forestall and neutralize morally problematic inequalities between people” 
(2008: 485), we need promises for our relationships to meet minimal conditions of moral 
decency. If, as is plausible to assume, morally competent persons are necessarily able to form 
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morally decent relationships, then they must necessarily have the power to promise. This gives us 
reason to reject the conventionalist idea that “promises are inventions that we could have failed 
to invent and still gotten by morally, although perhaps less well and less efficiently” (498). 
The existence of promises thus seems to be less contingent than conventionalism implies. 
But the conventionalist is only vulnerable to this objection if she bundles together two claims that 
can and should be separated: the claim that promising is a move within a social practice, and the 
claim that this practice is optional, in the sense that social interaction would be possible without it. 
It is easy to run these claims together, because it is natural to assume that all social practices must 
be optional.21 But this assumption is simply false: some social practices are non-optional. 
Consider assertion. Assertion has all the signature features of a move in a social practice. It 
is governed by a rule that dictates which assertions are permissible – the much-discussed ‘norm of 
assertion’ (Williamson 2000). Beyond this norm, assertions are governed by many other ‘maxims’ 
determining when they are relevant or cooperative (Grice 1989). And, as in all practices, what 
assertions are permissible in a conversation depends upon what other ‘moves’ have already been 
made (Lewis 1979). No wonder philosophers studying assertion, just like those studying promises, 
have felt the irresistible pull of the analogy with baseball.22 
Yet few are tempted to say that the assertion practice is socially optional. The ability to 
share information in the way assertion makes possible seems to be a precondition for cooperative 
society. And the norms governing assertion are widely thought to be “derived from general 
principles of rationality, cooperation and/or cognition” (Korta & Perry 2015). Thus though 
                                                
21 While critics usually attribute both of these claims to the conventionalist, some conventionalists are careful to keep 
them apart. In fact, Hume, the canonical conventionalist, explicitly denies that the promising practice is optional: 
“Where an invention is obvious and absolutely necessary, it may as properly be said to be natural as any thing that 
proceeds immediately from original principles … Tho’ the rules of justice be artificial, they are not arbitrary. Nor is 
the expression improper to call them laws of nature; if by natural we understand what is common to any species, or 
even if we confine it to mean what is inseparable from the species” (1739/1978: 484 [3.2.1]). Thus it may be that 
Hume was never vulnerable to Scanlon and Shiffrin’s contingency objection in the first place. Thanks to Jed 
Lewinsohn for drawing my attention to this point, and to the relevant passage of Hume. 
22 Compare Rawls (1955) with Lewis (1979b). See also Williamson (2000): “someone who knowingly asserts a 
falsehood has thereby broken a rule of assertion, much as if he had broken a rule of a game; he has cheated” (238). 
Others who endorse the assertion-game analogy include Wittgenstein (1953/2009), Searle (1969), Brandom (1983), 
Dummett (1993), and Rescorla (2009); for criticism of this analogy, see Cappelen (2011) and Maitra (2011). 
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assertion is a move in a practice, this practice is not conventional in the Lewisian sense of the term: 
it is not one of multiple different possible solutions to a coordination problem (Lewis 1969/2002: 
70). The practice of assertion, with just the rules it has, is the unique solution to the problem of 
sharing information between persons. 
Taking assertion as our model, then, we can make room for a nonconventionalist practice 
theory of promising: a theory that claims, with the conventionalist, that promising is a move in a 
practice, but departs from conventionalism in claiming that this practice is not socially optional.23 
The deliberative theory occupies this relatively uncharted area of logical space. Like 
conventionalism, the deliberative theory is a practice theory: it claims that promises are a move 
within a practice. But unlike conventionalism, the deliberative theory does not take the power to 
promise to be “activated only by the happenstance that a social convention of promising has 
developed” (Shiffrin 2008: 483). For the practice within which it locates promises – joint practical 
deliberation – is plausibly as essential to social life as is promising itself. Like the practice of 
making assertions, the practice of joint practical deliberation serves a function essential to social 
interaction: it enables us to plan and act together on terms that all can accept. So it is not a 
contingent fact that morally competent persons engage in joint practical deliberation; and thus it 
is no more contingent that we have the power to promise.24 
                                                
23 We could equally well retain the label ‘conventionalism’ for all practice theories, including the deliberative theory, 
and simply point out that conventionalism need not imply optionality. I avoid this labeling only because it is 
potentially misleading, given how widely conventionalism is thought to entail that promises are optional. 
24 Anyone who asserts the necessity of promising has to contend with Korn and Decktor Korn’s (1983) argument 
that there exists at least one society with no practice of promising, in the Tonga Islands of the South Pacific. In 
Tonga, they claim, statements of the form “I will φ” are not taken to commit the speaker to φing, but instead merely 
express solidarity for the addressee’s desire that φ be done. No alternative form of speech plays the role of promising. 
Though this does seem to show that promising is not culturally universal, it does not show the same for joint 
practical deliberation. For it may be that Tongans engage in joint deliberation, but refrain from proposing joint 
decisions in the particular way involved in promising. Tongans do appear to make demands and requests of one 
another; they also marry and exchange gifts (Evans 1996). If I am right that demands, requests, and agreements are 
also moves in joint practical deliberation, this indicates that the Tongans engage in this practice. But why, then, 
don’t they promise? Perhaps because there is a taboo in Tonga against long-term planning, which restricts joint 
decision-making to the here and now. While it makes sense for me to demand or request that you do something right 
now, there’s no point in promising to do something right now, since I can just do it. Promises require a longer-term 
view. Perhaps this is why Tongans avoid promises while still making joint decisions in other ways. 
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With this in mind, return to Scanlon’s desert island case. The crucial premise of Scanlon’s 
objection is that, since the island stranger and I come from mutually isolated societies, we must 
share no social practices. But we can now see that this premise is mistaken. To participate in any 
society at all, one must be competent in those practices that are necessary to social cooperation – 
including, I have suggested, the practice of joint practical deliberation. Thus the stranger and I 
are able to deliberate together simply because both of us are members of some society or other. 
So, I can propose to the stranger that we jointly decide that I will throw him his boomerang if he 
throws me my spear. On the deliberative theory, to do this is to promise him that I will do so. If I 
walk away without returning the boomerang, then, I do commit “the same kind of wrong” as 
that of breaking a promise – because I am breaking a promise. 
 
4.2. The expectation theory 
 As an alternative to conventionalism, Scanlon proposed what has come to be known as 
the expectation theory of promising (1990; 1998: Ch. 7).25 On this view, the obligation to keep our 
promises derives from a practice-independent obligation to not create false expectations in 
others. When I promise you that I will φ, I give you assurance that I will φ, leading you to form an 
strong expectation that I will do so; having deliberatively raised this expectation, it would be 
wrong for me to violate it. 
 The expectation theory has substantial intuitive appeal. One of the main reasons why we 
make promises at all is to give others assurances that they can rely upon. If you are worried about 
whether I will actually show up to our meeting, I can reassure you by promising you that I will. 
The fact that I promised to come to our meeting justifies you in having a particularly strong 
expectation that I will do so, which you can then rely upon in planning your future conduct. 
 However, the expectation theory doesn’t just say that one important function of promises 
is to give assurance; it says that all it is to promise is to give someone assurance. And as the 
                                                
25 Scanlon was not the first to propose the expectation theory (see Árdal 1968, Narveson 1971, MacCormick 1972, 
and Thomson 1990: Ch. 12). But Scanlon’s is widely regarded as the canonical presentation of the view. 
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substantial literature in response to Scanlon’s proposal has revealed, there is reason to doubt this 
strong claim. The obligations one undertakes by deliberately raising expectations in others seem 
importantly different from the obligations one undertakes in making a promise. If I inform you of 
my future plans to φ, but then change my mind, I can discharge my obligations to you by simply 
warning you that I won’t φ, and perhaps compensating you for any losses you incurred by relying 
on my testimony. In contrast, if I promise you that I’ll φ, merely warning you that I’ve changed 
my mind and compensating your losses is not enough: I am obligated to φ, pure and simple 
(Owens 2006: 53-56; Southwood and Friedrich 2009: 266-271). This difference does not seem to 
be accounted for by supposing that promises give rise to especially strong expectations. For I can 
tell you that I will φ with as much confidence as I like, and yet still coherently add the disclaimer, 
“but I don’t promise to φ” (Raz 1972: 99; 1977: 216; Robins 1984: 9; Owens 2006: 60; Darwall 
2011: 267). In such a case, it seems that my disclaimer succeeds: I have no promissory obligation 
to φ. This seems to show that I can knowingly and voluntarily lead you to form a very strong 
expectation that I will φ without thereby promising to do so. 
 Scanlon was aware of these worries from the outset (see his 1998: 301-302). His response 
is to claim that, while not all deliberately created expectations generate promise-like obligations, 
one undertakes a promissory obligation when one creates a special kind of expectation under a 
special set of conditions – the conditions encapsulated in his “Principle F” (1998: 304). Even if it 
succeeds at dodging the above objections, however, this move comes at a steep theoretical cost. 
The appeal of the expectation theory comes from its potential to demystify promissory obligation 
by explaining it in terms of a moral obligation that we independently understand: the obligation 
not to mislead others. By separating promises out from other ways of leading others to form 
expectations about our actions, and giving promises their own tailor-made moral principle, 
Scanlon’s version of the expectation theory loses this explanatory appeal. 
 But I won’t press this complaint further; my aim here isn’t to refute the expectation 
theory. Instead, I want to show how the deliberative theory can capture both the observation that 
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motivates the expectation theory – promises’ role of providing assurance – and the observation 
that has motivated some to reject it – the distinction between promises and testimony. 
 Begin with the assurance-providing role of promises. Our jointly deciding that I will φ 
gives you a particularly strong basis for forming an expectation that I will φ. First, it (normally) 
puts me under an obligation to φ, one that I owe to you in particular (§2.1). Our joint decision thus 
generates a new, and weighty, reason for me to φ. The more resolute our joint decision, the 
stronger this reason will be: which is why joint decisions that aim to provide assurance will 
typically be quite resolute (see §3). Second, the norms of joint practical deliberation require me to 
treat our decision that I will φ as I do my own intentions, excluding the possibility of not φing 
from my future deliberations and not being over-ready to reconsider this plan (§2.2). Finally, 
since joint decisions cannot be retracted unilaterally, I cannot simply change my mind about 
whether to φ without violating my obligation to you – even if I give you fair warning. If I want to 
retract our joint decision, I must propose to do so by means of propose-and-ratify, thereby giving 
you the final say over whether our joint decision remains in force (§2.4). These factors combined 
make joint decisions a powerful tool for giving others assurances about what we will do. 
 Thus the deliberative theory easily captures the important fact that promises provide 
assurance to their addressees. And it does so while keeping promises clearly distinct from 
testimony regarding one’s future actions. Proposing to jointly decide that I will φ is clearly 
different from telling you or otherwise leading you to believe that I will φ. I can coherently tell 
you that I will φ while explicitly denying that I am proposing to jointly decide that I do so. 
 Moreover, the deliberative theory makes it easy to see why promises and testimony have 
such different normative upshots. Through the lens of the deliberative theory, we can see the 
distinction between promises and testimony regarding one’s future actions as just the 
interpersonal analogue of the intrapersonal distinction between intention and belief regarding one’s 
future actions. Consider the difference between my intending to finish this paper by May and my 
believing that I will do so. If I intend to finish the paper by May, I am committed to making this 
the case. While if I merely believe that I will do so, this does not imply any commitment to 
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action. Imagine that, midway through April, I notice that I am not on track to finish the paper 
before May. If I intend to finish the paper by May, I need to adjust my behavior to make this 
happen – say, by working longer hours. While if I merely believe that I will finish the paper by 
May, I need only adjust my beliefs. Seeing that I am not on track to finish by May, I may simply 
come to believe that I will finish by June, and not adjust my behavior at all. 
 The same contrast applies in the interpersonal case. If I promise you that I will finish the 
introduction to our coauthored paper by May, the result is a joint intention between us to the 
effect that I will do so. Like its individual analogue, this joint intention commits me to adjusting 
my behavior so as to make sure I finish the introduction by May. In contrast, if I merely tell you 
that I will finish the introduction by May – explicitly clarifying that this is a prediction, not a 
promise – then the result of my testimony is not a joint intention, but instead something like a 
shared belief. So if it begins to look like I won’t finish the introduction by May, then all I need to 
do is adjust our shared beliefs to reflect this fact – say, by warning you that the introduction is 
taking longer than expected. The different obligations attending promises and testimony are thus 
a direct consequence of intention and belief’s different directions of fit: we change the world to fit 
our intentions, while we change our beliefs to fit the world. Promises bind us to act, not just to 
warn, because they result in decisions, not just in beliefs. 
 
4.3. The normative powers theory 
 As both conventionalism and the expectation theory have come under criticism, a third 
view has gained prominence: the normative powers theory (Raz 1972; 1977; Shiffrin 2008; 2011; 
Owens 2006; 2012). The normative powers theory rejects the idea that promissory obligation 
needs to be explained by appeal to a more general moral principle like the principles governing 
our participation in social practices or our care for others’ expectations. Instead, the obligation to 
keep promises is “morally fundamental” and “derive[s] directly from the expression of an 
individual’s will to be bound” (Shiffrin 2008: 482). 
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 The normative powers theorist offers an alternative strategy for explaining promissory 
obligation. We are obligated to keep our promises, she argues, because it is in our interests to have 
the ability to undertake obligations by making promises. The ability to bind ourselves by 
promising is essential to human social life. If we lacked this capacity, we would be much worse 
off. On the normative powers view, the fact that having the ability to make binding promises is in 
our interests is sufficient to make it the case that we do have this ability.26 Morality conspires to 
give us the tools that we need to live together, and one of these tools is the power to promise. 
 This explanatory strategy has traditionally been combined with a particular hypothesis 
about the interests that promises serve. In principle, the interest-based explanation just sketched 
could be adopted by someone who thought, with the expectation theorist, that the primary 
function of promises is to give others assurance. But most normative powers theorists are united 
in rejecting this idea (Raz 1972: 99; Owens 2006). The point of promising is not just to give 
others reliable information about what one will do: it is to give others authority over what one will 
do (Owens 2006). When I promise you that I will φ, I give you the authority to demand that I will 
φ and to rebuke me if I fail to do so. Moreover, I give you the authority to decide whether I am 
bound to φ by deciding whether to release me from my promise. These effects are often described 
in the language of rights: when I promise you that I will φ, I transfer my right to decide whether I 
will φ to you (Shiffrin 2011: 156; though see Owens 2014). The power to transfer authority in this 
way plays an important role in making valuable forms of human relationship possible (Shiffrin 
2008). These benefits of transferring authority, in turn, ground the normative power to promise. 
 Understood this way, the normative powers theory is in fact compatible with the 
deliberative theory: the two could be adopted together. On this combined ‘deliberative 
normative powers theory’, the normative power to promise arises from the wider normative 
power to make binding joint decisions. Our obligation to abide by our joint decisions, in turn, is 
                                                
26 This argument strikes some as strange (myself included), as it seems to take the form “wouldn’t it be nice if p, 
therefore p” (Enoch 2009). But many have argued that this strange form of inference is in fact valid within the moral 
domain (Kamm 1992; Nagel 1995; Enoch 2009; Preston-Roedder 2013; see van Someren Greve 2011 for criticism). 
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to be explained by appeal to our interest in being able to morally bind ourselves to the results of 
our joint deliberation. One (perhaps the) interest that the power to make binding joint decisions 
serves is to enable us to give one another authority over our actions. When we jointly decide that 
I will φ, I give you the authority to demand that I will φ and to rebuke me if I fail to do so. 
Moreover, I give you the authority to decide whether I continue to be bound to φ by deciding 
whether to agree to retract our joint decision. In fact, on the deliberative theory, there is a literal 
sense in which my promisee decides what I will do: the joint decision that determines my action is 
as much hers as it is mine. Thus the normative powers theorist can hold that promises transfer 
authority by means of making a joint decision. 
 Of course, the normative powers theorist could also deny the deliberative theory, 
claiming that promises are a sui generis normative power, not reducible to the power to make joint 
decisions. But in doing so, she would deny herself the explanatory resources that the deliberative 
theory offers. As we have seen, once we grant the bindingness of joint decisions, the deliberative 
theory gives us many of promises’ features for free: their uptake requirements, validity conditions, 
and exclusionary effects on deliberation. These features can all be explained as consequences of 
the structure of joint practical deliberation. If she denies the deliberative theory, however, the 
normative powers theorist must instead write each of these features directly into her description 
of the normative power of promising. Then she must show why our interests most favor having 
this exact kind of normative power, with precisely the uptake conditions, validity conditions, and 
effects on deliberation that promising has. Perhaps this challenge can be met (see Owens 2012 for 
a formidable attempt). But if she instead adopts the deliberative theory, the normative powers 
theorist’s task becomes much simpler. All she needs to do is show why it is in our interest to invest 
the results of our already-existing practice of joint practical deliberation with the force of moral 
obligation. Once we have that, the rest of promises’ features will follow. 
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5. The redundancy argument 
 Here’s what I’ve argued so far. If we are able to decide together what to do, then we must 
have speech acts by means of which we propose joint decisions. One of the speech acts we need is 
a proposal to make a joint decision about what the speaker will do by means of the propose-and-
challenge method: what I have called an ‘I-proposal’. Given plausible assumptions about the 
structure of joint practical deliberation, we can draw a number of conclusions about the 
properties such proposals must have. Together, these conclusions show that I-proposals have 
exactly the same properties as promises. When made and accepted in good faith, I-proposals have the 
same normative effects as promises: they give the speaker a strong pro tanto reason to perform the 
relevant action, typically obligating the speaker to the addressee to do so (§1.1, §1.2) and making 
it inappropriate for her to seriously consider doing otherwise (§1.3). For I-proposals to bind in this 
way, however, certain conditions must obtain: the proposal must be recognized and not 
challenged by the addressee (§1.4); the addressee must not have released the speaker from her 
obligation (§1.5); and the addressee must not have deceived or coerced the speaker into making 
the proposal (§2). These are the very same conditions that are required for promises to have their 
normative force. So an I-proposal has the same normative effects, under the same conditions, as 
a promise. The best explanation of these systematic similarities between promises and I-proposals 
is, I submit, that promises are I-proposals. 
In offering this abductive argument, I have focused primarily on highlighting the 
deliberative theory’s attractions rather than objecting to its opponents. However, we are now in a 
position to give an argument that challenges alternative theories more directly. 
 Say you accept that people engage in joint practical deliberation, and that one of the 
speech acts required for this activity has the very same properties that common sense ascribes to 
promises. If you accept this much, it is hard to go on and deny that promises are these proposals 
in joint practical deliberation. Doing so would commit you to the existence of two distinct speech 
acts with indistinguishable properties: I-proposals and promises. This view makes it mysterious 
why we have promises at all. I can obligate myself to you to φ by proposing to you that we decide 
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together that I will φ. So why would I need a second, distinct way of undertaking obligations to 
you with exactly the same normative upshots? Such a speech act would be redundant, 
unnecessary, even epiphenomenal. This is the status we must assign to promises if we deny the 
deliberative theory. But promises are not redundant in this way. Therefore, the deliberative 
theory must be true. Call this the redundancy argument. 
We could, of course, avoid the argument’s conclusion by simply accepting that promises 
are redundant. But this is deeply unattractive. Not only would this undermine the importance of 
promising – if promises are redundant, why should we care about them? – but, more 
importantly, it would saddle our theory with new and difficult mysteries. Why do promises exist, 
if their central functions can all be fulfilled by the more general practice of joint practical 
deliberation? If I-proposals are an additional speech act, separate from promises, then why don’t 
we have a word for them in ordinary language? How has this entire category of speech act, at 
least as normatively significant as promises, escaped the notice of both ordinary language and 
philosophical inquiry? And why do these two separate speech acts, promises and I-proposals, 
have such eerily similar properties? Is it just a cosmic coincidence? The only way to avoid these 
awkward questions is to accept the deliberative theory. 
 Let’s briefly consider how the redundancy argument applies to the three theories of 
promising we considered in section 4. 
 Begin with classical conventionalism, which says that promises are moves in the social 
practice of making and keeping promises (§4.1). Once we understand the nature of joint practical 
deliberation, we can see that all of the functions served by this promising-specific practice could 
be performed equally well by the wider practice of joint practical deliberation. If we already have 
the practice of joint practical deliberation, why would we need a separate practice of making and 
keeping promises? If we do have such a practice, it is redundant. 
 Now consider the expectation theory, on which to promise to φ is to offer your promisee a 
special kind of assurance that you will φ (§4.2). This special assurance is based in the promisee’s 
knowledge that you are morally obligated, and specifically obligated to him, to φ. But if we engage 
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in joint deliberation, I can offer you exactly this kind of assurance by proposing that we jointly 
decide that I will φ. Why then would we need a distinct speech act of promising to provide a 
second way of offering the same assurance? If we do have such a speech act, it is redundant. 
 Finally, consider the normative powers theory (§4.3). On this view, to promise is to exercise a 
normative power to obligate oneself by declaration, granting one’s promisee the authority to 
demand that one perform the promised action and to release one from this obligation if he 
wishes. But I can give you exactly these kinds of authority by simply proposing that we decide 
together that I will φ. Why, then, would we need a sui generis normative power of promising, if we 
can shape the normative landscape in exactly the same way by proposing joint decisions? If we 
do have such a normative power, it is redundant. 
 In sum, if one accepts that we engage in joint practical deliberation, and thus that we can 
propose to make joint decisions regarding our own actions by means of the propose-and-
challenge method, it is strange to maintain that promises are a further, distinct speech act. Such a 
position is comparable to that of a nineteenth-century physicist who, acknowledging that mean 
kinetic energy exists and has all of the same observable features as temperature, still maintains 
that temperature is a further, distinct property. It is hard to see what could motivate such a view 
other than theoretical inertia. It is far more elegant and plausible to conclude that there are not 
two things here, but one: promises and I-proposals are one and the same. 
 We thus have a general argument against all alternatives to the deliberative theory: these 
theories all render promising redundant. The only way to escape this argument is to deny that 
there exist proposals in joint practical deliberation that have the same properties as promises. But 
that is the claim that the whole of this paper has been occupied with defending.27  To deny this 
                                                
27 Even if you think promises are different from I-proposals in some respect, the redundancy argument should still 
give you pause. Suppose you are unconvinced by some part of sections 1 and 2: perhaps you think that insincere 
promises are valid while insincere I-proposals are not (§2.4), or that the power to release given by promises is more 
asymmetric than the power to release granted by I-proposals (§1.5). Still, if you grant that I-proposals share promises’ 
most important features – they create obligations, give assurance, can be reversed with the addressee’s consent, and 
are invalidated by coercion and deception – it seems to follow that I-proposals can serve all the major functions we 
attribute to promises. So, you face a choice: should you accept that promises are redundant, or instead question your 
commitment to thinking that promises are different from I-proposals in this particular respect? I think you should 
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claim, one must contest the theory of joint practical deliberation from which it follows. So, if the 
deliberative theory is false, that must be because the account of joint practical deliberation on 
which it rests contains some hidden flaw. For if we accept that joint practical deliberation exists 
and has roughly the shape I have described, the conclusion that promises are moves within this 
activity seems almost inevitable. 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
choose the latter: it seems easier to accept that common sense is misleading about one of promises’ peripheral 
features than to swallow the conclusion that promises are redundant. 
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Chapter 3 
Offers, Agreements, and Requests 
 
In this chapter, I build a cumulative case for the deliberative theory by extending it to 
offers, agreements, and requests. I will not treat these three phenomena in the same detail as I 
did promises, partly due to space, partly because there is far less literature on them. Instead I will 
emphasize the deep similarities between these acts and promises. While the deliberative theory 
predicts these similarities straightforwardly, other theories are hard-pressed to explain them. 
 
1. Offers 
1.1. Similarities between offers and promises 
We begin with offers: 
The Deliberative Theory of Offers: For S to make an offer to A that she will 
φ just is for S to propose to A, by means of the propose-and-ratify method, that 
they make a joint decision to the effect that S will φ. 
On the deliberative theory, what distinguishes offers from promises is their method of evaluation: 
while promises are meant to be evaluated by propose-and-challenge, offers are meant to be 
evaluated by propose-and-ratify. This captures the most salient difference between these speech 
acts: offers require explicit acceptance to come into force, while promises do not. This is why 
offers often take the form of questions: “Would you like for me to drive you home?” Offers call 
for a response in a way that promises do not. If you don’t explicitly accept or reject my offer, it will 
hang in the air, unresolved – and eventually, I’ll take your silence as a tacit rejection. Promises do 
not require a response to be complete in the same way. If you are silent after I make a promise, 
I’ll normally take your silence as acceptance, and the promise will be in full force. 
 Beyond their different methods of evaluation, however, the deliberative theory holds that 
promises and offers are the same. When valid and accepted, both speech acts bring into force a 
joint decision that constrains only the speaker’s actions. Since the normative effects of promises 
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derive from the normative effects of joint decisions, the deliberative theory predicts that offers, by 
bringing a joint decision into force, will have the same normative effects as promises. And since 
the validity conditions of promises derive from the conditions for good faith deliberation in 
general, the deliberative theory predicts that offers will share promises’ validity conditions as well. 
Common sense seems to agree with the deliberative theory on these points. Suppose I 
offer to pick you up at the airport and you respond, “Thanks, that’d be great.” I am now bound 
to pick you up at the airport in the same way I would have been if I had promised to do so. Once 
you accept it, my offer gives me a strong pro tanto reason to pick you up at the airport. Unless this 
reason is overridden by unexpected circumstances, I will be obligated to pick you up, and 
specifically obligated to you. If I leave you stranded at the airport, you will have special standing to 
complain; if I look likely to renege on my offer, you can demand that I honor it. My offer also 
constrains my deliberation in the same way as a promise. Once you accept my offer, I should 
treat it as decided that I will pick you up at the airport, and not seriously consider any plans that 
conflict with this. And, as with promises, you (and you alone) have the power to release me from 
the obligation my offer created: “Actually, Ellen offered me a ride, so you don’t have to pick me 
up after all.” 
Finally, just as coerced and deceived promises are not binding, so too with coerced and 
deceived offers. Consider these variations on our earlier examples: 
BANK 2: Bert holds a gun to Anna’s head and says “OFFER TO GO TO YOUR BANK 
AND FETCH ME BACK A THOUSAND DOLLARS OR I’LL SHOOT YOU!” 
Anna says, “Yessir: I hereby offer to go to my bank and fetch you a thousand dollars.” 
Bert says, “Thank you for your gracious offer; I accept.” 
VAN GOGH 2: Cora makes an offer to Diego: “I offer to pay you $1000 for your Van 
Gogh.” Diego says, “Wonderful! I accept.” Cora sets off to the bank to get $1000 to pay 
Diego. On the way, she learns that the painting is forged, and Diego knew this was so. 
Are Anna and Cora any more bound by these offers than they are by the promises in our original 
cases? I think not. Bert’s (strangely polite) coercion renders Anna’s offer invalid; Bert would not 
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be wronged if she did not give him the money. Diego’s deception voids Cora’s offer: he would 
not be wronged if she did not pay him for forgery. 
It is indicative of how similar offers and promises are that philosophers rarely bother to 
distinguish them. But given that offers and promises are distinct speech acts, their similarities call 
out for explanation. Why do these two speech acts have such similar normative effects and 
validity conditions, differing only in their requirements for uptake? The deliberative theory 
answers this question straightforwardly: offers and promises are so similar because they are both 
proposals to make joint decisions about the speaker’s actions; they are distinct because they 
propose this joint decision by means of different methods. 
For those who do not accept the deliberative theory, life is not so easy. They will need to 
provide some alternative explanation of why offers and promises are so similar. The most 
obvious strategy is to claim that offers and promises are not distinct speech acts after all: offers 
are just a special type of promise. Let us give this view a closer look. 
 
1.2. Is an offer a conditional promise? 
The main feature that distinguishes offers from promises is that they need explicit 
acceptance from their addressees to come into force. If we want to claim that offers are a special 
kind of promise, we need to explain why they are different in this way. 
The most plausible explanation seems to be: offers are conditional promises. When I offer 
to pick you up at the airport, what I am doing is promising to pick you up at the airport if you say 
you want me to. It is as if I had said, “I promise you this: if you say you want me to pick you up 
at the airport, I will do so.” To generalize, the view we are considering is: 
The Conditional Promise View: for S to make an offer to A that she will φ is 
for S to promise A that, if A signals that she wants S to φ, then S will φ.1 
                                                
1 I use the unspecific term ‘signal’ to leave it open exactly what an addressee must do to count as accepting an offer. 
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The conditional promise view can easily explain why offers have the same normative effects and 
validity conditions as promises: because they are promises. But, I shall argue, the conditional 
promise view has trouble explaining the intuitive differences between offers and promises. 
Here are two commonsense observations about promises. First, promises do not expire: 
there is no time limit after which a promise ceases to have its force. If, when we are young and 
sprightly, I promise you that I will come to your 80th birthday party, then my promise is made no 
less binding by the fact that it will be decades before I have to fulfill it. When your 80th comes 
around, I will have to make good on my word. Second, promises cannot be retracted unilaterally. I 
cannot simply take back my promises when I don’t want to fulfill them anymore. I can ask you to 
release me from my promise, but I cannot take back my promise without securing your express 
permission to do so.2 
Both of these commonsense points apply equally to conditional promises. Suppose you 
are playing the Pac-Man machine at our favorite bar. As the reigning champion, I challenge you 
to beat my high score. I say, “I promise you this: if you beat my high score on Pac-Man, I will 
buy you a beer.” I thereby undertake an obligation to buy you a beer if you beat my high score. 
As with other promises, this obligation does not have an expiration date. If, many years from 
now, you beat my Pac-Man score, you can tell me to pay up. “You promised, remember?” I 
might be a bit chagrined that you are holding me to my promise so many years later, but I am 
nonetheless still bound by it. Second, I cannot revoke my promise unilaterally. If I see you 
racking up ever-higher scores in Pac-Man, I can’t say, “Never mind, I take it back.” To do so 
would not just be bad sportsmanship; it would be misunderstanding the very nature of a promise. 
These points may seem so obvious as to not need saying. All the better. For neither of 
these points holds true for an offer that has yet to be accepted. On the conditional promise view, 
an offer that has yet to be accepted is simply a conditional promise whose condition has yet to be 
                                                
2 On the deliberative theory, this is due to an asymmetry in the methods by which promisors and promisees can 
propose to retract the joint decision brought into force by a promise: while the promisee can propose retraction 
using propose-and-challenge, the promisor can only do so by means of propose-and-ratify (see Ch. 2, §1.5). 
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fulfilled. If I make an offer and you say, “I’ll think about it,” I am in the same position as when I 
promise to buy you a beer if you beat my high score: I have undertaken a conditional obligation, 
but the condition has yet to obtain. Thus if offers are conditional promises, we should expect that 
unaccepted offers do not expire and cannot be unilaterally revoked. But this is not the case. 
Suppose I offer to give you my antique bookcase. “I have too much stuff,” I say. “Would 
you like to take it off my hands?” You aren’t sure whether to accept my offer: the bookcase is 
nice, but you’re not sure you have space for it. “I’ll think about it,” you say. Then we both forget 
about it. Several months pass, until one day, you discover the perfect spot to put the bookcase, 
and decide that you want it. 
When you came to ask for my bookcase, what would you say? The natural thing to say 
would be something like: “Hey, is that offer still on the table?” or, “Do you still want to give away 
that bookcase?” You wouldn’t simply say, months later, “I’ll take the bookcase.” That would be 
presumptuous. You should ask whether my offer is still on the table because there’s a real chance 
that it isn’t. I might have given the bookcase to someone else by now, or decided that I want to 
keep it after all. And importantly, if either of these things is true, I have not done you wrong: I 
was not obligated to keep the bookcase available indefinitely, in case you decided you want it. 
This shows that offers expire: if an offer is not accepted, then after a certain (vague and context-
dependent) period of time, the offer is no longer available to be accepted. If you want my 
bookcase, you’ll have to ask if I am willing to offer it again. 
This is in stark contrast with conditional promises. Say that, months after I promise to 
buy you a beer if you beat my high score, you finally do it. Triumphant, you wouldn’t then say, 
“Hey, is that promise still on the table?” You would say: “I’ll take that beer now.” That’s because 
conditional promises, unlike unaccepted offers, do not expire. 
For a closer comparison, suppose that instead of offering you the bookcase, I said, “I 
promise you this: if you ask for the bookcase, I’ll give it to you.” Then the situation would be 
quite different when, months later, you decide you want it. You could ask for the bookcase 
directly, knowing that I am still bound to give it to you. And if I had given the bookcase to 
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someone else in the meantime, then I would have done you wrong. My conditional promise 
committed me to keeping the bookcase available in case you asked for it. 
Let us turn to the second point of contrast between offers and conditional promises: 
before they are accepted, offers can be retracted unilaterally. Say, again, I offer to give you my 
bookcase and you say, “I’ll think about it.” But then someone else offers to pay me a large sum 
for the bookcase. I can call you up and say, “Sorry, something came up – I can’t give you my 
bookcase after all.” I am perfectly within my rights to do this. Before you accept my offer, I am 
free to revoke it at any time.3 
This is not the case for conditional promises. As mentioned above, I cannot simply take 
back my promise to buy you a beer if you beat my Pac-Man score, even before you beat it. And 
the same holds if I promise to give you the bookcase if you ask for it. This promise commits me to 
holding the bookcase for you; if I want to give it to someone else, then I have to ask you to release 
me from my promise first. 
That offers have these two features – expiration and revocability – appears to be standard 
doctrine in contract law. After a contract is offered, the offeree must accept it within a reasonable 
(sometimes explicitly stated) period of time, or else it lapses, becoming void. And before the 
offeree accepts a contract, the offeror may legally revoke it at any time. The following passages 
are illustrative of this consensus: 
An offer having been made will continue until it is ended by a lapse or a 
revocation. The offerer may, by informing the offeree of a change of mind, 
terminate the offer by thus destroying the expectation which his offer has aroused 
and for which he is responsible (Oliphant 1920: 204-205). 
                                                
3 Here it is important to distinguish the question of whether I have the authority or power to revoke my offer from 
whether I ought to do so. There might be strong reasons why I should not revoke an unaccepted offer: for instance, 
you might be relying on the expectation that you can have my bookcase if you want. For this reason, perhaps I 
should give you another chance to accept the offer before I take it back and give the bookcase to someone else. The 
important point is that offers can be revoked unilaterally, even if they should not be. Before you accept my offer, I 
have the power to take it back without asking for your permission to do so. When I say, “Sorry, I can’t give you the 
bookcase after all,” I thereby successfully revoke my offer. This action is perfectly intelligible, even if it is rude. But it 
is impossible to revoke a promise in the same way – I simply don’t have the power to do so. The closest thing I can do 
is inform you that I will break my promise, which is a very different thing from revoking an unaccepted offer.  
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It is elementary that an offer not under seal and without consideration may be 
revoked at any moment prior to its acceptance (McGovney 1914: 644). 
In order to lock in the deal, B [the offeree] must accept the offer in a proper 
manner, and within a proper period of time – that is, before S [the offeror] has 
revoked the offer, and before the offer has terminated for some other reason. The 
standard rule holds that, even if S never revoked her offer, B's power of 
acceptance ends if he does not accept the offer within a ‘reasonable time’ 
(Craswell 1996: 512). 
An offer having been made and a power having been thereby created, how long 
will this power continue to exist? The offeror is the creator of the power, and 
before it leaves his hands he may fashion it to his will. Such is the present decree 
of society. If he names a specific period for its existence, the offeree can accept 
only during this period. If the offeror names no period whatever, the power will be 
held to exist for a reasonable time, to be determined as a fact by the court and 
dependent upon the circumstances (Corbin 1917: 183). 
Can the conditional promise view be modified to accommodate these facts? Yes, but at a 
cost. To accommodate expiration, we could say that offers are really conditional promises of the 
form, “if you signal that you want me to φ within a certain period of time, I will φ.” To capture 
revocability, we would have to add an opt-out clause to the conditional promise. On the resulting 
view, when I offer to give you my bookcase, I am making the following complex promise: “I 
promise you this: I will give you my bookcase if you ask me for it within a reasonable period of 
time, and if I do not change my mind at some point before you ask me for it.” 
This is a strange sort of promise. Imagine if I made a similar promise in the Pac-Man 
case: “I promise you this: if you beat my high score in Pac-Man within a reasonable period of 
time, I will buy you a beer, unless I change my mind at some point before you do.” That’s not a 
promise – that’s a joke. To say “I promise, unless I change my mind” is to undercut your promise 
so dramatically that it is barely intelligible as a promise at all. 
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Here’s a less flat-footed objection. The conditional promises view can indeed capture 
offers’ intuitive features by squeezing more implicit clauses into the relevant promises’ content. 
But in doing so, it makes it mysterious why we make offers at all, not to mention singling them 
out in ordinary language as their own special category. The subset of promises that the view 
identifies with offers – conditional promises with a time limit and an opt-out clause, both of 
which only apply before the condition is met – is so specific and gerrymandered that it is 
surprising that we make promises of this kind at all. Why, for instance, don’t we add opt-out 
clauses to our unconditional promises, or allow our conditional promises to lapse after they are 
accepted but before they are performed? Why is this one specific kind of conditional promise, 
with its complex set of implicit conditions, performed so commonly that it has its own entry in 
the dictionary? Perhaps it would be worth swallowing these mysteries if the conditional promise 
view was the only account of offers available. But it isn’t. 
 On the deliberative theory, offers are not conditional promises. A conditional promise, 
when valid and accepted, brings into force a binding joint decision with conditional content. 
When I promise to buy you a beer if you beat my Pac-Man score, the result is a joint decision 
between us to the effect that if you beat my Pac-Man score, I will buy you a beer. Just like any 
other joint decision, this decision cannot be revoked unilaterally and does not expire. 
If I make an offer, on the other hand, then until you accept it, no joint decision is made, 
conditional or otherwise. All I have done is propose a joint decision. Since proposing is an act I 
perform individually, rather than a commitment we jointly make, I can retract my proposal at 
any time, simply by indicating that I no longer stand by it. In this way, offers are more like 
assertions than promises: if I change my mind about an offer, I can take it back by simply saying, 
“Never mind.” 
And there is no reason to think that, once I propose a joint decision, my proposal will 
remain on the table indefinitely, awaiting your response. Deliberative proposals remain open 
only so long as it is common ground between us that they are open. If I make a proposal and you 
say, “I’ll think about it,” then after a certain amount of time the proposal will no longer be an 
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active question in our joint deliberation, simply because we are no longer treating it as such. If 
you want to take it up again, you will have to propose the joint decision yourself, or see if I am 
willing to make the proposal again. In this way, offers are like factual questions: if I ask you what 
your summer plans are, there’s only a certain period of time in which your saying “I’m traveling 
to Spain” will count as an answer to my question. 
The conditional promises view can accommodate the observation that unaccepted offers 
can expire and be revoked, but only by building these features in after the fact – and at a steep 
theoretical cost. In contrast, the deliberative theory independently predicts that offers will have 
these exact features. It seems clear to me which account is preferable. 
 I conclude that offers are not conditional promises. Offers and promises are distinct 
speech acts, neither reducible to the other. The deliberative theory is well placed to explain both 
the similarities between these speech acts and their differences – including the fact that, before 
they are accepted, offers can expire and be revoked. And as the strategy of reducing offers to 
promises appears unworkable, the opponent of the deliberative theory is back at square one. She 
is left with an unsolved mystery: if offers are not promises, then why are they so similar to them? 
 
1.3. Differences between offers and promises 
We have already covered the central differences between offers and promises: first, that 
offers require explicit acceptance to come into force, while promises do not (§1.1); and second, 
that unlike promises, offers expire and can be revoked before they are explicitly accepted (§1.2). 
Here I want to explore one further set of differences: the different conditions under which 
promises and offers are socially appropriate. 
For example, it would be inappropriate for you to promise, unbidden, to read an early 
draft of a paper I am working on, as this seems to presume that I want you to read it. But it 
would be perfectly appropriate for you to offer to read my draft, since that gives me the option of 
turning you down. Conversely, it would be strange, even offensive, for me to offer to be honest to 
my partner. Phrasing it as an offer seems to imply that I’m doing her a favor. But it is perfectly 
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appropriate for me to promise my partner that I will be honest with her (even if this is only 
reaffirming a commitment I’ve already undertaken).4 
We can explain these differences in appropriateness by looking at when it is appropriate 
to employ the propose-and-challenge vs. propose-and-ratify methods. When I introduced these 
two deliberative methods (Ch. 1, §3.1), I pointed out two main differences between them. First, 
the propose-and-challenge and propose-and-ratify methods guard against different kinds of error. 
By making it harder for a joint decision to come into force, the propose-and-ratify method guards 
against false positive errors: the error of making a joint decision that is not warranted. The 
propose-and-challenge method, in contrast, makes it relatively easy for a proposal to come into 
force. Thus it guards against false negative errors: the error of failing to make a joint decision that is 
warranted. Second, our two methods create different balances of power. Propose-and-challenge 
puts greater deliberative power in the hands of the speaker, while propose-and-ratify gives the 
deliberative power to the addressee. 
Taking these factors into account, we can predict the conditions under which promises 
will be more appropriate than offers, and vice versa. Here I review four such predictions. 
(i) Promises are appropriate only when the speaker justifiably takes herself to know that the promise is 
warranted. Conversely, only offers are appropriate when the speaker does not know whether the promise is 
warranted. If the speaker is uncertain about whether the decision she is proposing is warranted, 
then there is significant risk of a false positive error. So, she ought to use the deliberative method 
that guards against false positive errors: the propose-and-ratify method. When you are uncertain 
as to whether your proposal is warranted, then, you should phrase it as an offer. Conversely, you 
                                                
4 It is hard to nail down the evaluative import of these judgments of appropriateness and inappropriateness. To say 
that it is inappropriate to make a promise or offer in a certain scenario is not necessarily to say that the promise or 
offer is unwarranted, i.e. that it fails to conform to the norm of joint decisions. My offer to be honest to my partner is 
certainly warranted – our shared reasons decisively support the joint decision it proposes – but it is still inappropriate.  
And your offer to read my draft is perfectly appropriate, even if the joint decision it proposes turns out to be 
unwarranted (since I don’t want your feedback at this stage of the paper). Judgments of appropriateness and 
inappropriateness won’t coincide with judgments of agents’ all-things-considered reason to make a speech act either. 
I might have overriding reason to make an inappropriate promise or offer – say, if someone holding a gun tells me to 
do so. I don’t have a theory of what exactly it means to be appropriate or inappropriate, but I think we have a firm 
enough grip on these notions to leave them unanalyzed. 
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ought to make a promise only when you are not in doubt as to whether the proposal you are 
making is warranted. 
This prediction fits our judgments. It is inappropriate for me to promise, unbidden, to 
read your draft because I do not know whether you want me to do so, and so do not know 
whether we would be warranted in deciding that I will read your draft. I should offer to read 
your draft instead, ensuring that the decision won’t be made unless you confirm that it is 
warranted. Generally, an important function of offers is to give someone the option of taking our 
help when we aren’t sure whether they want it. This allows the addressee to determine whether 
the proposed decision is warranted and accept or reject it on that basis. To promise help when you 
aren’t sure it is wanted is off-base precisely because it doesn’t allow for this epistemic check. 
However, when you take yourself to already know that your addressee wants you to do 
something (perhaps because they’ve told you, perhaps because it’s obvious), then promising to do 
it can be perfectly appropriate. Intuitively appropriate promises – promising to be honest to my 
partner, to pay you back, to be home in time for dinner – seem to fit this mold. 
(ii) Ceteris paribus, offers are more appropriate than promises, since they give the addressee more 
deliberative power. Even when you are in a position to know that a joint decision is warranted, that 
doesn’t always mean that propose-and-challenge is appropriate. Given the asymmetrical power 
involved in our deliberative methods, the choice of whether to promise (giving yourself more 
power) or offer (giving your addressee more power) has significance that goes beyond the 
epistemic considerations just cited. 
Ceteris paribus, it seems better to give the deliberative power to your addressee.  Now, ceteris 
are not always paribus: there are situations in which you have good reason to take power into your 
own hands (see (iii) and (iv) below). But the default choice should be to offer rather than promise 
(and, similarly, to request rather than command; see §3.3 below). Why? Because there is a natural 
temptation to take power for oneself, both in order to skew the results of deliberation in one’s 
favor and because one tends to trust one’s own judgment more than the judgment of others. 
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These self-serving biases are the perennial foe of equal cooperation. So, when there is little cost to 
doing so, it is better to cede deliberative power to others. 
This seems to me to fit our everyday practice. By my observation, at least, it seems that 
offers are much more common than promises. People often make an offer even when they are, 
epistemically speaking, in a position to promise. An example: my colleague and I almost always 
read one another’s work. It’s common knowledge between us that if one of us has written a draft, 
he would like the other to read it. Still, when he tells me he’s finished up a draft of a new paper, I 
don’t just say straight-out, “I’ll read it, I promise.” I ask, “Would you like me to read it?” I know 
the joint decision that I will read my colleague’s draft is warranted, but it is still more polite to 
offer rather than promise to read it. Why? Because by doing so, I give my colleague the 
deliberative power rather than taking it for myself. 
(iii) When the addressee needs assurance that the speaker is motivated to perform the proposed action, 
promises are more appropriate than offers. One case where it is appropriate to take the deliberative 
power for oneself is when one needs to demonstrate one’s commitment to the proposed decision. 
If I have the power over whether a joint decision is made, then proposing it counts for more. By 
using propose-and-challenge, I ensure that my proposal will come into force by default, rather 
than just if my addressee accepts it. If my addressee is less concerned about having deliberative 
power than she is about knowing that I am committed to the decision, then she might wish for 
me to affirm the decision more forcefully by using the propose-and-challenge method. 
This characterizes many of the situations in which promises are made. Often, a speaker 
will promise to do something that she already intended to do, simply to reassure her addressee 
that she will do it. I say “I’ll be home in time for dinner, I promise” because my addressee is 
worried that I won’t make it home in time, and needs to be assured that I will take the necessary 
measures to do so. I promise my partner that I’ll be honest in order to express my commitment 
to doing so, and thus provide her with reassurance. 
When the addressee needs to be assured of the speaker’s commitment, offers seem 
inappropriate. If your willingness to do something is in doubt, offering to do it seems to show that 
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you’re holding out hope that the addressee will turn your offer down. Even if you know that the 
offer will be accepted, phrasing it as an offer seems to say, “I’ll do this, if you insist.” By giving the 
addressee the last word over whether you will perform the action, you make it the addressee’s 
responsibility to decide whether you do so, rather than taking that responsibility for yourself. But 
what the addressee wants is for you to decide to perform the relevant action, and thereby 
demonstrate your commitment to doing so. The best way to do this is to take control into your 
own hands by promising to do it. 
This difference has implications for the relative force of promises and offers. If promises 
are more likely than offers to be made in order to give the addressee assurance, then we can 
predict that promises will tend to result in more resolute joint decisions than offers do (see Ch. 2, 
§3). For, the more resolute a joint decision, the stronger assurance it will provide. The upshot is 
that promises will tend to generate stronger obligations than offers do. This seems right: making a 
promise seems to be a more serious undertaking than making an offer. Rather than furnishing an 
objection to the deliberative theory, however, this intuitive contrast is predicted by it: it is a direct 
result of the different functions of the propose-and-challenge and propose-and-ratify methods. 
(iv) When the addressee is likely to reject a warranted proposal, promises are more appropriate than offers. 
Many of us know people who turn down help even when they need it – out of pride, self-denial, 
or anxiety about burdening others. Those of us who have such people in our life quickly learn 
that offering them help is the wrong way to go. To use an example from earlier, suppose you have 
a proud but frail grandmother who needs help moving into her new home. If you say, “Would 
you like me to help you move?” she will inevitably turn down your offer, and that will be the end 
of the conversation. If you reiterate the offer, your grandmother will continue to reject it. And 
once she has turned you down, showing up to help anyway would be disrespectful. 
Much better to promise help: “Grandma, I’m helping you move.” Your grandmother may 
still resist: “No, I’ll be fine.” But now the dynamic is different. All you need to do is counter her 
objections: “Nonsense. There’s too much stuff for you to move alone!”  Now, the onus is on your 
grandmother to provide a defensible challenge to your promise. If your promise is warranted, she 
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will have a tough time doing so, and eventually she will have to give in and accept your help. 
That is a good thing: she needs your help, after all! 
Though, other things equal, it is better to err on the side of granting deliberative power to 
your addressee, this is one of the cases where other things are not equal. Your grandmother 
cannot be trusted to accept a warranted joint decision if it involves you helping her in some way.  
This doesn’t necessarily mean that she is deliberating in bad faith; she may just be biased and 
stubborn. But the result of your grandmother’s biases is that you are at high risk of the false 
negative error of failing to jointly decide that you will help her when you have decisive shared 
reason to do so. So, you should take the deliberative power out of Grandma’s hands, using 
propose-and-challenge to push through the warranted decision that you will give her help. This is 
why you should promise help rather than merely offering it. 
I am sure that the subject of when it is appropriate to promise versus offer is not 
exhausted by the observations I have made here. But I hope to have shown that, when we make 
this choice, we are guided by our tacit knowledge of the costs and benefits of the propose-and-
challenge and propose-and-ratify methods. 
 
2. Agreements 
Now we turn to agreements: 
The Deliberative Theory of Agreements: For S and A to make an 
agreement that they will φ just is for S and A to make a joint decision to the effect 
that they will φ. 
This thesis sounds almost tautological: of course agreements are joint decisions! True enough. The 
interesting claim of this dissertation is not that agreements are joint decisions, but that they are 
not the only kind of joint decision. The deliberative theory’s surprising thesis is that so many 
speech acts that do not appear to involve joint decisions – promises, offers, requests, demands, 
commands – are moves within joint deliberation as well. My main purpose in discussing 
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agreements is thus not to defend the deliberative theory of agreements itself, but instead to 
bolster the case for the other, more controversial parts of the deliberative theory. 
 I just argued that the opponent of the deliberative theory has trouble explaining the 
similarities between offers and promises, because offers cannot be plausibly reduced to promises. 
I will now make the same argument regarding agreements. While the deliberative theory explains 
the similarities between promises and agreements easily, these similarities pose an awkward 
question for other views. For, like offers, agreements cannot be reduced to promises. 
 It is uncontroversial that agreements share promises’ central features (cf. Sheinman 2011). 
Suppose we agree to meet at Clover for lunch. Then this agreement puts both of us under the 
same kind of obligation we would have if we had each promised individually to go to Clover. We 
are each obligated to show up to Clover (barring some unexpected reason that overrides our 
commitment), and obligated to one another to do so. This agreement constrains both of our 
subsequent deliberations: it would be inappropriate for either of us to treat the question of 
whether to go to Clover for lunch as open for further deliberation. Finally, we can release each 
other from the obligations created by our agreement by retracting it: “Actually, could we take a 
rain check until next week?” “Sure, that’s fine.” Agreements thus share the pattern of normative 
effects that we’ve already seen in promises and offers. 
 Agreements, too, are invalidated by coercion or deception. Consider 
BANK 3: Bert holds a gun to Anna’s head and says, “LET’S MAKE AN AGREEMENT: 
YOU WILL GO TO YOUR BANK AND FETCH ME ONE THOUSAND 
DOLLARS, AND IN EXCHANGE I WON’T SHOOT YOU.” Anna says ‘Yessir.’ 
VAN GOGH 3: Diego proposes an agreement to Cora: “How about you go to your bank 
and fetch me one thousand dollars, and in exchange, I’ll give you my Van Gogh.” On the 
way to the bank, Cora learns that the painting is forged, and Diego knew this was so. 
Bert’s coercion and Diego’s deception rob the resulting agreements of their normative force – just 
as they rendered the promises in BANK and VAN GOGH invalid. 
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 The primary difference between agreements and promises is that promises bind only one 
person’s actions, while agreements bind multiple parties’ actions simultaneously. As we saw in 
Chapter 2 (§3), this leads to some subtle downstream differences between the two. First, since 
agreements bind the participants’ actions symmetrically, their retraction conditions are also 
symmetrical: both parties will typically be able to propose to retract the agreement by means of 
the same method. Whether that method is propose-and-challenge or propose-and-ratify will 
depend on the situation – specifically, on whether the participants ought to make the agreement 
easier or more difficult to retract. This contrasts with promises (and offers), which, because they 
bind the participants’ actions asymmetrically, have correspondingly asymmetrical retraction 
conditions. While the promisee can propose to retract the promise using propose-and-challenge, 
the promisor must use propose-and-ratify. 
 The second main difference between promises and agreements concerns the purposes for 
which they are typically made. As I argued earlier (Ch. 2, §3), promises almost always serve the 
function of strengthening the promisor’s commitment to a course of action; for this reason, the 
joint decisions they propose will usually be very resolute. But while agreements can serve this 
committing function, they more often simply serve the planning function of coordinating both 
parties’ plans to make joint action possible. Since this planning function does not require a high 
level of resolve, we can predict that the joint decisions resulting from agreements will have a 
wider range of resolve, being more or less resolute as the situation requires. This difference in 
resolve, I argued, explains the intuitive observation that promises typically generate stronger 
obligations than agreements. 
 But the similarities between agreements and promises are far more significant than these 
differences. Intuitively, agreements have the same kind of normative force, under the same 
conditions, as promises. This is just as the deliberative theory predicts. But for the opponent of 
the deliberative theory, who does not hold that promises result in joint decisions, the similarities 
between promises and agreements should be surprising. If promises do not involve joint 
decisions, but agreements are joint decisions, then why should the two be so similar? 
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 As with offers, it seems that the best strategy available to the opponent of the deliberative 
theory is to try to show that agreements are reducible to promises in some way. The canonical 
way of doing this is to claim that agreements are promise exchanges: when we agree to meet at 
Clover, what really happens is that I promise you that I’ll be at Clover, and in exchange, you 
promise me that you’ll be there as well. But, as we shall now see, this reductive strategy cannot be 
made to work. 
The hard work has been done for us already. In her classic paper “Is an Agreement an 
Exchange of Promises?” Margaret Gilbert argues at length that the answer to her title question is 
no (Gilbert 1993b). I find her arguments convincing, so I will review them here. 
Gilbert begins by observing three features of agreements that any theory must capture: 
(1) Obligation: “the agreement directly generates the relevant performance obligation 
for each of the parties” (630). 
(2) Simultaneity: “In many cases, a given party will have no desire to take on some 
particular obligation before the other party has taken on a corresponding obligation 
… [Agreements ensure] that obligations are undertaken simultaneously by the parties, 
even though one may speak or relevantly gesture before the other. No one is obligated 
first” (630). 
(3) Interdependence: “the obligations of … agreements are interdependent at least in 
the following way: if one party defaults on his performance obligation, the other 
ceases to have his original performance obligation” (630). 
Gilbert then argues that no exchange of promises can have all three of these features. I do not 
have space to survey all of the proposals Gilbert considers, but a couple examples will illustrate 
the problems faced by the promise-exchange view. 
 Gilbert considers the following sample agreement: “Rita: ‘Someone must walk Fido this 
afternoon, and Tibbles has to be groomed.’ Peter: ‘Why don't you walk Fido, and I'll groom 
Tibbles?’ Rita: ‘Fine!’” (627). Can we reconstruct this agreement as an exchange of promises? 
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 First, consider the simplest analysis: Peter promises to groom Tibbles, and Rita promises 
to walk Fido (635).5 This exchange fails the interdependence criterion, simply because pairs of 
promises are not normally interdependent. Say you promise me that you will read my draft by 
Friday, and in an unrelated event, I promise to look after your cat next week. You fail to read my 
draft in time. Am I off the hook for cat-sitting? It doesn’t seem so. The fact that you broke your 
promise doesn’t nullify mine. The same holds for Peter and Rita’s promises: if one of them breaks 
their promise, this does not nullify the other. This simple promise exchange fails the simultaneity 
criterion as well: whoever makes their promise first is obligated before the other is. 
 We can build in simultaneity as follows. Suppose that Peter says: “I promise to groom 
Tibbles, if you promise to walk Fido.” Then Rita says, “I promise to walk Fido” (642). Then 
Peter and Rita’s obligations come into force at the very same time: once Rita makes her promise. 
Though this analysis yields simultaneity, it gets us no closer to interdependence. The result of 
Peter and Rita’s exchange is still two independent promises: Peter has promised Rita that he will 
groom Tibbles, and Rita has promised Peter that she will walk Fido. Neither of these promises 
loses its binding force if the other promise is broken.  
 With a little fancy footwork, we can build in interdependence as well. Suppose that Peter 
says this: “‘On condition that you make the very same … promise, I promise to do my part in the 
following pair of actions if you do your part: Peter grooms Tibbles and Rita walks Fido.’ Rita 
makes the same promise as Peter” (640). The obligations that result from this exchange are 
interdependent: if Rita does not walk Fido, then Peter is not obligated to groom Tibbles, and vice 
versa. And they also seem to be undertaken simultaneously: since Peter’s promise is conditional 
on Rita’s making the same promise, both Peter and Rita’s obligations come into effect at the 
moment when Rita makes her promise. 
However, as Gilbert points out, this exchange of conditional promises fails the obligation 
criterion: it does not obligate Peter to groom Tibbles or Rita to walk Fido. The obligations that 
                                                
5 The objections I present in the next three paragraphs are all Gilbert’s; I am just paraphrasing them. 
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result from this exchange are conditional: Peter is obligated to groom Tibbles if Rita walks Fido, 
and Rita is obligated to walk Fido if Peter grooms Tibbles. One way for Peter and Rita to satisfy 
these obligations would be for Peter to groom Tibbles and Rita to walk Fido. But another, 
equally legitimate way for Peter and Rita to satisfy their obligations is for both of them to do 
nothing. So long as Peter does not groom Tibbles, Rita is under no obligation to walk Fido, and 
vice versa. Thus this exchange of promises fails to give Peter and Rita reason to do anything at 
all: they can both fulfill their obligations by sitting on the couch and neglecting their poor pups. 
 This final problem seems fatal to me. For it is hard to see how to make two promises 
interdependent except by making each promise conditional on the other’s fulfillment. But 
mutually conditional promises can always be fulfilled by both parties doing nothing. Agreements 
are different. Though the obligations they generate are interdependent, agreements are not 
fulfilled when both parties break them. We both have reason to ensure that our agreement is 
honored: if we both break our agreement, then we have both failed to do what we had reason to 
do. Unlike mutually conditional promises, agreements do not treat joint inaction as normatively 
equivalent to joint fulfillment. This suggests that it is impossible in principle for two promises to 
imitate the normative effect of an agreement. 
 Let me briefly indicate how the deliberative theory captures the three features of 
agreements that promise-exchange theories cannot. 
 The obligation criterion is easy. Agreements generate obligations in the same way that 
promises do: by bringing a joint decision into force. If we retain the assumption that people are 
typically obligated to abide by their standing joint decisions (see Ch. 2, §1.1), then people will 
typically be obligated to abide by their agreements. 
 Both the simultaneity and interdependence of agreement-based obligations are explained 
by the fact that agreements involve a single joint decision concerning the actions of multiple 
agents. An agreement that we will φ brings into force a single decision that we will φ, not two 
separate decisions that I will do my part in our φing and that you will do your part in our φing. Thus the 
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various obligations that result from an agreement are all created at the same moment: the 
moment at which our joint decision comes into force. 
 To see why agreement-based obligations are interdependent, note that on the deliberative 
theory, our reason to keep our agreements derives from our reason to abide by our standing joint 
decisions. Recall from Chapter 1 (§1.1 and §1.2) that the content of a joint decision is a set of 
possible combinations of our individual actions. So, the content of our joint decision that we will φ 
is the set of possible combinations of our individual actions in which we both do our part in our 
φing. To conform to this joint decision, we must collectively keep our behavior within the bounds 
of this set. So, if one of us acts in a way that falls outside of this set – in other words, if one of us 
breaks our agreement – then that alone is sufficient to make it the case that we have not acted in 
accordance with our joint decision. Once you have broken our agreement, there is nothing I can 
do to bring our actions within the set of action combinations that we jointly decided upon. So, 
my reason to uphold our standing joint decisions no longer gives me any reason to do my part in 
our φing, since my doing so will no longer make it the case that our joint decision has been 
upheld. Hence interdependence. Crucially, however, so long as it is still possible for us to fulfill 
our joint decision, we both have reason to do so. Thus the deliberative theory avoids the 
conclusion that we can always fulfill an agreement by doing nothing. 
 This explanation of why agreements yield interdependent obligations does not extend to 
exchanges of promises. Say Rita promises Peter that she’ll walk Fido, and Peter promises Rita 
that he’ll groom Tibbles. The deliberative theory claims that these promises result in two 
separate joint decisions: a decision to the effect that Rita will walk Fido, and a decision to the 
effect that Peter will groom Tibbles. Since these are two separate decisions, the violation of one is 
compatible with the fulfillment of the other. If Rita violates their joint decision that she will walk 
Fido, that is unfortunate, but it does not affect Peter’s ability to execute their joint decision that 
he will groom Tibbles. Thus the deliberative theory predicts correctly that while agreements 
create interdependent obligations, exchanges of promises do not. 
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 Drawing on Margaret Gilbert’s work, I have argued here that the opponent of the 
deliberative theory cannot explain the similarities between promises and agreements by reducing 
agreements to promise exchanges. It is more plausible to go the other way around and say, with 
the deliberative theory, that promises are a special kind of agreement: a joint decision concerning 
the speaker’s actions. Those who refuse to take this route are left with another mystery: if 
agreements are not exchanges of promises, then why are they so similar to them? 
 
3. Requests 
3.1. Similarities between requests and promises 
 Our third and final topic in this chapter is requests: 
The Deliberative Theory of Requests: For S to request of A that she φ just is 
for S to propose to A, by means of the propose-and-ratify method, that they make 
a joint decision to the effect that A will φ. 
As with offers and agreements, we will begin by surveying requests’ similarities to promises. 
 Suppose I ask you to read my draft, and you say, “Sure!” By accepting my request, you 
become obligated to read my draft. The obligation you undertake by accepting my request is 
much like the obligation you would have undertaken if you had promised to read my draft 
instead. The list should by now be familiar. By accepting my request, you gain a new strong pro 
tanto reason to read my draft, a reason that can be overridden but typically generates an 
obligation for you to read it. This obligation is directed: you owe it to me in particular to read my 
draft. Like promissory obligation, this obligation imposes constraints on your deliberation: it 
would now be inappropriate for you to treat the question of whether to read my draft as a matter 
for further deliberation. And as with promises, I alone have the power to release you from the 
obligation you took on in accepting my request: “Actually, I’ll have a better draft soon, so don’t 
worry about reading that one.” 
 Like promises, offers, and agreements, requests are invalidated by coercion and deception 
as well. Consider a fourth (and final) variation on our favorite examples: 
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BANK 4: Bert holds a gun to Anna’s head and says, “WOULD YOU PLEASE GO TO 
YOUR BANK AND FETCH ME ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS? IF YOU DON’T, 
I’LL HAVE TO SHOOT YOU.” Anna says ‘Yessir.’ 
VAN GOGH 4: Seeing Cora eye his Van Gogh, Diego says, “Would you take it off my 
hands? It’s only $1000.” Cora says, “Sure!” and heads to her bank to get the money. On 
the way, Cora learns that the painting is forged, and Diego knew this was so. 
As in our other cases, Bert’s coercion and Diego’s deception rob the interaction of any binding 
force. By accepting Bert’s request, Anna does not become obligated to go fetch him the money; 
by accepting Diego’s request, Cora does not become obligated to pay for his forged Van Gogh. 
 Thus requests seem to create obligations with the same normative upshots as promises 
under the same conditions. The two speech acts seem to differ only in the subjects of the 
obligations they create: requests bind their addressees, while promises bind the speaker. 
 The deliberative theory has a ready explanation for these similarities. Requests are similar 
to promises because they have the same result: bringing a joint decision into force. When you ask 
me to read your draft, and I accept your request, the result is that we have jointly decided that I 
will read your draft. When I promise to read your draft, and you do not object, the result is the 
same: we have jointly decided that I will read your draft. This joint decision gives rise to an 
obligation with all the features listed above. 
Requests are invalidated by coercion and deception for the same reason that promises 
are: coercion and deception are incompatible with good faith joint deliberation. While coerced 
and deceived promises are invalidated by the bad faith of the addressee, coercive and deceptive 
requests are invalidated by the bad faith of the speaker. But the mechanism is the same: if you are 
coercing or deceiving me, then you cannot be deliberating with me in good faith, and so our 
interaction cannot give rise to a binding joint decision. 
 Thus the deliberative theory predicts that requests and promises will have similar 
normative effects and validity conditions. The question, again, is how other views can explain 
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these similarities. Again, the reductive strategy – explaining requests in terms of promises – seems 
like the only viable route. So let us see if it can be made to work this time. 
 
3.2. Are requests solicitations of promises? 
 The observation we are trying to explain is this: by accepting a request, one undertakes 
an obligation that is very similar to the obligation one undertakes by making a promise. Thus a 
simple explanation presents itself: accepting a request just is making a promise. 
 What, then, is it to make a request? It must be something like a promise solicitation: when 
I ask you to read my draft, I am trying to get you to promise to read my draft. How? We can’t 
say that I am asking you to make a promise – that would be circular. The only non-circular 
interpretation of the idea that requests are promise solicitations I can think of is this: to make a 
request is to express your desire that your addressee promise to do a certain action. 
 This view does not face the same kind of direct counterexamples that defeated our other 
reductive proposals. After all, the deliberative theory agrees with this reductive view that the 
normative upshots of accepting a request will be indistinguishable from those of making a 
promise. While the two views agree on the effects of accepting a request, however, I want to 
suggest that the deliberative theory better explains the import of making a request. 
 The act of making a request changes the normative situation even before it is accepted. 
To see this, suppose that you and I are beginning a fledgling friendship: we are not mere 
acquaintances, not quite friends, but somewhere in between. I call you up and make a request: 
“Hey, I’m moving to a new apartment on Saturday, and I can’t move my furniture alone. Any 
chance you could come over and help me out?” 
My request puts you in a bit of a bind. On the one hand, giving up your Saturday to lift 
my heavy furniture would be beyond the call of duty even if we were closer friends. Given the 
liminal status of our friendship, it’s a lot to ask. If I had casually mentioned that I was moving on 
Saturday, you would have felt no obligation to offer your help. And importantly, my request 
alone does not obligate you to help: you are still free to turn me down. On the other hand, my 
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request does seem to oblige you to give some reason for turning it down. If you had some prior 
plans, you could cite those. But if not – if, say, you were just planning to spend Saturday relaxing 
– you’ll be in an awkward position. “I don’t want to” is generally not a socially acceptable reason 
for rejecting a request.6 You’ll either have to accept my unreasonable request, or pretend you 
have some better excuse for turning it down. 
 Perhaps it is because we are aware of this fact that we are careful about what requests we 
make. Many of us have had the experience of agonizing over whether we can reasonably make a 
certain request – or, when we do make a request, trying to assure our addressee that she can turn 
us down. We don’t want to put other people in the bind of having to respond to an unreasonable 
request, and so we often only make requests when we already know the answer will be ‘yes.’ 
 On the reductive view we are considering, these everyday experiences should be 
surprising. All I do when I make a request, on this view, is express a desire that you do a certain 
thing. But we normally do not feel obliged to provide a justification for failing to satisfy others’ 
desires. If you say, “I want a chocolate cake,” I will feel no pressure to offer a reason why I won’t 
make one for you. Granted, we do often make requests by expressing our desires. When I say, “I 
want for you to read my draft,” I both express a desire that you read my draft and ask you to do 
so. So the trouble for the reductive view isn’t that we can’t make requests by expressing desires. 
My complaint is more subtle: I can’t see why requests would make their addressees feel obliged to 
offer a justification for turning them down if they are nothing more than expressions of desire. We 
normally don’t owe others a justification for not satisfying the desires they express; why, on the 
reductive view, should requests be any different? 
 The deliberative theory better captures the phenomenology of requests. Using the 
resources of the theory, we can explain our example as follows. When I request that you help me 
move, I am not merely expressing a desire that you do so. I am proposing that we jointly decide 
that you will help me move. If I am deliberating in good faith, then I must believe that my 
                                                
6 Faced with a similar request, Phoebe – a character in the sitcom TV show Friends – responds, “Oh, I wish I could, 
but I don’t want to.” It’s a laugh line because so many of us have wanted to say exactly this, but felt we cannot. 
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proposal might be warranted: that is, I must believe that our shared reasons might support your 
helping me move enough to justify our jointly deciding that you will do so.7 But if you turn down 
the proposal in good faith, you must believe that you are not required by our shared reasons to 
accept it. This means you must believe one of two things. 
First, you could think that while the decision that you will help me move would be 
warranted, the decision that you won’t help me move would be warranted as well. You could 
think that these two shared options are on a par, both permissible but neither required. (In other 
terms: you might think that our shared reasons in favor of your helping me move are sufficient, but 
not decisive). If this is the case, however, then by rejecting my request, you are resolving the tie 
between these shared options in a way that clearly favors your preferences over mine. To reject 
my request in this tiebreaking scenario, then, you have to show a willingness to be mildly, but 
blatantly, selfish. 
 Second, you might believe my proposal to be simply unwarranted. But if I proposed this 
joint decision in good faith, I must not believe that it is unwarranted. So if you think it is 
unwarranted, you must either think that I misjudged the balance of our shared reasons, or you 
must know something I don’t that counts against the proposal. 
 The implicature of your turning down my request, then, is that one of three things is the 
case: either (a) you are being selfish, (b) you think I misjudged the weight of our shared reasons, 
or (c) there is some reason against your accepting the request of which I was not aware. Given 
these options, no wonder we prefer to opt for (c) and offer an excuse for turning down the 
request. (a) is unattractive for obvious reasons. (b) is perhaps worse: if I misjudged our shared 
reasons, but not because I was unaware of some relevant matter of fact, that means I must have 
overestimated how much weight you attach to our shared reasons. In short, I must be mistaken 
about how important our relationship is to you. So the implicit message of both (a) and (b) is, “I 
                                                
7 To make a proposal in good faith, I don’t have to believe outright that the proposal is warranted; I only have to not 
believe that it is unwarranted. So, I can propose a joint decision in good faith while being uncertain about its 
warrant. Indeed, a central function of offers and requests is to enable us to do just this. 
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don’t care about you that much.” Even when this is true, we don’t want to acknowledge it so 
openly. This is why we feel pressure to offer a reason for turning down the request of which the 
speaker was not aware (c): for instance, a prior plan that conflicts with fulfilling the request. The 
alternative is to admit that we don’t care as much about the other person as they think we do. 
 Thus the deliberative theory predicts that turning down a request will be awkward in 
exactly the ways we experience it to be. I don’t see how the reductive theory could offer a similar 
explanation. The norms of desire expression do not seem to require that one express a desire that 
someone φ only if one believes they might have sufficient reason to φ. Indeed, it is sometimes 
perfectly appropriate to express a desire for someone to do something you know they ought not 
do: “I know you have to go, but I want you to stay.” If requests are just expressions of desire, it is 
unclear why we are so careful about making them, and so reluctant to turn them down. 
 The view that requests are promise solicitations thus appears too impoverished to explain 
the social significance of making a request. In requests, again, we have a speech act that is 
strikingly similar to promises, but which does not seem reducible to them. The opponent of the 
deliberative theory thus faces yet another mystery: if requests are not reducible to promises, then 
why are they so similar to them? 
 
3.3. Requests and demands 
 Requests are to demands as offers are to promises: requests propose decisions regarding 
the addressee’s actions by means of propose-and-ratify, while demands propose the same kind of 
decisions using propose-and-challenge.8  This should lead us to expect that the differences 
between offers and promises’ appropriateness conditions surveyed in §1.3 will be paralleled by 
requests and demands. And when we look, this is just what we find. 
                                                
8 For our purposes in this section, we need not distinguish between demands and commands. So, rather than repeat 
the cumbersome phrase “demands and commands” throughout, I will speak only of demands. But the observations I 
make should apply to commands as well. For more on this distinction, see the next chapter. 
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 To review, the propose-and-challenge and propose-and-ratify methods differ in two main 
respects. First, they guard against different types of deliberative error: propose-and-challenge 
protects against failing to make joint decisions that are warranted (false negatives), while propose-
and-ratify protects against making joint decisions that are unwarranted (false positives). Second, 
they distribute deliberative power in different ways: propose-and-challenge puts greater power in 
the hands of the speaker, while propose-and-ratify gives power to the addressee. 
 These differences allow us to make four predictions about when it is appropriate to make 
requests and demands, which roughly parallel the predictions we made for offers and promises. 
Let me review each prediction in turn. 
 (i) Demands are appropriate only when the speaker justifiably takes herself to know that the demand is 
warranted. Conversely, only requests are appropriate when the speaker is uncertain whether the request is warranted. 
Like offers, one function of requests is to air proposals that one doesn’t know will be, or ought to 
be, accepted. My colleague is very busy, but I’d like to get her thoughts on my latest draft. I 
genuinely don’t know whether she can or should take the time to read my draft. The appropriate 
thing to do is ask: “Any chance you could read my draft?” 
 Not all requests are made under such uncertainty. I will request rather than demand a 
meeting with my advisor, even when I know that he has sufficient reason to meet with me if I ask 
(it’s his job, after all!). It is usually polite to make requests rather than demands even when one 
knows they ought to be accepted (see (ii) below). But even when demands would otherwise be 
permissible, uncertainty about warrant renders them inappropriate. 
 Consider a head chef at a restaurant. If the head chef knows what the sous chef should be 
doing, she can just demand that he do it: “Chop the onions!” But suppose she is uncertain about 
a particular case: she would like the sous chef to take over plating the appetizers so that she can 
focus on the entrée, but she doesn’t know if the sous chef has time to do that while fulfilling his 
other more important duties, such as making the soup. In this case, it would be brash for her to 
simply demand that the sous chef plate the appetizers. Instead, she should ask: “Can you take 
over plating the appetizers for me?” This gives the sous chef an opportunity to check whether the 
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proposal is warranted, and say, “Sorry, I’ve got my hands tied with the soup,” if it’s not. When 
the warrant of a proposed decision is under question, it is typically wise to give the addressee a 
chance to double-check the proposal before it is accepted. This is why requests are more 
appropriate under conditions of uncertainty, as the deliberative theory predicts. 
 (ii) Ceteris paribus, requests are more appropriate than demands, because they give the addressee more 
deliberative power. It seems undeniable that requests are far more common than demands in 
everyday life. Genuine demands are rare occurrences, common only in contexts of formalized 
authority (e.g., the military or a restaurant kitchen) or moments of high drama (“Let my people 
go!”). In comparison, requests are innocuous creatures, perfectly at home in polite conversation. 
 Why would this be? As we discussed in the case of offers, it seems to be good deliberative 
practice to err on the side of giving more power to one’s addressee. But this point has special 
significance for requests and demands.  Since requests and demands propose joint decisions that 
concern the addressee’s actions, it is particularly important to give the addressee power over 
whether these decisions are made. By making a demand, one seizes asymmetric deliberative 
power over another person’s actions. The bar for doing so appropriately is thus understandably 
high. We can thus predict that there will be a particularly wide gap between the appropriateness 
conditions of demands and requests, since there is special reason to use propose-and-ratify when 
the addressee’s actions are at stake. This fits our intuitive judgments: there seems to be a much 
bigger difference between making a demand and making a request than there is between making 
a promise and making an offer. 
 (iii) The more likely the addressee is to reject a warranted proposal, the more appropriate it is to make that 
proposal using a demand rather than a request. Sometimes we start out by making a request, but then 
turn to demands when the request is ignored. “Would you pass the salt, please? … Hello, can you 
pass the salt? … Hey! Pass the damn salt!” Parents often follow this pattern when dealing with 
stubborn children. “Sam, would you please put away your toys?” “No!” “Sam, put away your toys.” 
 When an addressee is not adequately doing his part in the deliberation – by, for example, 
ignoring or turning down a request he ought to accept – it is sometimes reasonable to respond 
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taking deliberative power away from him. Knowing that Sam ought to put away his toys, I might 
still request rather than demand that he do so, giving him the opportunity to actively accept this 
decision. When he refuses, however, I may be warranted in taking away this deliberative power 
by making a demand.  This puts the justificatory burden on Sam: if he wants to block my 
proposal, he will have to provide some legitimate challenge to it, rather than just saying “No!” 
The deliberative theory allows us to see this request-demand progression as not just an expression 
of increasing frustration, but as a strategic shift in the balance of deliberative power. 
 This power dynamic also explains why demands are better tools for holding people 
accountable to their moral obligations. If you see me doing something horrible, it is more 
appropriate for you to demand “Stop that at once!” than to meekly request, “Would you please 
stop?” When someone is already doing wrong, he has thereby demonstrated a propensity to 
disregard his obligations. Thus you should take the deliberative power into your own hands, 
demanding that he stop doing wrong rather than merely requesting that he do so. 
 (iv) When there is reason to give the speaker greater power over the addressee’s actions, demands can be 
appropriate. Sometimes we have good reason to put someone in charge. There are head chefs 
because kitchens function better when a single person sets the menu and decides how to divide 
up the labor. Armies have hierarchies of command because they function better when some 
people give orders and others obey them. If we are unloading a moving van, we might appoint 
one person the ‘leader’ in order to better coordinate our actions. 
 The propose-and-challenge method’s greatest liability is also its most important asset: the 
power it confers on the speaker. This power dynamic explains why it is usually inappropriate to 
use the propose-and-challenge method when putting forward decisions about others’ actions: 
because by doing so, you assert asymmetric power over the choices of others. But this power 
dynamic can also be an advantage, because sometimes we want to put the decision-making 
power in a single person’s hands. As I argue at length in the next chapter (especially §4.2), the 
situations when we stand to benefit from putting the power in one person’s hands are exactly the 
situations in which demands and commands are intuitively appropriate. Yet another illustration 
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of this section’s wider point: by thinking about the costs and benefits of the propose-and-
challenge and propose-and-ratify methods, we can explain our commonsense judgments about 
when it is appropriate to make a demand, and when it is better to make a request. 
 
4. The unity argument 
The above discussions of offers, agreements, and requests were cast from a common 
mold. I began by pointing out the similarities between each of these speech acts and promises. 
When I make an offer and you accept it, the moral situation is just as if I had made a promise. 
When we make an agreement, the mutual obligations we thereby undertake have the same shape 
and significance as promissory obligations. When I accept your request, I become obligated to do 
what you asked in the same way as if I had promised to do so. 
Then I asked a question: how do we explain these speech acts’ similarities to promises? 
The deliberative theory offers an easy answer to this question. Promises, offers, agreements, and 
requests are all species of the same genus. When successful, these acts all have the same effect: 
they bring a new joint decision into force. This new joint decision gives promises, offers, 
agreements, and requests their shared pattern of normative effects. Joint decisions put their 
subjects under an obligation with a certain suite of normative features. When we look at these 
features, we find that they are the very features that are common to the obligations created by 
promises, offers, agreements, and requests. The other salient similarity between these acts – that 
all of them are invalidated by coercion and deception – is explained by the fact that coercion and 
deception are forms of deliberative bad faith. By subsuming promises, offers, agreements, and 
requests under a common framework, the deliberative theory enables us to predict and explain 
their deep similarities. 
Life is not so easy for other views. Their best option seems to be to claim that offers, 
agreements, and requests are so similar to promises because they are promises of special kinds. If 
this view could be defended, it would provide an alternative explanation of these speech acts’ 
commonalities. 
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But, as I have argued in this chapter, this reductive view is false. Offers, agreements, and 
requests cannot be plausibly reduced to promises. The best attempts at such reductions fail to 
capture essential features of each kind of act. We cannot hold that offers are conditional 
promises, for this fails to capture the fact that unaccepted offers expire and can be revoked (§1.2). 
We cannot hold that agreements are exchanges of promises, for no promise-exchange can 
generate the interdependent obligations characteristic of agreements (§2). We cannot hold that 
requests are promise solicitations, for while this view captures the normative significance of 
accepting requests, it fails to explain the normative impact of making them (§3.2). Thus the most 
plausible alternative account of the similarities between promises, offers, agreements and requests 
seems to be ultimately untenable. 
This provides the materials for a second general argument for the deliberative theory. 
(The first was the redundancy argument presented in Ch. 2, §5). Any adequate theory of 
promises, offers, agreements, and requests must explain why these four kinds of act have such 
similar normative effects and validity conditions. The deliberative theory can explain this 
observation: these four acts are so similar because they all result in joint decisions. Other theories 
seem to offer no viable explanation of this fact. Their most plausible candidate – the view that 
offers, agreements, and requests reduce to promises – simply fails to capture the intuitive features 
of offers, agreements, and requests. And so the opponent of the deliberative theory is left with a 
mystery: if offers, agreements, and requests are not special kinds of promises, then why are they 
so similar to them? It seems that the only way to answer this question is to hold, with the 
deliberative theory, that these acts are all moves within joint practical deliberation. Call this the 
unity argument, as it challenges alternative theories to explain the unity of promises, offers, requests, 
and agreements. 
Given what we know about joint practical deliberation, we should expect to find a 
plurality of distinct speech acts with very similar normative upshots. There are different ways of 
making joint decisions, and different contents that joint decisions can have. Putting these 
parameters together, we get a set of possible moves within joint practical deliberation that look 
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exactly like moves we recognize in ordinary language: promises, offers, agreements, and requests. 
The deliberative theory predicts the differences between these acts while explaining their unity. It 
offers a single map on which we can locate the full variety of ways we make commitments to each 
other. I have yet to find another theory that does the same. 
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Chapter 4 
Demands and Commands 
 
 Consider the following cases: 
SAND CASTLE: Walking along the beach, you come across me stomping on a beautiful 
sand castle. To your horror, you realize that the sand castle is not mine, but instead 
belongs to a nearby child, who is watching tearfully as I destroy her creation. Seeing this, 
you shout: “Stop that at once!” 
PUSH-UPS: The sergeant in charge of a training camp likes to keep her soldiers on their 
toes. Walking through the mess hall during lunch, she picks out a soldier at random and 
barks: “Johnson! Drop and give me fifty!” 
These two examples are both importantly similar and strikingly different. 
On the one hand, your utterance in SAND CASTLE and the sergeant’s utterance in PUSH-
UPS share many features: both take the imperative grammatical form; both seek to get their 
addressee to perform an action; both are forceful in a way that other forms of interpersonal 
influence – say, making a request or giving advice – are not. On the other hand, these utterances 
also differ in crucial respects. When she tells Johnson to do fifty push-ups, the sergeant obligates 
him to do something he had little reason to do before; when you tell me to stop destroying the 
sand castle, you are merely holding me to an obligation I already had. The sergeant has the 
authority to tell Johnson to do push-ups because of her special role in an institution; you have the 
authority to tell me to stop destroying the sand castle simply because you are another human 
being. 
Following ordinary usage, let us call your speech act in SAND CASTLE a demand, and the 
sergeant’s speech act in PUSH-UPS a command. (Also following ordinary language, I will call 
commands ‘orders’ sometimes; please treat the two words as synonyms). 
In this chapter, I will argue that demands and commands are both proposals to make 
joint decisions regarding the addressee’s actions by means of the propose-and-challenge method. 
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Where demands and commands differ is in the kind of decision they propose. Demands propose 
what I will call commissive decisions: decisions to perform an action one already has decisive reason 
to do. Commands propose what I will call enactive decisions: decisions to perform one of out of 
multiple actions that are rationally on a par. So, the theses I will defend are: 
The Deliberative Theory of Demands: For S to demand that A φ just is for S 
to propose to A, by means of the propose-and-challenge method, that they make a 
commissive joint decision to the effect that A will φ. 
The Deliberative Theory of Commands: For S to command A to φ just is 
for S to propose to A, by means of the propose-and-challenge method, that they 
make an enactive joint decision to the effect that A will φ. 
I begin the chapter by elaborating on the contrast between demands and commands (§1). 
Despite their important differences, I argue, the commonalities between these speech acts are 
deep enough to require explanation. However, the prospects for reducing one of these speech 
acts to the other appear dim (§1.2). Instead, I suggest, we should understand the contrast between 
demands and commands in terms of the distinction between commissive and enactive decisions 
(§2). In the following sections, I elaborate upon and defend the deliberative theory of each speech 
act, starting with demands (§3) and then moving to commands (§4). 
 
1. Two kinds of authority 
1.1. Commands and demands: differences and similarities 
Let’s take a closer look at the contrast between SAND CASTLE and PUSH-UPS. 
The first and most salient difference between the two concerns the relation between the 
speaker’s utterance and the addressee’s reasons for complying with it. In PUSH-UPS, the 
sergeant’s command creates the soldier’s reasons for complying with it. Before the sergeant gives 
the command, Johnson (the soldier) has no reason to interrupt his lunch to spontaneously drop to 
the floor and do fifty push-ups. But once the sergeant gives the order, Johnson has decisive reason 
to drop to the floor and do fifty push-ups. The sergeant’s command does not merely trigger some 
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independent reason Johnson had to do push-ups; her command is the reason why Johnson 
should do push-ups. If Johnson asks, “Why should I do that?” the sergeant can answer: “Because 
I said so!” 
Compare SAND CASTLE. Here, you do not take your demand to be the reason why I 
ought to stop destroying the child’s sand castle. Perhaps your demand provides some extra 
reason for me to do so, but this reason is superfluous: the fact that I am destroying a child’s 
valued creation, taken alone, is enough to give me decisive reason to stop. Instead of creating a 
new reason, the point of your demand seems to be to hold me accountable to the reasons I 
already have. If I responded to your demand by saying, “Okay, I’ll stop, but just because you said 
so,” you could reply, “Don’t stop because I said so, stop because it’s wrong!” 
The second major difference between commands and demands concerns the kind of 
authority one must have to make them. The authority to command is a rare thing: only 
particular people have it in particular situations. To have the authority to command, one must 
normally occupy a special role or office within some social institution: sergeant, teacher, coach, 
chef, president, conductor, parent. Typically this authority only applies within a delimited 
domain. For example, the head chef can order around her sous chefs in the restaurant kitchen, 
but cannot tell them what to do in their kitchens at home. Finally, the authority to command is 
fundamentally asymmetrical: if I have authority to command you within a domain, then you do not 
have authority to command me within that same domain. Due to this hierarchical nature, I will 
call the authority to command hierarchical authority. 
In contrast, the authority to make the kind of demand you make in SAND CASTLE 
appears to be universally held by all persons. Anyone who came across me stomping on the child’s 
sand castle would have the standing to demand that I stop. You do not have to occupy some 
special institutional role to have the authority to demand that I comply with my moral 
obligations; you seem to get that authority merely from your status as a fellow human being. 
Thus the authority to demand is symmetrical: if you have the authority to make demands of me, 
then I must have the authority to make similar demands of you (cf. Darwall 2006: 20-22). Finally, 
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the authority to demand does not seem to be domain-specific like the authority to command: if I 
am doing wrong, you can demand that I stop, no matter where I am doing this wrong or whom I 
am doing it to. Since the authority to demand is given universally to all morally competent 
persons, I will call it moral authority. 
Given these differences, should we simply conclude that demands and commands are two 
separate topics, requiring separate treatments? No. Despite their differences, demands and 
commands also have a deep similarity that calls out for explanation. 
The fundamental commonality between demands and commands is this: both speech acts 
purport to close the question of what the addressee will do. Compare two other forms of 
interpersonal influence, advice and threats. Though advice and threats also aim to influence their 
addressees’ actions, they leave the ultimate decision of what to do up to the addressee. Suppose I 
want you to read my favorite book. I might advise you: “You should read it, I think you’ll really 
enjoy it.” Or I might threaten you: “If you don’t read this book, I won’t watch your favorite 
movie.” In either case, you could sensibly reply, “I’ll take that under consideration.” But if I 
demand that you read my favorite book – “Read this book!” – it wouldn’t make sense for you to 
say, “I’ll take that under consideration.” This response could only be a joke. 
Advice and threats aim to influence their addressees’ actions by providing them with 
some new input to their deliberation. When I give you advice, I point out facts and features of 
your situation that support some particular course of action. When I make a threat, I provide you 
with a new incentive to perform a certain action (namely, that I will carry out my threat if you 
don’t). In both cases, I am simply providing you with another reason to take into account in your 
deliberation; I am still leaving the decision itself up to you. 
But when I demand that you do something, or command you to do it, I am not merely 
trying to provide some new consideration for you to take into account when you deliberate. I am 
purporting to end your deliberation entirely, deciding for you that you will do the action I am 
demanding or commanding. If you continue to treat it as an open deliberative question whether 
to do what I have said, treating my demand or command as something to be ‘taken under 
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consideration’, then you have thereby rejected my demand or command. If you think my demand 
or command is legitimate, you must treat it as decided that you will do what it requires.1 
As far as I can tell, demands and commands are the only speech acts that purport to close 
their addressee’s deliberation in this way. This suggests that demands and commands may be two 
subtypes of a single overarching kind of speech act, the distinctive force of which is to decide for 
the addressee what she will do. If we can characterize a wider speech act genus of which 
demands and commands are species, then we will be able to explain their similar force. This is 
just what the deliberative theory does: it locates a single speech act category within which both 
demands and commands fall, and explains their similarities by appeal to the features of this wider 
category. Can other theories offer the same kind of explanation? 
 
1.2. Extant accounts 
Demands and commands are rarely considered together: the literatures on these two 
speech acts are largely separate from one another.2 Thus I will look at the leading theories of 
commands and demands separately, and ask whether each could be extended to capture the 
other speech act. 
 
1.2.1. Raz’s theory of commands 
 The most influential contemporary theory of authority to command is that of Joseph Raz 
(1985; 1986; 2006; 2010). On Raz’s view, the signature feature of hierarchical authority is the 
surrender of judgment it involves. I should give you hierarchical authority over my actions when, and 
because, I think you are better positioned to judge what I should do than I am. When this is the 
case, I should just do what you say instead of acting on my own judgment. Instead of assessing 
                                                
1 This contrast between demands and advice is noted by both Darwall (2006: 5-7) and Macnamara (2009: 97). 
Macnamara proposes that demands are more like threats, motivating action by threatening the sanction of blame 
(2009: 92). I think this view should be rejected for the same reasons why we should think demands are distinct from 
advice: threats aim only to provide an input to deliberation, while demands purport to close it. 
2 One exception is the work of Stephen Darwall, especially his (2013a) and (2013b). But, I argue below, it is not clear 
how his account of demands might be extended to explain commands’ power to create new obligations. 
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the balance of my reasons myself, I should simply take your command as my reason for action. 
This is the rationale behind what Raz calls the preemption thesis: “The fact that an authority 
requires performance of an action is a reason for its performance which is not to be added to all 
other relevant reasons when assessing what to do, but should exclude and take the place of some 
of them” (Raz 1986: 46). This fits the observation we just made: commands do not seem to offer 
further reasons to be taken into account in deliberation, but instead to preempt deliberation, 
replacing the addressee’s judgment with the authority’s directive. 
 To learn whether a purported authority is legitimate, then, all we have to do is ask 
whether we should surrender our judgment to them in this preemptive way. This leads to the 
centerpiece of Raz’s theory, which he calls the normal justification thesis: 
The normal way to establish that a person has authority over another person 
involves showing that the alleged subject is likely better to comply with reasons 
which apply to him … if he accepts the directives of the alleged authority as 
authoritatively binding and tries to follow them, rather than by trying to follow the 
reasons which apply to him directly (Raz 1986: 53).3 
In other words, you have authority to command me within a certain domain just in case I am 
likely to better comply with my reasons for action in that domain by obeying your commands 
than I am by deciding for myself what to do. 
 If the purpose of commands is to help their addressees better act on their own reasons for 
action, then a command had better be based upon the reasons it is supposed to preempt. Thus 
the normal justification thesis leads naturally to the dependence thesis: “All authoritative directives 
should be based on reasons which already independently apply to the subjects of the directives 
and are relevant to their action in the circumstances covered by the directive” (47). 
 These three theses comprise Raz’s account of both the force of commands and the 
conditions under which one has the authority to make them. The force of commands, we learn 
                                                
3 What I am calling a ‘command,’ Raz calls a ‘directive.’ The difference is only terminological. 
 131 
from the preemption thesis, is to preempt judgment: to give the addressee a decisive reason for 
action that stands in for, and replaces, her judgment of the balance of her other reasons for 
action. For a command to be authoritative, we learn from the dependence and normal 
justification theses, it must be based on the addressee’s reasons for action, and the addressee must 
be more likely to conform to those reasons by obeying the command than she would be by 
deciding herself. 
 I do not wish to evaluate Raz’s account of commands here (but see §4.4 below). Instead, 
my question is: can Raz’s theory of commands explain demands as well? 
 Begin with the force of demands. Raz’s preemption thesis captures our observation that 
demands purport to close deliberation. However, the way in which Raz thinks commands 
preempt deliberation does not fit demands as naturally. For Raz holds that commands preempt 
deliberation by providing a reason that is “meant to replace the reasons on which it depends” 
(42). So, when the head chef orders the sous chef to chop the onions, the sous chef is now 
supposed to chop the onions not for the reasons he had to do beforehand (e.g. that he needs 
chopped onions for the soup), but instead for the reason that the head chef told him to. While this 
rings true for commands, it sounds false for demands. As we have already observed, when you 
demand that I stop stomping on the child’s sand castle, you don’t take your demand to be the 
reason that should motivate me to stop. You think I should be motivated by the facts that make 
my stomping wrong – e.g., the sadness I am causing the child. If I say, “I’ll stop, but only because 
you said so,” I am missing the point of your demand. So, while your demand purports to close 
my deliberation, it does not seem to do so by providing a reason that replaces my other reasons 
for complying with it.4 The preemption thesis appears false when applied to demands. 
 Let’s now turn to the conditions for authority to demand. Raz’s criterion for hierarchical 
authority, the normal justification thesis, does not seem to fit the facts about moral authority. 
                                                
4 This is not to say that demands are motivationally inert. In making a demand, one typically hopes that the demand 
will help to motivate one’s addressee to do the right thing. But the way in which demands motivate does not seem to 
be by replacing the addressee’s other reasons for action. Instead, demands seem to motivate either by drawing the 
addressee’s attention to the reasons he already had, or by supplementing those reasons with the further motivation 
provided by the demand. Thanks to Kieran Setiya for discussion here. 
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Depending on how we interpret it, the normal justification thesis either draws the bounds of 
moral authority too broadly or too narrowly. 
First, suppose we interpret the normal justification thesis as applying to individual actions 
on a case-by-case basis. Then it seems that your demand in SAND CASTLE meets Raz’s criteria, 
since I am clearly more likely to conform to my reasons by complying with your demand than by 
following my own judgment. If a person is obligated to φ, but is inclined not to do so, she will 
better conform to her reasons by complying with a demand that she φ than by deciding herself 
what to do (and therefore not φing). Thus the normal justification thesis, on this interpretation, 
rightly predicts that we can demand that people comply with their moral obligations. 
 The trouble is that the same rationale applies to any action that one ought to do at all, 
not just for moral reasons. If I ought to φ, but am inclined not to do so, I will better conform to 
my reasons by complying with a demand that I φ than by deciding myself what to do (and 
therefore not φing). Thus our first interpretation of the normal justification thesis entails that 
whenever one ought to do something, others can legitimately demand that one do it. But this is 
starkly at odds with common sense. I ought to floss every night, watch my sugar intake, and work 
on this dissertation rather than watch Netflix – but nobody can demand of me that I do these 
things. If you see me chowing down on sugary cookies and say, “Stop that at once!” I could 
legitimately reply: “Mind your own business!” 
 The right fix seems to be to reinterpret the normal justification thesis as applying to whole 
domains of action. Instead of asking whether one will better comply with one’s reasons for action 
by obeying a particular command, we should ask whether one will better comply with one’s 
reasons for action within a certain domain by obeying a person’s commands in general. The head 
chef has the authority to command the sous chef in the restaurant kitchen because the sous chef 
is more likely to generally comply with his reasons for action by obeying her commands rather 
than deciding what to do by himself.5 
                                                
5 Raz seems to favor this second interpretation (see Raz 1986: 60-62). 
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 On this second interpretation, the normal justification thesis does not imply that everyone 
has authority to demand that I floss. For, in the domain of my personal hygiene, I am generally 
in the best position to judge what I ought to do. But now the normal justification thesis does not 
generate enough authority to demand. Take your demand in SAND CASTLE. Suppose that, with 
the notable exception of my current behavior, I am generally a paragon of moral virtue. I am 
quite good at judging the balance of my moral reasons and acting in accordance with them. 
Suppose also that your judgment on moral matters is fairly unreliable. Then it seems possible 
that, despite my wrongdoing in this particular case, I am more likely to conform to my moral 
reasons in general by deciding for myself what to do than by following whatever demands you 
make of me. Thus our second version of the normal justification thesis would predict that you do 
not have the authority to demand that I stop destroying the child’s sand castle. But this is clearly 
incorrect. No matter who is a more reliable judge of my moral obligations in general, the fact is 
that in this case I am doing wrong, and that alone is enough to give you the authority to demand 
that I stop. Intuitively, anyone has standing to demand that I stop doing wrong, regardless of 
whether their moral judgment is more reliable than mine. Thus the normal justification thesis, on 
its second (and more plausible) interpretation, draws the bounds of moral authority too narrowly. 
 I conclude that Raz’s theory of commands cannot be plausibly extended to demands. It 
mispredicts both the reasons that ought to motivate compliance with demands and the extension 
of our standing to make them. 
 
1.2.2. Darwall’s theory of demands 
Perhaps we should instead start with demands, and try to explain commands in terms of 
them. Thus let us consider Stephen Darwall’s influential theory of demands (2006). 
On Darwall’s view, demands and moral obligation are conceptually intertwined: an 
action is morally obligatory just in case we can demand it of one another, and a demand is 
authoritative just in case it expresses a moral obligation (Darwall 2006: 101). Demands and 
moral obligation are part of a wider circle of phenomena that involve what Darwall calls “the 
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second-person standpoint,” which is “the perspective you and I take up when we make and 
acknowledge claims on one another’s conduct and will” (3). Whenever we make a demand, we 
take up this standpoint and thereby commit ourselves to certain interpersonal standards of 
justification. When I make a demand of you, I must recognize your standing to make similar 
demands of me (117), and I must take my demand to be one that you can recognize as legitimate 
from your own perspective and make of yourself in turn (112). 
This theory provides an elegant framework within which to understand demands’ force 
and justification. (One that, I argue briefly in §3.2, coheres nicely with the deliberative theory). 
But taken alone, this framework will not give us a satisfactory account of commands. 
As Darwall argues, a demand is only authoritative if its addressee is obligated to do the 
action demanded. However, commands can be authoritative even when their addressees were 
under no previous obligation to do the action commanded. The sergeant’s command in PUSH-
UPS is authoritative even though Johnson had no prior obligation to do fifty push-ups at that 
moment. To extend Darwall’s theory to commands, then, we might hypothesize that commands 
work in two steps: first, they create a new obligation, and second, they demand that the addressee 
comply with it. Thus when the sergeant commands Johnson to do fifty push-ups, her utterance 
both creates an obligation for Johnson to do the push-ups and holds him accountable for 
complying with it. It is as if she had first said, “I hereby make it the case that you, Johnson, are 
obligated to do fifty push-ups now,” and then demanded: “So, drop and give me fifty!” Commands 
are thus demands that hold their addressees accountable to a specific kind of obligation: namely, 
an obligation to do what the speaker says. 
This account captures the similarities between commands and demands by building 
demands into commands as a constituent part. However, as an account of commands, this 
proposal is deeply unsatisfactory. It presupposes what an account of commands is supposed to 
explain: namely, commands’ power to create new reasons for their addressees. The first step in 
the two-step process outlined in the last paragraph is left completely unexplained. How can the 
sergeant create an obligation for Johnson by simply declaring that it exists? Why does she have 
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the authority to put Johnson under obligations in this way, while Johnson does not have the 
authority to do the same to her? What is the basis of the reason that the sergeant’s command 
gives to Johnson? These are the questions we want our theory of commands to address; Darwall’s 
account of demands, taken alone, gets us no closer to answering them.6 
To be clear, the arguments of this section are not criticisms of Raz’s theory of commands 
or Darwall’s theory of demands in themselves. Neither theorist intended for their account to be 
extended to the other speech act in the way we just attempted. My point is not that Raz or 
Darwall’s theories fail on their own terms, but that they cannot provide what we are looking for 
here: a unified account of commands and demands that explains the similarities between these 
speech acts while respecting their differences. To find such an account, we have to look 
elsewhere. 
 
2. Two kinds of decision 
Forget about demands and commands for a minute. Consider these examples instead: 
GYM: I know I ought to go to the gym. Exercise not only promotes my long-term health, 
it also makes me feel happier and more energetic in the short term. Though it is tempting 
to sit on the couch watching TV, there’s no question in my mind that going to the gym is 
what I ought to do. So I decide to go to the gym. 
LUNCH: I’m deciding where to get lunch. There are two nearby restaurants, Darwin’s 
and Clover. Thinking about it, I don’t see any strong reason to choose one over the other; 
the two are on a par, roughly similar in price, quality, atmosphere, distance, etc. But I 
have to choose somewhere, so I decide to go to Darwin’s. 
These cases illustrate two different roles decisions play in our lives. Sometimes, as in GYM, we 
make decisions in order to commit ourselves to doing what we have most reason to do. But other 
                                                
6 Darwall seems to acknowledge this when, rather than claiming that his theory explains hierarchical authority, he 
says only that it provides the framework within which such explanations must be given: “the only justification [of 
hierarchical authority] that can succeed is one that proceeds from within the second-person standpoint, beginning 
with the assumption that we all share a common basic authority … and proceeding from there to consider what 
differential claims to authority anyone could sensibly accept” (2013b: 167). 
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times, as in LUNCH, our reasons don’t supply clear guidance about what to do. Sometimes we 
have two or more options that are on a par, our reasons supporting neither decisively over the 
other. Like Buridan’s ass, who famously starved because he could not choose between two 
equidistant bales of hay, our judgments of what we ought to do are not sufficient to determine 
our behavior in these cases. Decisions step in to fill the gap: by making a decision, we commit 
ourselves to one of the equipoised options and avoid the fate of Buridan’s ass. 
 Call decisions of the first kind commissive decisions, as they commit us to acting on reasons we 
already have. Call decisions of the second kind enactive decisions, as they enact a determination of 
action that outstrips the balance of reasons. 
Sometimes, among the options available to a person, one is clearly the best choice. We 
can describe this fact in multiple ways: the person has decisive reason to perform this option; she is 
rationally required to perform this option and rationally forbidden to perform the alternatives; she ought 
to perform this option and ought not perform any other. I will treat these formulations as 
equivalent. When a person decides on an option because she judges that her reasons decisively 
support it, she makes a commissive decision. Thus my decision in GYM is commissive: I decide to 
go to the gym because I judge that I am rationally required to do so. 
 If there is no single option that a person has decisive reason to perform, then there must 
be multiple options, each of which she has sufficient reason to perform.7 Though there are almost 
always options that we clearly ought not perform, there are many cases where no single option 
stands out as best. Often two or more of the options available to an agent are on a par.8 Again, 
philosophers have multiple ways of describing this situation: we can say that an agent has sufficient 
reason to perform each of the options; that each of the options is rationally permissible, but none are 
rationally required; that she ought to perform one of the options, but none of them is such that she 
                                                
7 I assume that there are no rational dilemmas: cases where a person has no options that has sufficient reason to 
perform (i.e., no options that are rationally permissible). If there are rational dilemmas, then I suspect we should 
classify decisions in such cases as enactive. 
8 I take the phrase “on a par” from Chang (2002). Chang argues, persuasively I think, that two options can be on a 
par without being exactly tied: i.e., without it being the case that adding a very small reason for performing one 
would ‘break the tie’ and make it decisively favored over the other. Perhaps this is because there is vagueness in 
comparisons between reasons, or perhaps, as Chang claims, it is because some of our reasons are incommensurable. 
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ought to perform it. I will treat these formulations as equivalent. When a person decides on one 
of multiple options that she judges to be on a par in this way, she makes an enactive decision. 
Thus my decision in LUNCH is enactive: I decide on Darwin’s, though I judge that I had just as 
much reason to go to Clover instead.9 
 Just as we can distinguish between commissive and enactive individual decisions, we can 
also distinguish between commissive and enactive joint decisions. Suppose that among the shared 
options available to us, there is one option that our shared reasons decisively support over all the 
others. The joint decision that we perform this option is not only warranted by our shared 
reasons; it is required by them.10 When we make a joint decision because we take it to be decisively 
supported in this way, we make a commissive joint decision. Our joint decision simply commits 
us to acting as our shared reasons require. 
 Suppose instead that there is no shared option that is required by our shared reasons, but 
instead multiple shared options that are permitted by them. That is, there are multiple joint 
decisions we could make, each of which is warranted by our shared reasons. When we jointly 
decide on one out of multiple shared options that we judge to be on a par in this way, we make 
an enactive joint decision. Our joint decision determines what we will do in a way that goes 
beyond our shared reasons. 
 I propose that we understand the distinction between demands and commands in terms 
of the distinction between commissive and enactive joint decisions. Demands propose commissive 
joint decisions; commands propose enactive joint decisions. 
 The central difference between demands and commands, I have argued, concerns the 
reasons they offer their addressees. Demands tell their addressees to do something they were 
already required to do, not because it is being demanded but because of the decisive reasons they 
already have to do so. Commissive decisions do the same. When I decide to go to the gym, I am 
                                                
9 For an account that emphasizes the commissive function of decisions, see Holton (2004); for an account that 
emphasizes their enactive function, see Watson (2003). 
10 I say more about what it takes for our shared reasons to require an action in §3.1 below. 
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telling myself to do something I was already required to do, not because I decided to do it but 
because of the decisive reasons I already have to do so. In contrast, commands determine their 
addressees’ actions in a way that goes beyond their prior reasons, telling them to do something 
simply because it is what was commanded. Enactive decisions do the same. When I decide to go 
to Darwin’s instead of Clover for lunch, I determine my own actions in a way that goes beyond 
my prior reasons, telling myself to go to Darwin’s simply because it is what I decided to do. 
 The feature that ties demands and commands together is their force: the way in which, 
unlike advice or threats, they purport to close the question of what their addressees will do. 
Demands and commands have this force, I suggest, because they put forward joint decisions by 
the propose-and-challenge method. When you propose the joint decision that I will φ using the 
propose-and-challenge method, then unless I can raise a convincing objection to your proposal, it 
is thereby decided between us that I will φ. Once I accept your proposal as warranted, there is no 
room for further deliberation on my part about whether to φ. This contrasts with advice and 
threats, which do not propose decisions at all, but instead just put forward considerations to be 
taken into account in deliberation. Other proposals to make joint decisions (promises, requests, 
etc.) have the same exclusionary effect on deliberation once accepted, as I have pointed out 
before (see especially Ch. 2, §1.3). But the effect is more dramatic with demands and commands, 
because they enable one person to impose this exclusionary effect on another’s deliberation. 
 The distinction between commissive and enactive joint decisions applies to our other 
speech acts as well. I might promise you that I won’t read your diary, though I was already 
obligated not to do so: a commissive joint decision. Or, I might promise to read your draft by 
Tuesday, when I could just as well have promised to read it by Thursday, or not at all: an 
enactive joint decision. But this distinction has particular significance for proposals to make joint 
decisions concerning others’ actions by means of the propose-and-challenge method. For, as I 
have argued (Ch. 3, §3.3), there is a strong presumption against using propose-and-challenge to 
propose joint decisions concerning others’ actions. By doing so, you take control over your 
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addressee’s actions out of her hands and into your own. Since people should generally be given 
control over their own actions, this seizure of deliberative power requires justification. 
Ordinary language distinguishes between demands and commands, I suggest, because 
they represent two very answers to this call for justification. When our shared reasons require you 
to φ, then proposing that you φ by propose-and-challenge is easier to justify, since I am not so 
much imposing my will on yours as I am holding you to the reasons you already have. This is 
how demands are justified: by the strength of the reasons behind them. But if our shared reasons 
leave open the question of whether you will φ or ψ, then by using the propose-and-challenge 
method to propose that you φ rather than ψ, I do seem to be imposing my will on yours. Your 
only reason for φing rather than ψing is that I told you to do so. Out of all of the different types 
of deliberative proposals, proposing an enactive joint decision regarding someone else’s actions 
by propose-and-challenge – that is, making a command – appears to be the hardest to justify. 
This, I will suggest, is why we set up special institutions in which some people are explicitly 
granted the power to do so. 
The remainder of this chapter will be spent defending these analyses, starting with 
demands (§3) and then turning to commands (§4). 
 
3. Demands as proposals to make commissive joint decisions 
Here, again, is our proposed analysis of demands: 
The Deliberative Theory of Demands: For S to demand that A φ just is for S 
to propose to A, by means of the propose-and-challenge method, that they make a 
commissive joint decision to the effect that A will φ. 
I just argued that this analysis captures both the deliberation-closing force of demands and the 
fact that demands, unlike commands, aim not to provide new reasons to their addressees but 
instead to hold them to acting on the reasons they already have. In this section I will focus on the 
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conditions under which demands are warranted, arguing that the deliberative theory predicts our 
intuitive judgments about when we have standing to make demands of one another.11 
 
3.1. Giving decisive reason 
There is a strong presumption against employing the propose-and-challenge method for 
joint decisions regarding others’ actions. Demands override this presumption by appeal to the 
strength of the shared reasons in support of the action demanded. For a demand to be 
warranted, the shared reasons must decisively support the joint decision it proposes. This is built into 
the idea that demands propose commissive joint decisions. Our first task is thus to get clearer on 
what it means for a joint decision to be decisively supported by our shared reasons. 
Way back in Chapter 1 (§2), we discussed the conditions for a joint decision to be 
warranted. There we were interested in what it took for a joint decision to be permissible; here, we 
are interested in what it takes for a joint decision to be required. But permissibility and 
requirement are interdefinable: an action is required just in case no other action is permissible; 
an action is permissible just in case one is not required not to perform it. So, we can apply the 
lessons of our earlier discussion here. 
We are looking for the joint analogue of an individual’s having decisive reason to do 
something. So, we can begin by noting that I have decisive reason to φ only if my reasons support 
my φing determinately more than they support any other option. This motivates a corollary of 
                                                
11 The normative status I am interested in when I ask whether a demand or command is warranted is also called 
fittingness. A speech act or attitude is fitting in this sense just in case it meets its own internal standard of justification: 
an assertion that p is fitting only if you have adequate evidence for p; it is fitting to admire a person only if she is 
admirable. Crucially, a response can be fitting even if there are compelling practical reasons to avoid it. I have 
adequate evidence for plenty of assertions that I still should not make, since they would be tactless or irrelevant. 
Similarly, it is fitting in our sense for a slave to demand her freedom from her master, but it is all too likely that the 
slave should not make this demand, since doing so would only bring her more abuse. 
It is an important question what exactly the normative significance of these standards of fittingness is. (For 
discussion, see Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 2004). Without taking a position on that debate, however, we 
can recognize the difference between a response’s being fitting and its being advisable all-things-considered. When I 
talk about commands and demands being warranted, I am interested in the former status, not the latter. For stylistic 
reasons, however, I will mostly avoid the term ‘fitting’. Instead, I will say that one has standing to demand or 
command, that a demand or command is warranted or legitimate, or that one has the authority to make a demand or 
command. As I will use them, all of these phrases mean the same thing: that the demand or command is fitting. 
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SUFFICIENT SHARED REASON for the decisive case: a joint decision that you will φ is required only 
if our shared reasons support your φing determinately more than they support any other option. 
As before, however, this condition is not enough. Since our shared reasons are only a 
subset of my individual reasons, it could be that our shared reasons most support my φing when 
my individual reasons in total most support my not φing. For example, if you and I are running 
buddies, then our shared reasons might most support my going on a run with you, while in fact I 
ought to be working on my dissertation instead. If you were to demand that I go running with 
you, I could reasonably object on the grounds that I ought to be doing something else. For a joint 
decision to be required, then, it’s not enough for it to just be best by the lights of our shared 
reasons; it must also be the case that I ought, all things considered, to act in accordance with it. 
This was the point that motivated JOINT-INDIVIDUAL COHERENCE. The corollary here is: a joint 
decision that you will φ is required only if, conditional on the joint decision’s having been made, 
you have decisive reason, all things considered, to φ. 
 In Chapter 1, we ended the discussion here, leaving it as an open question whether 
satisfying both SUFFICIENT SHARED REASON and JOINT-INDIVIDUAL COHERENCE is enough to 
make a joint decision warranted. Now, however, I want to argue that the fact that a joint decision 
satisfies the analogues of these conditions we just stated is not enough to make it the case that it is 
required by our shared reasons. To see why, consider the following example: 
CONFERENCE: My friend Jane is attending a conference in my area of interest at her 
university. If I go, then I’ll get to see Jane. But the conference is several hours’ drive away, 
and another friend is giving a talk at my home university that same weekend. However, 
the conference also presents a unique opportunity to meet new people and hear new ideas 
in my area of research. Taking all of this into account, I ought to go to the conference. 
It is both the case that Jane and my shared reasons most favor my going to the conference and 
that, all things considered, I ought to go. And yet it seems clear that Jane could not legitimately 
demand that I come to the conference. 
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 Why? Because our shared reasons are not enough on their own to make it the case that I 
ought to go. Though we do have a significant shared reason in favor of my going to the 
conference (that doing so will allow us to spend time together), this reason alone is not enough to 
outweigh all of my reasons against going to the conference, such as the fact that it conflicts with 
my other friend’s talk. These considerations are only outweighed when I take into account 
reasons Jane and I do not share, such as the fact that attending will enrich my research. And so, if 
Jane were to propose to jointly decide that I will go to the conference, this would be asking me to 
make the right decision, but for the wrong reasons. 
 For our shared reasons to require the joint decision that I φ, then, it is not enough for it to 
be the case both that I ought to φ, all things considered, and that my φing is most supported by 
our shared reasons. Instead, I want to suggest, it must be that I ought to φ because of our shared 
reasons. In other words, our shared reasons must give me decisive reason to φ: 
GIVING DECISIVE REASON: 
For any persons X, Y, Z, et al., and action φ, 
(i) The joint decision that X will φ is required by the shared reasons of X, Y, 
Z, et al. iff those shared reasons give X decisive reason to φ. 
(ii) The reasons X shares with Y, Z, et al. give X decisive reason to φ iffDef  these 
reasons, given only the weight they have as shared reasons, weigh in favor 
of X’s φing determinately more than all of X’s reasons against φing weigh 
against it. 
The relation of giving decisive reason defined here is analogous to the relation an action has to a 
person’s individual reasons for action when she ought to do it. My individual reasons require me 
to φ just in case the reasons I have in favor of φing are enough to decisively outweigh all of my 
reasons against φing. Similarly, our shared reasons require me to φ just in case the shared reasons 
I have in favor of φing are enough to decisively outweigh all of my reasons against φing: that is, 
just in case our shared reasons give me decisive reason to φ. This is the condition that fails to obtain in 
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CONFERENCE; and, as we shall now see, it is the condition that is met in the cases where we 
intuitively take demands to be warranted.12 
 
3.2. Who has standing to demand? 
 Our intuitions about standing to demand divide cases into three categories. 
 In what I call everybody’s business cases, everyone has standing to demand that I perform 
some action. SAND CASTLE is a case of this kind: anyone who came across me destroying this 
poor child’s sand castle could legitimately demand that I stop. Any action that is sufficiently 
horrible falls in this category: anyone can demand that I not deface the Mona Lisa, punch a 
stranger in the face, dump poison into the Pacific, or yell ‘Fire!’ in a crowded theatre. 
 On the other end of the spectrum are what I call nobody’s business cases: cases where I ought 
to perform some action, but nobody has the standing to demand it of me. (I mentioned these 
cases briefly in §1.2.1). I ought to go to the gym, read Anna Karenina, and learn how to cook 
risotto, but nobody can reasonably demand that I do these things (cf. Baier 1966: 221; Gibbard 
1990: 41). You can certainly advise me to read Anna Karenina, but to demand that I do so would be 
unreasonable (not to mention strange). This does not mean that no one could ever demand that I 
perform these actions: if I am being sufficiently self-destructive, then my loved ones might 
legitimately demand that I take better care of myself – and if that means going to the gym, then 
so be it. But it is overwhelmingly plausible that there are some cases where I ought to do some 
action that will make me healthier or happier, but nobody can demand that I do it. 
 I think there is also an intermediate kind of case: cases in which somebody has the 
standing to demand that I φ, but others do not have this standing. Call these somebody’s business 
cases. Here’s one such case, adapted from an example in Chapter 2 (§2.2): 
                                                
12 Even when the condition of GIVING DECISIVE REASON is met, it may still be more socially appropriate to make a 
request rather than a demand. For instance, if the speaker is uncertain whether the shared reasons give her addressee 
decisive reason to φ, then even if they do, it is more appropriate for the speaker to request that the addressee φ rather 
than demanding that she do so. I elaborate on these differences in social appropriateness at length in Ch. 3, §3.3. 
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DISHES: My partner Dee Dee has done much more than her share of cleaning in 
our apartment lately, and our sink is full of dirty dishes. She’s asked me to wash 
the dishes several times and I have ignored her requests. Fed up, Dee Dee 
demands: “Brendan, wash the dishes!” 
Compare our neighbor George. George has overheard Dee Dee griping over the 
phone about my laziness in the kitchen, and so has all of the information he needs 
to judge that I ought to wash the dishes. While visiting, George turns to me and 
demands: “Brendan, wash the dishes!” 
Intuitively, Dee Dee’s demand is perfectly legitimate, while George’s demand is out of place. 
George is in a position to advise me to wash the dishes, but to demand that I do so is to overstep 
his authority. Whether I wash the dishes or not is none of his business. 
Of course, some of the obligations I owe to Dee Dee are George’s business: if George saw 
me physically assaulting Dee Dee, he (and anyone else) could legitimately demand that I stop. 
The point is just that there are some situations in which I ought to do something, and someone 
can demand that I do so, but nobody else has standing to make that demand. The members of 
my choir can demand that I come to our rehearsal, while others, intuitively, cannot. My 
department colleagues have the standing to demand that I do my share of committee work; but 
intuitively, no one else has the standing to demand this of me. 
What determines how we sort cases into these three categories? The first answer that 
comes to mind is what I call the interest account: X has standing to demand that Y φ just in case X’s 
interests would be sufficiently harmed by Y’s failing to φ. This account is most appealing when 
we consider nobody’s business and somebody’s business cases. Nobody has standing to demand 
that I go to the gym because nobody else’s interests would be significantly harmed by my failing 
to do so: only my interests are at stake. Dee Dee has standing to demand that I wash the dishes 
because her interests are harmed by my failing to do so; our neighbor George’s interests, in 
contrast, do not significantly depend on whether I wash the dishes. The interest account explains 
these cases easily. 
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 However, the interest account has a difficult time making sense of everybody’s business 
cases. If everybody has standing to demand that I φ, then according to the interest account, this 
must be because everybody’s interests would be harmed by my failing to φ. This may be a correct 
description of some cases: perhaps dumping poison in the ocean harms everyone’s interests, since 
everyone has an interest in sustaining the natural environment. But consider SAND CASTLE. The 
interest account must say that you have standing to demand that I not destroy the child’s sand 
castle because your interests are harmed by my doing so. First, it is not obvious that this is the 
case: are the interests of every person harmed every time a significant wrong is done? But even if we 
grant this strong claim, the interest account seems to give the wrong explanation of your standing 
to demand. You can legitimately demand that I stop destroying the child’s sand castle because I 
am harming the child, not because I am harming you.13 
 This problem with the interest account motivates the alternative view offered by the 
deliberative theory. The idea is to shift our focus from interests to reasons. Though the interests 
underlying my obligation not to destroy the child’s sand castle are the child’s alone, the reasons 
why I should not destroy the sand castle are in an important sense everyone’s reasons. I shouldn’t 
destroy the sand castle because doing so causes the child pain, and everyone has just as much 
reason to care about the child’s pain as I do. This is why everyone has standing to demand that I 
not destroy the sand castle: because the reasons why I shouldn’t do so are shared by all persons. 
 Extending this idea, we can predict when everybody’s business cases will arise: everybody 
has standing to demand that I φ when the reasons that I share with all morally competent 
persons give me decisive reason to φ. Thus everybody’s business cases will arise when we ought to 
do something due to general, universal moral reasons that apply to us just by virtue of being 
persons. This seems to fit our intuitive judgments: anyone can demand that I not harm innocent 
                                                
13 Hart (1955: 180-181) also criticizes the interest account, though on a different basis. 
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people, that I not dump poison in the ocean, that I not deface objects of beauty – and these are 
just the kinds of action that are supported by the reasons all persons share.14 
 The deliberative theory predicts that somebody’s business cases will arise when the 
reasons why we ought to do something are shared with some people but not others. In DISHES, 
Dee Dee has standing to demand that I wash the dishes because she shares the reasons that 
support my doing so. The fact that washing the dishes will make our apartment tidier is a reason 
for both Dee Dee and me to prefer that I wash the dishes. Since this shared reason is strong 
enough to outweigh the reasons I have against washing the dishes (e.g., that it is a tedious task), it 
gives me decisive reason to do so. In contrast, our neighbor George has much less reason to care 
about the cleanliness of our apartment. George might have some reason to prefer that our 
apartment is clean – say, out of concern for our welfare. But his reason to prefer this is much 
weaker than mine. Applying the UNANIMITY constraint on shared reasons I defended in Chapter 
1 (§1.2), we can infer that our shared reason in favor of my washing the dishes will be no stronger 
than George’s reason to prefer that I do so. So, the reasons I share with George in favor of my 
washing the dishes will be fairly weak: too weak to outweigh the reasons I have against doing so. 
Thus the deliberative theory correctly predicts that Dee Dee has the standing to demand that I 
wash the dishes, while George does not. 
 Finally, the deliberative theory predicts that nobody’s business cases will arise when the 
reasons why we ought to do something are not shared to a significant extent with anyone else. 
For example, I have much stronger reason to care about my physical health and career success 
than anyone else does. So, actions I ought to perform on the basis of these self-regarding reasons 
– going to the gym, working on this dissertation – are supported by reasons that are in an 
                                                
14 Some theories of reasons for action – e.g., rational egoism, or ‘internalist’ views that hold that an agent’s reasons 
depend closely on her desires – may deny that there are any reasons that all persons share. Adherents of these 
theories might deny, for instance, that everyone has reason to prefer that I not harm an innocent stranger: because 
not everyone’s welfare depends on the stranger’s (egoism), or because some people simply do not care about the well-
being of strangers (internalism). These claims are compatible with the deliberative theory in principle. But the 
deliberative theory does entail that, if there are no universally shared reasons, then there are no cases in which 
everyone has standing to demand that one perform an action. So, the deliberative theory is committed to denying 
‘hybrid’ views that are internalist about reasons for action but externalist about moral demands (i.e., allowing that 
one might legitimately demand something that one’s addressee has no reason to do). Thanks to Kieran Setiya here. 
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important sense shared by no one else. Of course, others have some reason to care about my 
health and career success, but their reasons will be much weaker than mine. Applying 
UNANIMITY again, our shared reasons in favor of my going to the gym can be no stronger than 
the relevant other person’s reason to prefer that I do so. As a result, the reasons I share with 
other people will usually not be weighty enough to outweigh the reasons I have against doing 
these actions – the time required to go to the gym, the difficulty of writing philosophy. This is 
why, though I ought to go to the gym and work on this dissertation, nobody else can demand 
that I do so: the reasons at stake are mine and mine alone. 
By thinking about what reasons we share, then, we can understand when and why others 
have standing to make demands of us. In its emphasis on shared reasons as the basis of demands, 
the deliberative theory resonates with Stephen Darwall’s account of demands (2006; see §1.2.2 
above). One of Darwall’s central theses is what he calls ‘Pufendorf’s Point’: “In holding people 
responsible, we are committed to the assumption that they can hold themselves responsible by 
self-addressed demands from a perspective that we and they share” (112).15 As I understand it, 
Pufendorf’s Point is vindicated by the deliberative theory. The “perspective that we and they 
share” is just the perspective we take up in joint practical deliberation: the perspective of our 
shared reasons. When you demand that I φ, you are committed to thinking that the reasons we 
share within this perspective are enough, on their own, to outweigh all of my reasons against φing 
(by GIVING DECISIVE REASON). Thus you must think that I can require myself to φ on the basis of 
our shared reasons. Thus we arrive at Darwall’s insight: we have standing to make a demand 
only when our addressee can make the very same demand of herself from the deliberative 
perspective that we share. I have argued that appreciating this fact enables us to predict and 
explain the contours of our standing to make demands of each other.16 
                                                
15 See also Wallace (2013): “The very considerations that give me reason to care about doing the right thing … 
equally ground corresponding claims and expectations on the part of those who are affected by what I do” (30). 
16 As Darwall’s work has shown, demands are closely tied up with the concept of obligation. This suggests that the 
deliberative theory of demands might be applied to better understand the notion of obligation. In other work I 
explore this possibility, arguing that the normative status of obligation can and should be analyzed in terms of shared 
reasons (de Kenessey ms). On the view I defend there, for X to be obligated to φ just is for the reasons that X shares 
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4. Commands as proposals to make enactive joint decisions 
We turn to the deliberative theory of commands: 
The Deliberative Theory of Commands: For S to command A to φ just is 
for S to propose to A, by means of the propose-and-challenge method, that they 
make an enactive joint decision to the effect that A will φ. 
I will start by showing how the deliberative theory captures commands’ reason-giving force 
(§4.1), and then turn to the question of what it takes to have the authority to command (§4.2, 4.3). 
I conclude by comparing the deliberative theory to Joseph Raz’s account of hierarchical 
authority (§4.4). 
 
4.1. The normative force of commands 
When the sergeant commands Johnson to drop and give her fifty, Johnson gains a strong 
reason to do push-ups that he did not have before. When the head chef orders the sous chef to 
chop the onions, the sous chef is now obligated to chop the onions, when before it would have 
been fine to carry on stirring the soup instead. While demands hold people to the obligations they 
already had, commands create obligations where none existed. How do they do this? 
On the deliberative theory, commands create new obligations by bringing new joint 
decisions into force. A basic premise of the deliberative theory (defended in Ch. 2, §1.1) is that we 
have strong pro tanto reason to abide by our standing joint decisions. Thus, when the sergeant 
commands Johnson to do fifty push-ups, this brings into force a joint decision to the effect that he 
will do so. Since Johnson has reason to act in accordance with his standing joint decisions, he 
now has reason to get on the floor and start doing push-ups. 
Demands, too, bring new joint decisions into force, and thereby create new reasons for 
their addressees. However, because demands propose commissive joint decisions, the reasons 
                                                                                                                                                       
with some other person(s) to give X decisive reason to φ. Though I cannot defend this proposal here, it illustrates 
how the theory of joint practical deliberation offered in Chapter 1 might be productively applied to phenomena 
beyond the speech acts that are the subject of this dissertation. 
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they create are almost always superfluous. In SAND CASTLE, I have decisive reason to stop 
stomping on the child’s sand castle before you demand that I do. So, though your demand gives 
me an additional reason to stop, this makes no difference to what I ought to do. 
Commands’ reason-giving force is more salient because they propose enactive joint 
decisions. A command picks out one among multiple shared options that are on a par and 
proposes to jointly decide on that option. When this joint decision comes into force, it tips the 
balance, giving the addressee decisive reason to do the commanded action rather than the 
previously equipoised alternatives. Before the sergeant made her command, Johnson was 
permitted to either continue eating lunch or to do push-ups. The two actions were on a par as far 
as their shared reasons were concerned (even if Johnson would prefer to keep eating). But once 
the sergeant commands Johnson to do fifty push-ups, the enactive joint decision her command 
brings into force tips the balance. Now, Johnson is required to do push-ups, and no longer 
permitted to continue eating his lunch instead. Such is the power of an enactive joint decision. 
The deliberative theory explains not only the fact that commands create reasons, but also 
the pattern of reasons they create. The obligation to obey a command has a set of features that 
should be familiar from our discussions of promises, offers, agreements, and requests. 
First, the reason commands give is strong but overridable. A legitimate command usually 
obligates its addressee to obey, but if unusual circumstances arise, it can be permissible to disobey 
it. For example, the sous chef should not obey the head chef’s command to chop the onions if she 
discovers that the onions are infused with poison. This is as we should expect: we have a strong 
reason to abide by our joint decisions, but this reason can be outweighed by other considerations. 
Second, the obligation created by commands is directed: the addressee owes it to the 
speaker in particular to obey them. If Johnson refuses to do push-ups, the sergeant has special 
standing to complain. If the sous chef leaves the onions unchopped, he wrongs the head chef by 
doing so.17 The deliberative theory predicts this as well. My obligation to abide by our joint 
                                                
17 This feature of commands is emphasized by Darwall (2013a), who objects to Raz’s account of authority on the 
basis that it cannot explain how commands generate directed obligations. 
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decision is owed to you in particular: you have a special stake in our joint decision-making, and 
you have the authority to reiterate any joint decision standing between us by demanding that I 
comply with it (see Ch. 2, §1.2). 
Third, commands require uptake. I cannot issue a command to an empty room and hope 
to bind you by doing so. Commands do not need to be explicitly accepted by their addressees like 
offers and requests do. Instead, like promises, all they require is that their addressees recognize 
them and do not raise any successful challenges to them.18 These are just the conditions required 
for a joint decision to come into effect by means of the propose-and-challenge method. 
Fourth, as we have noted, commands close deliberative questions. Once the head chef 
commands the sous chef to chop the onions, he should not treat the question of whether to chop 
the onions as open for further deliberation. It would be inappropriate for him to seriously 
consider stirring the soup instead. He should take it as decided that he will chop the onions, 
excluding other options from his subsequent deliberation. This is just what the deliberative 
theory predicts: these exclusionary effects are the characteristic upshot of making a decision, 
whether that decision is individually or jointly made. 
Fifth, the speaker has the power to release the addressee from a command after it comes 
into force. Say that, as the sous chef picks up his knife to start chopping onions, the head chef 
says, “Actually, Cora can chop the onions instead – you can go back to what you were doing.” 
The head chef has thereby released the sous chef from his obligation to chop the onions. On the 
deliberative theory, this power of release works by retracting the joint decision the initial command 
brought into force. Both the head chef and the sous chef can propose the joint decision’s 
retraction, but for reasons reviewed in Chapter 2 (§1.5), only the head chef has the power to do 
so using propose-and-challenge. 
                                                
18 You might be thinking that, unlike promises, commands are not open to challenge by their addressees at all. I 
address this worry in §4.3 below. 
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Finally, following the pattern of our other speech acts, we should expect commands to be 
invalidated by coercion and deception. I think that our intuitive judgments bear this prediction 
out – though it takes a bit more elaboration to see. 
Begin with coercion. The claim that coercion invalidates commands is initially surprising, 
since many paradigm commands are backed by threats of what will happen if they are not 
obeyed. If the sous chef does not obey the head chef, he can be fired; if Johnson doesn’t obey the 
sergeant, he could be court martialed. But recall from earlier that legitimate threats do not 
invalidate promises, since they can be made in good faith (Ch. 2, §2.2). Only illegitimate threats – 
i.e. those that it would be wrong to carry out – have an invalidating effect. Since the head chef 
can legitimately fire the sous chef for disobedience, and Johnson can be legitimately court 
martialed for insubordination, the deliberative theory does not predict that these threats will 
invalidate the commands they back. 
Instead, the deliberative theory predicts that commands will be invalid when they are 
backed by illegitimate threats. And this seems intuitively correct: 
VIOLENT CHEF: The head chef says to her sous chef, “Chop the onions! I’ll punch you in 
the face if you don’t!” 
BLACKMAILING SERGEANT: The sergeant steals embarrassing photos from Johnson’s 
personal computer. She then commands Johnson to do her tedious paperwork for her, 
threatening to post Johnson’s embarrassing photos online if he doesn’t. 
These commands lack any semblance of authority. If the sous chef or Johnson were to disobey, 
this would not be wrong, even if it would be imprudent. And notably, these commands could have 
been authoritative if they hadn’t been backed by illegitimate threats. The head chef clearly has 
the authority to order the sous chef to chop onions, and we can certainly imagine a case in which 
the sergeant could order one of her soldiers to do her paperwork for her. By making an 
illegitimate threat, our speakers deprive themselves of the authority they would otherwise have. 
 Moving to deception: intuitively, authorities do not have to reveal all of the considerations 
on the basis of which they make their commands. A person in authority can sometimes 
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legitimately keep secrets from her subjects, even when those secrets are essential to the rationale 
behind her commands. What the deliberative theory requires, however, is that the authority 
make her commands in good faith, commanding only actions that she believes to be warranted 
by the reasons she shares with her subjects. Thus we can predict that deception will invalidate a 
command when it conceals a truth that shows the command to be unwarranted, thereby 
demonstrating bad faith. This seems intuitively correct; consider 
JEALOUS CHEF: The head chef feels threatened by the talents of her sous chef. So, she 
hatches a plot to get the sous chef fired: she commands him to garnish the soup of a 
famous critic with cilantro. The head chef knows, while her sous chef does not, that the 
critic loathes cilantro; since the soup will be blamed on her sous chef, he will bear the 
brunt of the critic’s fury. 
CORRUPT SERGEANT: The sergeant orders an attack on an enemy outpost. In fact, the 
sergeant knows that the attack serves no strategic purpose, and involves substantial risk to 
her soldiers’ lives. She commands the attack only because she plans to run for political 
office when she returns home, and knows that the attack will make her appear tough and 
decisive to voters. 
In my view, neither of these commands seems authoritative. If the sous chef were to discover the 
head chef’s deception, he should feel no compunction about disobeying her. And if the soldiers 
discover the sergeant’s true motives, they should refuse to obey her command to attack the 
outpost. These commands are not merely overridden by other considerations; instead, the 
speaker’s duplicity robs them of any normative force at all. 
 Thus commands too are subject to the requirements of deliberative good faith. When a 
command is made in bad faith – whether because it is backed by an illegitimate threat or because 
the speaker is concealing information that shows it to be unwarranted – it fails to create any 
obligation for its subject to obey. This is why commands, like the other speech acts we have seen, 
are invalidated by certain forms of coercion and deception. 
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It is telling how similar the obligation to obey a command is to the obligations generated 
by promises, offers, agreements, and requests. The deliberative theory predicts this. These 
obligations’ common features derive from their shared source: our reason to abide by our joint 
decisions. It is hard to see how else we might explain why commands share so many features with 
such seemingly distant speech acts. 
 
4.2. The conditions of hierarchical authority 
We begin, again, with the presumption against using propose-and-challenge for joint 
decisions concerning others’ actions (Ch. 3, §3.3). Demands overcome this presumption by 
appeal to the weight of the shared reasons behind them. Commands require a different sort of 
justification. Commands propose enactive joint decisions: decisions to perform one out of several 
actions that are on a par. They cannot be justified by the strength of the reasons behind the 
action they propose, for no particular enactive decision is required by one’s reasons. 
For this reason, the asymmetrical power dynamic of propose-and-challenge is far more 
salient for commands than it is for demands. When I demand that you fulfill your obligations, it 
is as if I am speaking on behalf of our shared reasons. What I will is beside the point; our shared 
reasons (which are your reasons too) already require the action I am demanding. But when I 
make a command, I actively impose my will on your actions. Our shared reasons don’t tell you 
what to do, so I tell you what to do instead. The choice of propose-and-challenge over propose-
and-ratify here cries out for justification: if our shared reasons don’t care whether you φ or ψ, 
then why don’t I leave it up to you to decide which to do? 
Sometimes this question has a good answer.19 Consider 
                                                
19 The extant literature on hierarchical authority is overwhelmingly focused on the authority of law and the state. In 
contrast, I will not discuss the authority of governments at all, focusing instead on cases where particular individuals 
have authority to command a small number of other individuals. This is simply because addressing the authority of 
the state would require answering questions that would take us too far afield: what the state is, what it takes for states 
to be legitimate, whether the law should be understood as a set of commands, and so on. I hope to extend the theory 
presented here to the authority of the state in future work. 
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EARTHQUAKE: Disaster strikes. An earthquake hits our small town, and a school building 
collapses before the students can evacuate. We, a group of concerned neighbors, rush to 
the scene. The official rescue teams are far away, so we start trying to help. There are 
many jobs to be done, and they need to be done quickly. At first our group works 
haphazardly, but it quickly becomes clear that we need to coordinate. So one member of 
the group, Anna, starts giving orders: “You, in the green shirt! Go to the pharmacy down 
the street and get medical supplies. You two, in the red and blue, search the front of the 
school for survivors; the rest of you search the back. Bert, call 911 and ask when the 
rescue team will get here…” Relieved, we all start obeying Anna’s commands. 
Anna occupies no official position of authority. Before she started giving orders, she was just 
another concerned neighbor. And the joint decisions she is proposing are enactive: though we all 
have decisive reason to be helping in some way, there’s no significant reason why we ought to 
divide up the tasks one way rather than another. (Bert could just as well have gone to the 
pharmacy while the green shirt called 911). Yet Anna’s use of propose-and-challenge in this case 
– her giving orders rather than making requests – is clearly appropriate. Why? 
The situation in EARTHQUAKE has many of the general features that justify the use of 
propose-and-challenge. First, there is urgency: we need to decide what to do quickly, since lives are 
at stake and time is of the essence. Second, there is a need for decisiveness: the cost of not acting is 
high, so we want the barriers to decision-making to be as minimal as possible. These factors both 
favor using the propose-and-challenge method. Propose-and-challenge is quick, since it does not 
require explicit ratification for a decision to go through, and decisive, as it errs on the side of 
accepting proposed decisions. 
Here, the asymmetric power dynamic of propose-and-challenge is a boon as well. We 
need to coordinate our actions to be fully effective. We need a coherent joint plan that gives each of 
us specific roles and tasks to fulfill. But if we tried to agree on this plan by unanimous vote, for 
example, there would be too many proposals and opinions. After spending precious time arguing 
about how best to divide up our actions, we would likely arrive at a patchwork, disunified plan 
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that takes pieces from each of our proposals. A plan formulated by any one of us alone would 
likely have been better, simply because it would provide a coherent vision. So we ought to give a 
single person (Anna, in this case) the power to make a plan on her own and propose that plan in 
a way that makes it difficult to block. By putting the deliberative power in a single person’s hands, 
the propose-and-challenge method facilitates efficient and coordinated joint action. 
We can only reap these benefits if Anna alone is allowed to propose joint plans using 
propose-and-challenge. Imagine that Bert starts barking orders that are incompatible with 
Anna’s. Confusion would ensue – whose plan are we supposed to follow? If our joint plan is to 
reflect a single person’s coherent vision, then we need to give a single person the final say over 
what that plan is. This is why, once it becomes common ground that Anna is the person giving 
orders, it would be inappropriate for anyone else to start giving orders as well. 
Thus the situation in EARTHQUAKE justifies our allowing Anna, and only Anna, to 
propose enactive decisions regarding our actions by means of the propose-and-challenge method. 
On the deliberative theory, to give Anna this deliberative power just is to give her the authority to 
command. So, the deliberative theory predicts that the situation in EARTHQUAKE is exactly the 
sort of situation that justifies giving someone hierarchical authority: a situation in which we need 
to coordinate our actions quickly and decisively under a single coherent plan. 
Most hierarchical authority is not ad hoc in the way that Anna’s authority is. Instead, most 
people with hierarchical authority occupy institutional roles that grant them this authority. How 
do we extend the deliberative theory to these institutional contexts? 
The first step is to notice that the benefits of propose-and-challenge can apply to longer-
term projects as well. Suppose we are building a skyscraper. Here we also have reason to follow a 
single person’s coherent vision rather than designing by committee. (After all, we need the 
skyscraper to literally hang together). Thus we should allow a single architect to propose the 
building’s design using the propose-and-challenge method. For the skyscraper to really represent 
the architect’s vision, however, she will need to be able to use the propose-and-challenge method 
for the whole duration of the building process. But there is no prior guarantee that the architect 
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will have sufficient justification to use propose-and-challenge in every case. Perhaps sometimes 
we will think that we need to deliberate more carefully, and so will opt for propose-and-ratify. 
Perhaps one of us will disagree with the architect at some point and will start proposing 
alternative designs using propose-and-challenge. 
If these possibilities are on the table, the architect’s control over the skyscraper will be too 
fragile. When she is drafting her initial plans, for example, she will not be able to defer certain 
decisions of detail to later – since for all she knows, she may not be given the authority to make 
the decision later. If our architect is required to justify her use of propose-and-challenge on a 
case-by-case basis, she will not be able to fully execute her plan. To ensure that our skyscraper is 
based on a coherent design, then, we should agree beforehand that the architect will have the 
exclusive ability to employ propose-and-challenge for decisions regarding the building design for 
the duration of the project. This agreement gives the architect the assurance of long-term control 
she needs to plan and execute her vision. 
Often, then, we will best harness the benefits of propose-and-challenge by making an 
explicit agreement to the effect that one person has the exclusive ability to use the propose-and-
challenge method to propose enactive joint decisions within a delimited domain. When we make 
such an agreement, we thereby create an institutional role, such as the role of architect, and 
endow it with hierarchical authority. The person occupying this role can then formulate and 
execute the kind of ongoing plans that are only possible because she knows that she will continue 
to be in charge. By obeying her commands, we can coordinate our actions over the long term 
and accomplish things that would not be possible under a different, less hierarchical decision-
making procedure. 
Thus, I claim, a person can come to have hierarchical authority in one of two ways. First, 
as in EARTHQUAKE, a situation may provide us with strong reason to allow one (and only one) 
person to propose enactive joint plans using propose-and-challenge. Such reasons include a need 
for quick and decisive planning and a need for coordination. In such cases, whoever speaks up 
first comes to have authority, since it matters less who gives the orders than that orders are given. 
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In this first kind of case, the speaker’s authority isn’t based in any explicit contract or agreement, 
but instead is justified directly by the nature of the situation. 
Second, as in the skyscraper example, we may explicitly agree beforehand to allow one 
(and only one) person to propose joint plans using propose-and-challenge within a certain 
domain. Such an agreement gives the relevant person the authority to command regardless of 
whether the reasons supporting the use of propose-and-challenge (urgency, decisiveness, 
coordination, etc.) apply in a particular case. I submit that the authority held by people who 
occupy institutional roles such as architect, head chef, sergeant, or conductor is based in 
agreements of this kind. These agreements are usually written into the rules or laws governing 
the institution: the contract by which the architect or chef is hired, the military code, the 
institutional norms of a university or orchestra, and so on. 
These predictions of the deliberative theory match our intuitive judgments and everyday 
practice. Rarely is a person given the authority to issue commands without occupying a role 
within some explicit hierarchy, but when they are, it seems to be in exceptional situations like 
EARTHQUAKE where there is a clear and present need for someone to take control and 
coordinate action. Institutional hierarchies are also commonly justified in the way I have 
suggested. We have head chefs because the restaurant needs a coherent menu; we have sergeants 
and generals because armies need efficient and decisive direction; we have conductors because 
orchestras would sound awful if everyone played at the tempo of their choice. These reasons 
justify making a standing agreement to give a single person the right to propose enactive joint 
decisions using the propose-and-challenge method. 
 
4.3. Does propose-and-challenge give enough authority? 
The first objection to the deliberative theory of commands that occurs to most people is 
that it is not hierarchical enough. When the sergeant orders Johnson to drop and give her fifty in 
PUSH-UPS, she does not seem to be proposing a joint decision. If it were a joint decision, Johnson 
would have some say in it. But intuitively, Johnson has no say in the matter. Once the sergeant 
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gives the command, Johnson has to obey whether he likes it or not. Isn’t this flatly at odds with 
the deliberative theory? No – as I now argue. 
My first point is methodological. The activity of joint practical deliberation described in 
Chapter 1 includes, but is not limited to, the activities we call ‘joint decision-making’ in ordinary 
English. When we pay attention to the basic structure of joint practical deliberation, we come to 
see that joint decision-making is a more flexible and pervasive activity than we normally 
recognize. Thus I have argued that we should expand our conception of joint decision-making to 
include many things we do not ordinarily describe as such, such as joint decisions made by the 
propose-and-challenge method. Nothing in the structure of joint practical deliberation precludes 
our extending the theory in these ways, and when we do so, we find that we can illuminate 
phenomena that were otherwise puzzling. These theoretical fruits give us good reason to think we 
were right to adopt a more expansive conception of joint deliberation. 
What this means is that our intuitive judgments about what to call a ‘joint decision’, or 
what interactions are naturally described as ‘joint decision-making,’ are not a reliable guide to 
what falls under the scope of joint practical deliberation as I have argued we should understand 
it. These direct intuitions of jointness are not a fair test of the deliberative theory. So, we should 
not dismiss the deliberative theory of commands just because it sounds odd to describe 
commands as proposing joint decisions. What matters is not how we describe commands, but 
whether the deliberative theory adequately captures their properties. The way to test the 
deliberative theory, instead, is to compare the predictions it makes about commands with the 
normative and communicative features we take this speech act to have. 
So the question we should be asking is: does someone with the standing to propose 
enactive joint decisions regarding others’ actions by the propose-and-challenge method have the 
same kind of authority as someone with the standing to issue commands? Or does the authority 
to command have features that are not shared by the authority to use propose-and-challenge? 
With this methodology in mind, let’s compare the authority given by propose-and-
challenge with the authority to command. The first notable feature of propose-and-challenge is 
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its initial default: if a propose-and-challenge proposal is made and then nothing else is said, the 
proposed joint decision comes into force automatically (Ch. 1, §3.1). This feature of propose-and-
challenge is clearly shared by commands. After the sergeant commands Johnson to do fifty push-
ups, she need not wait for his explicit acceptance: so long as he does not object, the command 
immediately comes into force. 
But the deliberative theory does predict that Johnson could object. Propose-and-challenge 
proposals can be challenged. Here there might seem to be a disanalogy with commands. If 
Johnson were to object to the sergeant’s command, saying, “But Sarge, I’m eating!” this would 
be way out of line. It might even get Johnson punished for insubordination. Commands thus do 
not seem to be open to challenge in the way that the deliberative theory predicts them to be. 
However, there are some situations where a command can be legitimately challenged. 
Suppose that Johnson and the sergeant are outdoors. Just as the sergeant barks, “Drop and give 
me fifty!” Johnson spots the enemy’s planes on the horizon. Johnson could then legitimately say: 
“But Sarge, look: enemy planes incoming!” This challenge seems perfectly legitimate. Far from 
being insubordinate, Johnson is fulfilling his duties as a soldier by alerting the sergeant to an 
attack. So, it does not appear that commands are closed to challenges completely, but rather that 
challenges to them must meet a fairly high bar. 
The deliberative theory can explain why this is so. The very considerations that justify 
giving someone the authority to use propose-and-challenge over others also count against raising 
challenges to their proposals unless absolutely necessary. As I argued in the previous section, it 
makes sense to give someone the authority to use propose-and-challenge when we need our joint 
decisions to be quick, decisive (i.e. favoring action over omission), coherent, and coordinated. 
These same considerations give us reason to avoid challenging the proposals of the person in 
authority: raising a challenge will slow us down, forestalling action and complicating the plan 
that is meant to coordinate our actions. In an institution such as the military where quick, 
decisive, and coordinated action is essential, we should expect there to be strong norms 
discouraging challenges to the decisions of those in authority. To justify challenging a command, 
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then, one must have something important to say – such as that there are enemy planes on the 
horizon. To challenge a command with insufficient justification is to disregard the importance of 
the considerations that justify the commander’s authority in the first place. This is why Johnson 
could be punished for raising a trivial challenge like “But Sarge, I’m eating!” 
The truth, then, is not that commands cannot be challenged, but that to challenge a 
command, one needs good reason to do so. Not just any objection will do. And this is just what 
the deliberative theory would lead us to expect, given the kind of situations in which we grant 
people hierarchical authority. 
The final relevant feature of propose-and-challenge what we earlier called its final default 
(Ch. 1, §3.1). In propose-and-challenge, if there is disagreement between the speaker and the 
addressee(s) over whether to accept a proposed joint decision, this disagreement is resolved by 
default in favor of the proposal, bringing it into force. This is the most important way in which 
propose-and-challenge gives the speaker deliberative power. It means that, if the speaker is 
unconvinced in good faith by an addressee’s challenges, then her proposed joint decision will go 
through whether the addressee likes it or not. In short, the speaker has the last word over 
whether the proposal is accepted: if she stands by her proposal, it will come into effect. 
This fits commands nicely. Whatever objections Johnson may raise, the sergeant can 
respond, “That’s final” or, “That’s an order.” And if she says this, then there really is nothing 
Johnson can do to prevent her command from coming into force. This is the truth behind the 
thought that Johnson has ‘no say’ regarding the sergeant’s command. It’s not that he has no say – 
he can challenge the command – but he does not have the final say. Ultimately, it is up to the 
sergeant to decide whether the joint decision her command proposes will come into force. 
 While giving the speaker the last word in this way matches our everyday practice with 
commands, you might worry that it undermines the idea that propose-and-challenge is aptly 
described as making joint decisions. If the sergeant can bulldoze over any of Johnson’s objections, 
then can we really say that the result of her command is a decision she made jointly with Johnson? 
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 Yes, for two reasons. First, Johnson still has a role to play, even if he has less deliberative 
power than the sergeant. He is given an opportunity to evaluate the command and raise any 
challenges he thinks sufficiently serious to be worth bringing up. Second, and more importantly, 
the sergeant’s commands must be based upon, and constrained by, the reasons she shares with 
Johnson. In other words, the sergeant must hold her commands accountable to the norms that 
apply to joint decisions. To deliberate in good faith, the sergeant must make only commands that 
she believes to be warranted by the reasons she and Johnson share. And if Johnson does 
challenge her command, the sergeant has to take his challenge seriously. If she judges that 
Johnson’s challenge shows the joint decision proposed by her command to be unwarranted, she 
must retract it. These requirements of good faith distinguish the authority to command from the 
brute imposition of one’s will by force: the authority to command is a kind of power over the 
process of joint deliberation, and so is subject to the norms of this activity. 
On reflection, we seem to hold authorities accountable to the requirements of good faith. 
People in positions of authority are expected to exercise their authority in the service of the 
purposes for which the authority was given – i.e., the reason-giving projects they share with their 
subordinates. When authorities violate this norm, exercising their powers to serve their own 
personal whims or interests, we take this to undermine their claim to authority. We have already 
seen this in the cases of coercive and deceptive commands we considered in §4.1: the fact that 
these commands were made in bad faith robs them of their normative force. More generally, 
when we find out that a person in authority is abusing their office for personal gain, neglecting 
the duties that they were put in power to perform, our response is to cease respecting that 
person’s claim to authority altogether. We will not hesitate to disobey their commands. 
Thus the deliberative theory helps us to explain why we take corruption to undermine a 
person’s claim to authority: because it shows they are not exercising that authority in good faith. 
Contrast an authority who makes commands in good faith, but has poor judgment. When an 
authority makes misguided commands, we might think that she should be taken out of the 
position of authority, but so long as she remains in this position, we still feel bound to obey her 
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commands. Corruption invalidates authority in a way that mere mistakes of judgment do not – 
just as the deliberative theory would lead us to expect. 
A person with the standing to propose joint decisions regarding other’s actions by means 
of propose-and-challenge will have the following kind of authority. Her proposals will bind the 
addressee’s actions by default, unless the addressee raises a legitimate challenge to them. Due to 
the kinds of situations in which we have reason to give someone authority, however, there will 
typically be a strong presumption against challenging her proposals unless necessary. And when 
the addressee does challenge a proposal, the speaker still has the last word: if she judges in good 
faith that the challenge is not decisive, she can reject it and bring her proposed joint decision into 
force. The speaker’s exercise of this power over their joint deliberation is constrained only by the 
norms of good faith, which require her to make only proposals that she believes to be warranted 
by the shared reasons, and retract her proposal if a challenge shows it to be unwarranted. 
I submit that this is the same kind of authority that comes with the power to command. 
Some people have certainly claimed more authority than this for themselves, asserting that their 
commands may never be challenged, or that they may exercise their authority arbitrarily, 
commanding whatever they wish for any reason they please. But I see no reason why we should 
recognize these claims as legitimate. Though it is useful to have contexts in which challenges to 
an authority are rare, to make an authority’s commands unchallengeable no matter what, even 
when the challenge is important, would give us little gain in coordination or efficiency at the 
steep cost of sometimes missing out on critical information (“enemy planes incoming!”). And 
while we may have reason to give some people broad domains of authority within which they can 
exercise wide discretion (e.g., a parent’s authority over her children), to release those people 
entirely from the requirements of good faith would be to erase the distinction between legitimate 
authority and brute domination. I conclude that the deliberative theory gives persons in positions 
of hierarchical authority as much authority as we reflectively judge they ought to have. 
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4.4. Comparison with Raz’s theory 
Joseph Raz’s theory of hierarchical authority (summarized in §1.2.1 of this chapter) has 
generated an enormous amount of commentary (for a review, see Ehrenberg 2011). Much of this 
literature has been critical, raising objections and counterexamples that, I believe, show the 
theory to be untenable as it is formulated. In spite of these criticisms, however, Raz’s theory 
remains in the foreground of the debate because it seems to many to contain deep insights about 
the nature of hierarchical authority. Here I will argue that the deliberative theory captures the 
truth in Raz’s theory while avoiding its problems. 
Recall that Raz’s theory is composed of three major theses: the normal justification thesis, 
the dependence thesis, and the preemption thesis. The deliberative theory vindicates partial 
versions of each of these theses. 
Begin with the preemption thesis, which states: “The fact that an authority requires 
performance of an action is a reason for its performance which is not to be added to all other 
relevant reasons when assessing what to do, but should exclude and take the place of some of 
them” (Raz 1986: 46). I think this thesis is partly false and partly true. It is false if we interpret it 
as describing the subject’s actual normative reasons. When the sergeant commands Johnson to 
do fifty push-ups, his other normative reasons to do push-ups (e.g., that push-ups make him 
stronger) do not disappear. More importantly, the reason provided by the sergeant’s command 
does not merely replace Johnson’s prior reasons to do fifty push-ups, leaving the total balance of 
reasons unchanged. If it did, then Johnson would have no more reason to do push-ups after the 
command is made than he had before. Clearly, the command creates a new reason for Johnson 
to do push-ups that is “added to all other relevant reasons” (46). 
The truth in the preemption thesis is that the addressee of a command should not think of 
the command as offering just another reason in favor of doing the action commanded. This is 
because the addressee of a legitimate command should not be weighing reasons for and against 
obeying the command at all. Instead, if the command is authoritative, the addressee should treat 
it as already decided that he will do the action commanded, and thus should not need to weigh 
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the reasons for and against doing it. As we have seen, the deliberative theory explains this 
preemptive effect of commands as resulting from the deliberation-closing force of joint decisions. 
The dependence thesis says: “All authoritative directives should be based on reasons 
which already independently apply to the subjects of the directives and are relevant to their 
action in the circumstances covered by the directive” (47). The deliberative theory vindicates this 
thesis without qualification. Commands, like any other proposals in joint deliberation, must be 
based upon the shared reasons of the speaker and addressee to be made in good faith. And, 
applying the UNANIMITY principle defended in Ch. 1 (§1.3 and §5.1), we can infer that any 
shared reason of the speaker and addressee must also be a reason within the addressee’s 
individual practical deliberation. So the deliberative theory entails that good faith commands 
must be based upon reasons that apply independently to their addressees.20 
The heart of Raz’s theory, and the target of the most criticism, is the normal justification 
thesis. The normal justification thesis claims that the “normal way to establish that a person has 
authority over another person” is to show that the subject of that authority would better comply 
with his own reasons for action by following the authority’s commands than he would by 
deciding what to do on his own (53). The deliberative theory mostly agrees: a large part of the 
justification for giving you the authority to propose enactive joint decisions regarding my actions 
by means of propose-and-challenge is that this will make me better able to act in accordance with 
my reasons – and in particular, the reasons I share with you. As we discussed in §4.2, different 
factors might make this the case: perhaps we simply need to decide quickly, perhaps we need to 
coordinate our actions, perhaps our actions need to be guided by a coherent vision, perhaps you 
are just a better judge of the reasons in this domain than I am. Any of these factors can 
contribute to the justification for giving someone hierarchical authority. 
We can see where the deliberative theory departs from the normal justification thesis by 
considering the objections that have been raised to it. First, some have complained that the 
                                                
20 As I pointed out in the previous section, this explains why commands lack authority when they are based on the 
personal whims of the person in authority rather than on the rightful priorities of her office. 
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normal justification thesis makes authority too fragile (e.g., Durning 2003: 603-604). It seems to 
predict that, when a subject of authority would better comply with her reasons by judging what 
to do for herself than by obeying the authority’s commands, the commands have no force. But 
this does not fit our practice. A sous chef is subject to the head chef’s authority even if, for a 
particular dish, he would make it better by following his own recipe than by following the head 
chef’s orders. The head chef does not lose her authority just when the sous chef happens to 
disagree with her – even if the sous chef is right. The reason why authority is not fragile in this 
way is because of the role of agreements in creating positions of authority. If we have agreed that 
the head chef is in charge of the kitchen, then this agreement obliges the sous chefs to obey her 
commands even when they would make better food on their own. Authority-granting agreements 
thus enable a person to have hierarchical authority even when, in a particular case, the normal 
justification criterion is not met. As we saw in the architect example, the benefits of giving one 
person assured control within a domain can outweigh the cost of sometimes having to obey a 
misguided command. 
The second major complaint about the normal justification thesis is that it seems to 
overgenerate, granting authority in too many cases (Hershovitz 2011; Darwall 2013a). There are 
many cases in which I would better comply with my reasons by obeying your direction than by 
deciding myself, and yet you intuitively have no authority to command me. Consider 
COOKING: Cora is trying to cook a traditional Chinese dish. She wants to make it as well 
as she can. As it happens, her roommate John is an expert on Chinese cuisine, while Cora 
knows little about it. Unbidden, John walks into the kitchen and starts issuing commands: 
“Turn up the heat! Add more red pepper!”21 
Darwall argues, and I agree, that John has no authority to tell Cora what to do in this case. And 
yet his commands clearly meet the criteria of the normal justification thesis: since Cora wants to 
prepare the dish as well as possible, and John knows far better than Cora how to do this, she will 
                                                
21 Though Darwall brought it to my attention (2013a: 147), this example is actually Raz’s own (1986: 64). 
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better comply with her reasons for action by following John’s commands than by deciding what 
to do herself. But this does not seem sufficient to give John authority over Cora. 
For similar reasons, the normal justification thesis also fails to accommodate the domain-
restrictedness of hierarchical authority. As I have said, the head chef can command her sous 
chefs in the restaurant kitchen, but she has no authority over them when they are cooking at 
home. Similarly, a professor can order her students to read The Republic while they are in her 
class, but after the semester ends, she has no say over what her students read. Authority can also 
be given or taken away by explicit acts. If the head chef is fired, then she immediately loses her 
authority to command the sous chefs. When your fellow soldier is promoted to a rank above you, 
she suddenly has an authority over you that she did not have before. 
If we think, as the normal justification thesis suggests, that the existence of authority 
depends primarily on a person’s being better placed to judge the relevant reasons for action, then 
these observations should be surprising. The head chef may be just as good at judging how her 
sous chefs ought to cook at home as she is at judging how they ought to cook in the restaurant – 
so why does she only have authority in the latter case? When your friend is promoted to sergeant, 
the mere fact that she has been given a new rank does not make her any better at judging what 
you ought to do – so why does she now have authority over you? 
Again, the deliberative theory explains these judgments by appeal to the mediating role of 
explicit agreements in grounding institutional positions of authority. The head chef’s authority 
over her sous chefs is based in an agreement to the effect that she can command the sous chefs 
while they are in the restaurant. This agreement specifies a particular domain for the head chef’s 
authority that, thankfully, does not extend to the sous chefs’ home kitchens. And when the head 
chef is fired, the agreement is thereby retracted, and thus no longer grants her the authority it 
once did. Generally, the deliberative theory predicts that role-based authority (a) will be restricted 
to the domain covered by the authority-granting agreement, and (b) can be explicitly granted or 
revoked by means of making or retracting this agreement. These predictions seem to fit the facts. 
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 What about COOKING? This example illustrates just how much it takes to justify enactive 
uses of propose-and-challenge over others’ actions. Yes, Cora will cook better if she obeys John’s 
commands. But Cora also has a strong interest in having control over her own actions. The 
prospect of higher-quality cooking is not enough to outweigh the cost to Cora of accepting the 
unbalanced power dynamic involved in giving authority to John. Plus, while John knows more 
than Cora about what to do, the other factors that justify uses of propose-and-challenge are not 
present. There is not the urgency and need for decisiveness that justifies Anna’s authority in 
EARTHQUAKE; there is not the need for a unified vision that justifies the architect’s authority over 
the skyscraper. Thus there is little reason why John should assist Cora by making commands rather 
than, say, giving her advice or offering his help. If the situation were different – if, say, instead of 
cooking Chinese, Cora was defusing a bomb that was about to detonate – then John might come 
to have the authority to give her orders. (This would be the ad hoc kind of authority we saw in 
EARTHQUAKE). But the fact that John knows better than Cora what she should do is not 
sufficient on its own to give him authority over her. 
 I conclude that the deliberative theory better fits our judgments about the extension of 
hierarchical authority than Raz’s account, while retaining the motivating insights that have 
rightfully earned Raz’s theory a central place in the literature. 
 
5. The redundancy argument redux 
At the end of Chapter 2, I raised a challenge for alternatives to the deliberative theory of 
promises. Our theory of joint practical deliberation predicts that a certain kind of proposal in this 
activity will have all the characteristic features of promises. Thus the opponent of the deliberative 
theory faces a dilemma: she must either accept the deliberative theory’s claim that promises are 
identical to these deliberative proposals, or accept that promises are redundant. The latter option 
is deeply unattractive, I argued; so they should opt for the former. We are now in a position to 
apply the same argument to demands and commands. 
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One of the categories of deliberative proposal generated by our theory of joint practical 
deliberation is a proposal to make a joint decision regarding the addressee’s actions by means of 
the propose-and-challenge method. We can make a further distinction within this category 
between proposals to make commissive joint decisions and proposals to make enactive joint 
decisions. When we take a careful look at these speech acts’ properties, I have argued, we will 
find that they are identical to the properties of demands and commands, respectively. 
These two kinds of deliberative proposal share the features that demands and commands 
have in common. By proposing a joint decision, both purport to close the addressee’s 
deliberation in a way that advice and threats do not (§1.1). Because they employ the propose-
and-challenge method, they do not require the addressee’s explicit acceptance to come into force, 
instead requiring only recognition and the absence of successful challenges. 
Distinguishing between commissive and enactive proposals generates two speech act 
categories that differ in the same ways as demands and commands. Commissive proposals put 
forward joint decisions that the addressee is already required by the shared reasons to perform. 
Thus, like demands, these proposals hold their addressees accountable to reasons they already 
have. Moreover, by looking at what it takes for our shared reasons to require an action, we can 
predict when others will have the standing to propose commissive joint decisions about our 
actions by means of propose-and-challenge (§3.1). When we compare these predictions to our 
judgments about when others have standing to make demands, the two appear to match (§3.2). 
No one has standing to propose in this way that I floss, because my reasons to floss are not shared 
to any significant extent with others; everyone has standing to propose in this way that I not 
dump poison in the ocean, because my reasons not to do so are shared by all persons. 
Thus, by proposing a commissive joint decision regarding someone else’s actions by 
means of the propose-and-challenge method, we can hold them accountable in the same way, 
under the same conditions, as we do by making a demand. The best explanation of this 
observation seems to be that demands are identical to this commissive kind of deliberative 
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proposal. If the two are distinct, then demands are redundant: everything we do with demands, 
we could do with proposals in joint practical deliberation instead. 
Our second category is a proposal to make an enactive joint decision regarding the 
addressee’s actions by means of the propose-and-challenge method. Enactive joint decisions 
decide between shared options that were previously on a par, choosing one to be performed at 
the exclusion of the others. By bringing an enactive joint decision into force, this second kind of 
proposal creates a new obligation that has the same normative upshots as the obligation created 
by a command (§4.1). Since these proposals give the speaker an asymmetrical power to impose 
her will on the addressees’ actions, they need strong justification to be used appropriately. The 
conditions under which such proposals are appropriate are tellingly similar to the conditions 
under which commands are appropriate (§4.2). In situations like EARTHQUAKE, where a group of 
people needs to coordinate their actions in a quick, efficient, and decisive manner, we have 
reason to give one person the ability to propose enactive joint decisions using propose-and-
challenge – in just the same way as we have reason to give someone the authority to make 
commands. In other situations, as when we are building a skyscraper, running a restaurant, or 
forming an army, we might want to explicitly agree to give someone this asymmetrical 
deliberative power on a more permanent basis, so they can shape our joint undertaking under a 
coherent plan. These agreements granting someone a right to make enactive propose-and-
challenge proposals within a certain domain are similar in both their rationale and effect to the 
agreements by which we create institutional roles of hierarchical authority. 
Thus, by proposing an enactive joint decision regarding someone else’s actions by means 
of the propose-and-challenge method, we can put them under a new obligation in the same way, 
under the same conditions, as we do by giving a command. The best explanation of this 
observation seems to be that commands are identical to this enactive kind of deliberative 
proposal. If the two are distinct, then commands are redundant: everything we do with 
commands, we could do with proposals in joint practical deliberation instead. 
 170 
If our opponent decides to bite the bullet and accept that commands and demands are 
redundant, she faces the same awkward questions we noted in Chapter 2. If commands and 
demands are redundant, then why do we have them at all? Why do we use commands to 
coordinate action, when proposing enactive joint decisions using propose-and-challenge would 
do the job just as well? Why do we use demands to hold one another accountable, when 
proposing commissive joint decisions by propose-and-challenge would have the same effect? How 
have these two categories of deliberative proposal, both with significant social and moral effects, 
escaped the notice of both folk observation and philosophical inquiry? And finally, if commands 
and demands are distinct from these two kinds of deliberative proposal, then why do they have 
the same properties? Is it yet another remarkable coincidence? 
When we accept the deliberative theory, these perplexing mysteries disappear. Demands 
and commands are so similar to proposals in joint practical deliberation because they are 
proposals in joint practical deliberation. There is no coincidence or similarity to be explained: we 
have simply discovered an identity. 
Once we accept this identity, we gain the full explanatory resources of the deliberative 
theory. We can now explain why others cannot demand that I floss by noting that our shared 
reasons do not give me decisive reason to do so. We can explain why Anna has the authority to 
command in EARTHQUAKE, while John has no such authority in COOKING, by appeal to the 
costs and benefits of the propose-and-challenge method. And so on. As we draw our map of joint 
practical deliberation, we discover a natural place for demands and commands. When we locate 
demands and commands on this map, they begin to make more sense: we can better see why we 
make these speech acts, why they have the effects we take them to have, and what it takes to 
employ them legitimately. This gives us good reason to think that the map is right. 
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Conclusion 
Three Cheers for the Deliberative Theory 
 
The deliberative theory of promises, offers, agreements, requests, demands, and 
commands claims that each of these speech acts is a move in joint practical deliberation, the 
activity of deciding together what to do. These speech acts map on to the different possible moves 
in joint deliberation as represented in the following table: 
 
 
Propose-
and-
challenge 
Propose-
and-ratify 
“I will φ” Promises Offers 
“You will φ” Commands & Demands Requests 
“We will φ” Agreements 
 
In this dissertation, I have offered three general reasons for thinking that these analyses are true. 
The first reason I called the redundancy argument (Ch. 2, §5; Ch. 4, §5). When we look at the 
speech acts we would need to engage in joint practical deliberation, we find that they match up 
exactly with various speech acts we recognize in ordinary language. Applying our theory of joint 
deliberation, we can predict that these deliberative proposals will have properties that exactly 
match those of their ordinary language twins. A proposal to make a joint decision regarding one’s 
own actions by means of the propose-and-challenge method has the same normative effects and 
validity conditions as a promise. The properties of proposals to make joint decisions regarding an 
addressee’s actions by means of propose-and-ratify exactly align with the intuitive properties of 
requests. A proposal to make an enactive joint decision concerning the addressee’s actions by the 
propose-and-challenge method is indistinguishable from a command. And so on. 
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If my arguments for these claims have been sound, then it is hard to justify denying that 
these deliberative proposals are identical to the ordinary speech acts with which they correspond. 
Doing so would commit you to thinking that all of these ordinary speech acts are redundant. 
Everything we accomplish using demands, offers, promises, and so on, we could do instead by 
making proposals in joint practical deliberation. Thus the opponent of the deliberative theory 
faces some stubborn puzzles. Why do we have these speech acts, if proposals in joint deliberation 
would work just as well? Why are these speech acts all so similar to acts within joint deliberation? 
Why are requests, for example, so similar to proposals to make joint decisions about others’ 
actions by the propose-and-ratify method? And why do we not have ordinary language words for 
any of the deliberative proposals in this set? How could all these admissible ways of deciding 
together have escaped our notice entirely? These problems have a clear solution: accept that our 
ordinary speech acts are identical to their corresponding proposals in joint deliberation. There 
are not two sets of speech acts here, but one. 
The second major reason for accepting the deliberative theory I called the unity argument 
(Ch. 3, §4). This argument points to the similarities between our ordinary speech acts as also in 
need of explanation. Promises, offers, agreements, requests, demands and commands all bring 
obligations into force that share a telling number of features. Each of these acts is invalidated by 
coercion and deception between the speaker and addressee. All of these acts generate directed 
obligations that hold between the speaker and addressee in particular. These acts all have 
exclusionary effects on deliberation, closing the question of whether a certain action will be done 
and making it inappropriate for the agent to reopen that question in later deliberation. These 
shared patterns between apparently disparate phenomena call out for explanation. 
The deliberative theory explains our speech acts’ common features readily. These speech 
acts all have the same primary effect: to bring a joint decision into force between the speaker and 
her addressee(s). We can thus explain their similar normative upshots by appeal to the normative 
upshots of making a joint decision, and their similar validity conditions by appeal to the norms of 
deliberative good faith. 
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Our opponent has a more difficult time explaining the similarities between these speech 
acts. Again and again, we have seen efforts to explain these similarities by reducing one speech 
act to another fail. Offers, agreements, and requests cannot be adequately understood as special 
cases of promises. Commands cannot be reduced to demands; nor can demands be reduced to 
commands. The failure of these reductive views leaves the opponent of the deliberative theory 
with few resources with which to explain the unity of our target speech acts. Again, the solution 
seems clear: these speech acts are unified by the fact that they are all moves in joint deliberation. 
While I find these two arguments compelling, I must admit that I was already convinced 
of the deliberative theory before I formulated either the redundancy or unity arguments. What 
sold me on the deliberative theory was not some devastating objection to its opponents. Instead, I 
became convinced of the deliberative theory when I saw how, again and again, it helped me 
come to understand otherwise puzzling features of its analysanda. 
This is the third and most important reason why the deliberative theory deserves our 
acceptance: its explanatory power. From the minimal constraints on which we based our account 
of joint practical deliberation, we can derive a theory that captures and explains the shape and 
significance of our ordinary practices of promising, offering, agreeing, requesting, demanding 
and commanding. We can explain why illegitimate threats nullify promises, while legitimate 
threats do not, by thinking about what is required to deliberate in good faith. We can capture the 
painful awkwardness of turning down a request without a good excuse by thinking about what 
rejecting a deliberative proposal implies about your beliefs. We can explain why my partner can 
demand things of me that my neighbor cannot by reflecting on what reasons we share within our 
different deliberative perspectives. We can understand when and why some people are given the 
authority to command others by thinking about the costs and benefits of using the propose-and-
challenge method. These and the many other explanations the deliberative theory has generated 
along the way constitute the strongest case for its truth. 
Once we start thinking of these speech acts as proposals in joint practical deliberation, 
they no longer seem like mysterious acts of changing the moral law by declaration. They become 
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predictable parts of our daily activity of figuring out how to live together. Under the light of the 
deliberative theory, promises, offers, agreements, requests, demands, and commands start to 
make sense. We can locate them in the world we live in. They lose their magic, becoming 
expected, obvious, even mundane. 
Isn’t that what theories are supposed to do? 
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